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Foreword
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was a
landmark eventfor those who agree with its deliberations and conclusions and those
who do not acknowledge it
as a significant development for several spheres of human action. Its success or failure,
therefore, need not be judged narrowly in terms of success or failure of the Conference
itself, but in terms of the processes that it signifies and that it may have set in motion
as a result. UNCED, of course, has raised more questions than provided answers, as
might have been anticipated. Most of the concerns and questions that have been raised
are generally global in nature and others are purely regional or local. But, of course, if
the future health of the planet depends on forging effective partnerships, then the
identification and articulation of concerns on environment and development should
rightly be much wider than those that are relevant to specific sites or countries.
The 'Post-UNCED Seminar on Environment and Development Policy Issues in
Asia' was designed and organised in Delhi in this very spirit. It was felt that since the
future of the planet lies in the success of the partnerships mentioned above, it would be
relevant to focus on the Asian region as a whole and assess the implications of UNCED
for Asia, both in terms of opportunities and responsibilities. The Asian continent is a
unique combination of diverse cultures, economic capabilities and production systems.
On the one hand, Asia contains a highly efficient and modern industrial state such as
Japan, and on the other, it is home to large numbers of people living in the worst state
of poverty and deprivation. Concepts of international cooperation cannot find a more
interesting region for application and implementation than Asia. But to bring about
cooperation both within the region and in relation to the rest of the world, it was felt
that researchers, policymakers and thinkers in the Asian region should meet and analyse
the deliberations held at UNCED and the documents that were produced at the
Conference. Consequently, the Seminar itself was organised around a set of selected
themes on which detailed papers based on adequate indepth analysis were presented and
discussed.
The Seminar organisers were fortunate to get the views and wisdom of select
eminent persons during the Inaugural and Valedictory Sessions, namely, the Hon'ble
Shri K C Pant, Chairman, Tenth Finance Commission; Mr R S Pathak, Former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of India; Hon'ble Dr Manmohan Singh, Finance Minister;
and Hon'ble Shri Kamal Nath, Minister of State for Environment and Forests. The
former two distinguished persons addressed the Inaugural Session and the latter two,
the Valedictory Session, during which the summary of discussions and deliberations in
the Seminar were also presented for their consideration.
The deliberations of the Seminar were distilled in the form of concise reports by
three working Groups, each of which dealt with (i) Implications of the Rio agreements
and the future path of negotiations on protocols and institutions; (ii) Formulation of
national/regional strategies in pursuance of the Rio agreements including Agenda 21;
and (iii) Scope for regional cooperation and capacity building for sustainable
development. In addition, the Seminar also saw the finalization and release of a
Compact on Sustainable Development Concerns in the Asian Region which has
subsequently iteen signed by a select group of distinguished persons in the Asian
region, for release to the rest of the world, embodying the spirit in which environment
and development actions and decisions will have to be pursued in the future.
Vill
Given the complexities of the subjects covered by UNCED, papers presented
covered Agenda 21, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on
Biodiversity and various legal and administrative issues related to global environmental
problems and their solutions. The Seminar was perhaps the first event held in Asia to
focus on the post-UNCED global scenario and develop an Asian perspective. The
following pages contain much useful material which, it is hoped, would add to the
growing wealth of literature in an area of some consequence to humanity. It is also
hoped that the publication of this volume would also support the larger objectives of
fostering cooperation among countries in the field of environment and development, in
the absence of which solutions would fall far short of what is essential to preserve the
health of this planet and for human civilisation to progress.
New Delhi (Ri,.Pa*thauri)
April 1993
Preface
It is possible that future historians may view the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) held at Rio de Janiero in June 1992 as the
end of the beginning of a long global swing to sustainable development. In other words,
that at Rio the world community finally garnered the political courage to alter the
course of growth to avoid potential future catastrophe, though not as yet, to restitute the
environmental damage already accomplished. Such a view would strike a balance
between the two opposite poles of opinion of observers who are still close to the event:
that Rio was an unmitigated disaster, an environmental Dunkirk in which countries
collectively made no firm commitment to eschew unsustainable activities and growth
paths. Alternatively, that it was a spectacular success, a Normandy beachhead in the
war to secure the environment, enabling the world to put in place a long-term
cooperative agenda for global action.
Rio was about 'sustainable development'. However, neither the Rio Agreements
themselves, nor the myriad workshops, seminars and negotiating sessions which
preceded it attempted anything like a formal, comprehensive definition. While there is
broad agreement on the core of the notion of sustainable development, summed up by
the Brundtland Commission (1987) as development that 'meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs',
several conceptual elements radiate outwards from this focus. These have been the
subject of intense debate in the entire UNCED process: intellectual, ethical, legal, and
political. In this debate the Rio Agreements, i.e., the Rio Declaration, the Conventions,
on Climate Change and Biodiversity, Agenda 21, and the Forestry Principles Statement,
settle some issues, but immediately raise new ones. Three pillars of the post-Rio order,
are however, now firmly in place. First, that sustainable development is about the rapid
elimination of the dire poverty in which billions of people in developing countries
remain mired, despite political independence, and considerable development efforts.
Second, that it concerns the welfare possibilities of future generations, and that
resources, i.e., natural endowments as well as capital and technology, must be
bequeathed to them in sufficient measure. Third, that while all countries have
responsibilities towards the global environment, the industrialized countries must take
the lead in committing financial and technology resources, both on account of their
greater historical and current levels of use of global environmental resources, as well as
their greater present capabilities, acquired in part, from use of environmental resources.
After Rio, the debate has not ebbed. What are the appropriate principles for
sharing global resources across countries and generations? What are the feasible policy
instruments for giving effect to such principles? What are the bases for financial and
technology transfers to developing countries to enable them to contribute to conserving
the global environment? What are the appropriate institutional structures for channelling
such transfers? What are the likely economic and social costs to different countries in
meeting their respective commitments?' What is a likely menu of response strategies in
a meaningful policy planning time horizon? Indeed, what is an 'appropriate time
horizon' for global policy making? Issues such as these, and others, continue to demand
time, energy and attention from researchers, policyniakers, and serious activists.
The present volume brings together the perspectives on this debate of a number
of international, professionals: researchers and policymakers, many of whom were
personally involved in the UNCED process, as well as their consensus on several broad
xcourses of action. These were formulated and presented shortly after Rio, in the 'Post-
UNCED Seminar on Environment and Development Policy Issues In Asia', organized
in October 1992 at New Delhi. The seminar being focused on Asia, the deliberations,
reflected in this volume, largely articulate the concerns of developing and newly
industrializing economies.
The papers in this volume cover a wide ground: issues of political economy,
institutional design, response strategies, means of financial and technology transfers,
economic implications, besides critiques of the major Rio Agreements. It also
incorporates the perceptions of the senior political leadership in India on the global
environmental debate, contained in several speeches made at the inaugural and
valedictory functions of the seminar. The contents, it is hoped, will stimulate further
thought and work by readers with a serious interest in the global environment.
(Prodipto Ghosh) (Akshay Jaitly)
New Delhi
April 1993
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Compact oi sustainafik development concerns in the Jsian 1qürn
(October 1992)
We, the undersigneil intiividTuth from titfferent countries ofsia, having stucuieti the
outcome of the Z10EfD process, awl being tieeply interesteti in aiul concerneti about
the prospects for equitable andT sustainabk tievelopment, place the following for the
serious consitleration of fellow sians anti citizens of the worlil
We reaffirm the tight of all nations anti peoples to dTevelopment, both in
terms of the tight to freely clet-ermine their economic, social; political anti cultural
priorities anti in terms of their right to the sustaituthle use of their natural anti other
resources.
7Jie process of sustainable tievelopment shoultl tafe into account the neetic of
present aiuifuture generations anti the d?sparities between nations. ç(obal resources
must be fairly shareti between nations, anti conservetifor future generations, without
neglect of history.
International environmental policy anti dTecision making neeuIc to be
tiemocratiz4 with all involveil international organizations ifecoming open,
transparent anti tienwcratic fiotiies. 'The restructuring of these organizations sIwuldT be
baseti on the principle of the sovereign equality of nations,
hie rights of intiigenous communities over the resources that they have
husbantieti over generations anti on which they have been tradTitionally tiepenulent
must be recognizeti by the worlil community anti their role in furthering sustainable
tievelopment must be acknowletigeti anti encourageti. '2his is particularly important in
the contet of the conserj'ation anti utilization of biologica[&versity.
We call upon the international community to invest the requisite resources
anti commitment into the tievelopment anti adoption of innovative international
instruments to monitor anti regulate the global environment, which at the same time,
are capable of embotiying equity concerns antifinancial transfers.
Climate c1uuge Convention
We urge nations to consitier on an urgent footing measures for atiaptation to
impacts of climate change. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable anti will
neeti signfleant transfers of resources, tecllnologq, anti capacity in ortier to formulate
anti implement necessanj response strategies.
We urge nations to consitier, without unnecessary tielay, the development of
protocols relating to various substantive issues in the Convention, including but not
limiteti to: targets for emissions reductions by tievelopeti countries, the method of
tietermination of "agreetifull incremental costs', the mechanisms for the transfer anti
tievelopment of the necessary technology, anti institutional arrangements for
implementation, monitoring anti enforcement of the Convention anti !Protocols.
We are particularly concerneti about the present lack., of specfic anti
appropriate emissions re4iiction paths for the developed countries. fzese slioutul be
Iasei on ii firoadTly agreed equity tietermination that takLes into account historical
emissions.
xiv
54ppropriate measures siwuld be taIen to protect the interests of..4suin,
especiall developing countiiés which tire producers offossilfuels, aiulproulucts
dpendTent on own resources of such JIieLc.
We note that the WC!E) process has recognized the polluter ptujs' principk
and we urge its adoption through an appropriate protocol; emp toying fTerjfile
inter,uitional instruments capable of em6oc1ying equity concerns and associated
resource transfers.
Developing countries have a responsibility for adopting abatement strategies
in the fitture.
fBio(ogicat &versity ConventiLrn
Aequate safeguards are required to ensure that the terms of access to genetic
materials are fair to the country of origin of the resources. 7here is also a need to
harmonize exjsting intellectual property rig/Its regimes in all countries wit/I the spirit
of the provisions of the Convention that relate to the granting of access to genetic
material and transfer of the resulting technology. '2/us will considerably strengthen
incentives for all countries to conserve fliodiversity. 'flIe fill incremental costs of
tiouiversity conservation must be reckoned to include credible opportunity costs.
'2lIe governments of the region should consider the formation of asian gene
Banks andthe utilization of biodiversity for the benefit and well being of their
people and humanity at large, with the rights of the contributing countries over their
contributions clearry defined. 2lIis wouldfaciht-ate capacity bui&1?ng and cooperation
in the region.
!Popu[ation
'Ihere is a need to focus on population issues that may adversely impact environment
and development L'ut this sIould not be the exclusive focus. 'Unsustainable patterns
of production and consumption, including those that are emerging, also need to be
adTdressed without delay in this contej.
Steps need to be taken to promote appropriate demographic policies üi all
countries with a focus on building human capitalfor sustainable development.
5-luman beings have tile right to primary health care, maternal and infant care,
education, lot/I primanj and vocational or technical; a secure means of liveli1iood
clean air and water, and adequate sanitation. i4sian countries must accord priority to
these goals, and cooperate, in particular in capacity building for this endeavour.
I7vleasures specfica(ly addressing population issues need to be sensitive to local
culture and value systems.
¶Eneigy
We recognize that energy production and use in the whole region, especially in
developing countriesi will increase in the foreseeable future, in the course of their
pursuit of sustainable development.
We recognize that several strategies may be devised with respect to energy
which wilt bring global environmental benefits, as well as leatito substantial
economic savings. governments in the region are encouraged to follow this approach.
s part of such strategies, we encourage, in particular, the following:
Increaseti utilization of naturalgas.
'Ihe increasedr use of economic renewable energy technologies sue/I as solar,
wind; biomass, geothermal; anti hyd4 making certain that any ativerse
environmental impacts aiuí &splacement of persons is minimizeti
9'[ote must be talen of the requirements of countries in the region that are
tiepentient onfossilfueli. In particular, their future growth paths of energy
prodTuction anti use woulti neeti to use fossilfuels with greatly enuianceti efficiency,
anti tievelTopeti countries both within the region anti outsitie can facilitate this
transition through mutually beneficial cooperation.
Jurther, energy planning anti fiolicy makfrig within countries must fully
integrate sustainabilitij, economic efficiency, anti equity concerns.
54gri.cu[ture
grkulture anti liveli:lwotis baseti on lantiprovitie sustenance anti basic human neetis
to the majority of people in asia. We note that the '7J9vCTJl) process has not paiti
sufficient attention to this fact. 'The crucial resources on which such activities are
based soil; water antiforest cover, must as a priority be conserveti anti regenerateti
on a planned; scientific basis, 'The sustainable tievelopment of agriculture inc[u&ng
by use of motiern biotechnology is crucial 011is enileavour provities significant
opportunities for cooperation among countries of the region.
Environment-econonuj ftnkjges
'The interiurtional community siwulti consitier innovations to tieal with foreign aiti
anti tiefit repayments in the context of past antifuture utilization ofglobal
environmental resources.
'The meaning of 'open anti supportive economic system' siwulti not tiilute the
content of sovereignty anti concerns of self reliance of tieveloping countries in i4sia
anti elsewhere.
'The worli is likçly to move to an era offreer tradTe. It must be ensureti that
traile liberalization measures enhance sustainaflility anti resource conservation.
J4genda 21
S4gentia 21 tietails a rich anti potentially fruitfulfie/Ilfor international cooperation
in sustainable tievelopment.
sian countries, both tieve[óping anti levelopeil, between them possess vast
reservoirs of skills, nowletige, Iqww-Ftow, anti organizational capability. 'Ills
provities an important basis for cooperation within the region anti outsitie. Sue/I
cooperation slioulti be pursueti on bilateral anti multilateral basis, as well as through
international organizations.
We are convineeti that the conservation of the environment anti tieveIopment
go hanti in hanti. We believe that Science anti Technology form an essential
component of the search for feasible pathways towartis sustainable tieveloptnent.
asian countries may, for a start, perhaps through appropriate regional
organizations, untiertaIe a dtaileti inventory of their collective resources for capacity
xv
xvi
building for sustainable uievelopment. In this compilation, both governmental antI
non-governmental or,qanizations ned to be involveti
We affirm tAzt capacity building anti human resource development is at the
heart of any plan to implement ..4genda 21. 'The training of young professionaLc to
handle the environmental problems is therefore an essentialyart ofgenta 21. 1hLc
specfie training for sustainable development has to be problem oriented gvlany
pro6lems of tie asian region are common.
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF WORKING GROUP I
Implications of the Rio Agreements and the future
path of negotiations on protocols and institutions
Chairperson: Fasih Uddin Mahtab
Rapporteurs: Maithili Iyer and Akshay Jaitly
Pre-conditions to further negotiations on global environment
There is a marked asymmetry between industrialized and developing countries in their
respective capacities for formulating informed and cogent positions during the
negotiating process. This asymmetry in capacity may have influenced the outcomes of
the negotiations leading to the Rio agreements. The agreements themselves were
negotiated in a relatively short period of time with the explicit objective of adoption at
the UNCED in June 1992. This period was too short for building up institutional
capacities in the several disciplines which are germane to formulating negotiating
positions.
Domestic capacity needs to be built in the relevant policy studies, scientific
disciplines and institutions, as well as in skills of public policy analysis and policy
making, The process of such capacity building must commence expeditiously and
involve the greatest measure of international cooperation between industrialised and
developing countries on the one hand, and developing countries themselves on the
other. The future course of negotiations must allow for this process to get sufficiently
under way.
The initiative for such capacity building must emanate from developing
countries themselves, both individually as well as through their groupings, which may
be regional. The scope for cooperation between developing countries in this respect
should not be underestimated. Cooperation in such capacity building should also rely on
professional and scientific networks and associations in developing countries as well as
industrialised countries, besides intergovernmental organizations. It is essential for the
International Panel on Climate Change and the Commission on Sustainable
Development to initiate specific actions for capacity building in developing countries on
global environmental issues, and to ensure the utilization of these capacities in their
deliberations, as also at the institutional level. The role and potential of NGOs,
including several NGOs in the North with outstanding records, for assistance in both
capacity building and support to negotiations is considered to be of key importance.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change
General issues
The first priority, before any serious negotiations on future protocols or other
arrangements can take place, is for countries to ratify the Convention itself
without unnecessary delays.
Strategies for mitigation and adaptation to climate change cannot be isolated
from issues of poverty alleviation and from ethical issues of conspicuous
consumption and excessive resoUrce use by the developed countries.
2Capacity building
Reporting requirements under the Convention will be greatly enhanced by the
development of scientific and institutional capabilities for independent
assessments in developing countries themselves. This would also reflect national
concerns on accuracy and appropriate consideration of scientific uncertainties in
GHGs sources and sinks.
Domestic know how is also essential to identify possible options to lower
anthropogenic GHGs increases, including institutional and policy measures.
Active collaboration with individual independent, scientific institutions in
developed countries should be promoted.
Differentiation should be made between different sources of emissions. One
such distinction could be between 'energy' and 'subsistence' emissions of
GHGs. Such differentiation should further consider the controllability of
different sources of GHGs.
Negotiations should also consider persistent scientific uncertainties especially
with respect to GHGs sinks. Collaborative research, both within the region and
with institutions in the developed world should be considered for this purpose.
Equity
There is an urgent need, prior to the start of the negotiations, to formulate and analyze
in detail various equity principles and formulations for sharing the global commons and
for burden sharing, with reference to GHGs mitigation and adaptation costs.
GHG mitigation
The international community will have to consider measures relating to
compensation for domestic steps involving high costs taken to mitigate global
environmental problems.
Financial resources are required for mitigation projects with high initial capital
investments, to ensure their economic viability under desirable social discount
rates.
There must be an emphasis from developing countries not to agree on absolute
emissions targets but rather on dynamic ones, for example, those relating to
energy efficiency improvements.
With their current structures, financial mechanisms such as the Global
Environmental Facility are not equipped to institute decentralised decision
making to put into place measures for energy efficiency, technology
development and other actions, which may require decisions by a large number
of individual actors.
Adaptation strategies
Special steps should also be initiated for global assessment of the problems
relating to measures of adaptation to climate change. Such analysis should focus
in particular on the agricultural sector and the protection of low lying coastal
areas.
3The Biodiversity Convention
The protection of biodiversity is of particular importance to ensure meeting basic
needs. This is of special importance for improving agriculture and increasing its
resilience to adverse impacts, including those of climate change.
Capacity building is important for developing countries to determine the value of
potential biological resources and, further, for making use of these resources to
meet their development needs.
To overcome the lack of information that exists relating to the extent and value of
genetic resources, it is necessary to develop biodiversity inventories, preferably on
a cooperative and regional basis.
Capacity building is also necessary with respect to the development of
biotechnology, especially that which relates to agriculture and food production.
Institutional development and evaluation and monitoring of biological resources
within developing countries is also essential; this will require additional capacity
building measures.
Attention needs to be paid to developing adaptation strategies to deal with the loss
of biological diversity. Again, agriculture is a priority area. Technology transfer,
particularly in the area of biotechnology, has to encompass comprehensive
adaptation policies which address the issues of adaptation, modification and
indigenous development of these technologies and techniques.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF WORKING GROUP II
Formulation of national/regional strategies in pursuance
of the Rio Agreements including Agenda 21
Chairperson: Ikthiyar Omar
Rapporteurs: Neha Khanna and Anna Roy
Background
As is well known, different countries in this region are in widely varying situations.
Diverse geographical features. There are countries such as the Maldives Islands
that face immediate dangers from the impacts of Climate Change such as sea-
level rise, and others like Bhutan with fragile mountain ecosystems.
Technological development
They are at different stages of technological development, especially in terms of
the endogenous capacity base.
Resources utilisation
Although most of the countries in this region are fossil fuel based with a large
share of biomass, there are substantial differences in the resource utiisation.
Economic growth and development
Last, but not the least, they are at different stages of economic growth and
development.
Thus, while the national strategies of these countries would be built around the
underlying theme of sustainable development in the light of the UNCED process, they
are likely to differ substantially. It is however possible to identify important common
elements that would be central to the strategies of the countries in the region.
Basic elements of a national strategy
Increased utilisation efficiency of the different energy resources both in industry
and power sectors.
Switch to alternative and new energy sources such as solar, hydro and wind as
appropriate.
Increased carbon sequestration through afforestation.
Efficient waste management including recycling of waste. Special attention to
management of hazardous wastes will be essential.
Controlling and stabilizing population growth rates through immediate measures
and sustained growth policies is another crucial element in the national
strategies of the countries of the region.
The countries face a huge population pressure on their resource base (perhaps
the only exception in this regard in South Asia is Bhutan).
Creation of strong endogenous environmental technologies.
Policy issues
These basic elements will have to be fully complemented and supported by a number of
other measures, primarily in the policy arena, to provide the necessary incentives to the
concerned economic agents. Some of these measures are listed below:
5As a first step, countries will need to introduce effective legislation for the
protection and enhancement of the environment. In countries where such
legislation already exists, there is a need to redefine it and make it more
comprehensive and supportive of resource conservation as well as development.
Monitoring is also an important aspect in this connection.
Resources balance sheets, as dynamic assessments of stocks, flows and
potentials for key resources should be constructed to serve as bases for both
environment and development management.
BIA (Environmental Imp act Assessments) should be made a preliminary
requirement. At the same time they must become development sensitive and
more integrated with economic (social) cost-benefit analysis. Comprehensive
Environmental Auditing, especially in the industrial sector, should be carried out
in each country. In many countries, it is possible that the requisite knowledge
with respect to these is not available. Thus steps should be taken to build up the
knowledge base in these countries.
Appropriate policies to facilitate technology transfer are required -- both in the
domestic economy and in the international arena. These should include extensive
screening of all available, technology at the international level so as to weed out
the inappropriate technologies. In this respect, special mention should be made
about the steps taken by various government bodies to ensure that 'dirty
technologies' are not imported. In the same vein, appropriate steps are required
to encourage increased research and development in the adaptation and adoption
of new technologies to the recipient economies.
Extensive research is also required in identifying the areas in which traditional
and indigenous technology could be applied, most of which may not be known
to the West. The use of these technologies should be encouraged, so as to
complement others that may be in place.
National strategies should also give due attention to environmental education at
all levels.
Research institutions both in government and non-governmental sectors need to
be encouraged so as to provide adequate research backing to governments. A
continuous feedback from these research projects should be institutionalized so
as to facilitate policy making at the national level.
Local environmental organisations will need to be strengthened to maintain
pressure on governments to incorporate environmental considerations in
development programmes.
Carbon sequestration through afforestation should be a major element in national
strategies. In this regard, both social and compensatory forestry programmes
should be encouraged. However, to make this policy effective, appropriate forest
management programmes will be required.
An important element needed in the formulation and implementation of national
strategy is political will.
These different common elements of national strategies, together with others
which are specific to each country, need to be combined into the national
Agenda 21 action plans.
6Initiatives taken
Some countries have begun to take the first few steps in this direction. For example, in
Bhutan, sustainable development seems to be the core element in the overall
development process. It is noteworthy that about 60% of the land area of Bhutan is
under forest cover and 20% (of the total land area) is declared as protected area. A
strict family planning programme has succeeded in restricting the population o only
600,000 in a total area of 47,000 sq. km. Recently BTF (Bhutan Trust Fund) was setup
with the total funding of 12 million dollars (of which 10 million dollars was provided
by the Global Environmental Facility of the World Bank), to facilitate environmental
conservation.
In Thailand, the Government has been laying increased emphasis on the
incorporation of environmental considerations in development planning. Recently, the
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment was restructured with the mandate
of policy planning with respect to environmental considerations and control of toxic
wastes.
In the Maldives, the biggest environmental threat is from sea-level rise. Some
policies were formulated in anticipation of Rio, which are currently being strengthened.
For example, recently a policy of licensing for coral mining was introduced so as to
decrease the pressure on coral reefs, which form a natural barrier against sea-level rise.
In the 202 inhabited islands of Maldives, all communications are based on solar power.
These national strategies could be facilitated by increased South-South
cooperation. Existing regional cooperation organisations should be supported. However,
to make these organisations more effective, the mandate should be clear and made more
specific.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF WORKING GROUP III
Scope for regional cooperation and capacity building for
sustainable development
Chairperson: Saswinadi Sasmojo
Rapporteurs: Ma/a Damodoran and Sanjay Mohanty
Questions addressed by the Working Group
How has regional cooperation taken place in the past, and what are factors
which could help improve regional cooperation in achieving development
options that are more sustainable in the Asian region?
What are the important areas for regional cooperation to achieve sustainable
development?
What are the possible avenues to promote regional cooperation for promoting
sustainable development?
Regional cooperation
The Working Group observed that there are several institutions/organisations in the
region that aid in regional cooperation. These comprise UN organisations,
intergovernmental organisations and non-government institutions. Some of the
multilateral institutions are ESCAP (Economic ans Social Commission for Asia and
Pacific), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), SACEP,
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), SPREP, APTC. Examples of non-
governmental institutions are ADB (Asian Development Bank), AEI (Asian Energy
Institute), AlT (Asian Institute of Technology). The regional institutes have the capacity
to influence the decision making process as well as operationalising concepts like
sustainable development. The Working Group felt that the following would enhance
regional cooperation in achieving sustainable development.
Creating a climate of inter-regional political reconciliation to agree on certain
common issues of concern.
Identifying issues of common concern.
Enriching the information base so as to strengthen the decision making process;
thereby developing a better understanding of sustainable development and
environmental problems.
Important areas for regional cooperation and capacity building
Optimal utilisation of natural resources on a regional basis (e.g., trade in the
power-sector between Nepal and India, thereby substituting coal by hydel power,
thereby reducing pollution in Nepal caused by coal utilisation in India).
Enhancement of technology capability and capacity.
Improving the quality of information generation within the region.
Developing methodologies to incorporate environmental considerations in
development processes/activities. This would include attempting to impute a
price for environmental resources. While price might not fully reflect all aspects
of resource use and environmental degradation, it could serve as a strong signal
of the extent of possible damage.
Incorporating resource accounting into the national accounting framework. This
would require modifying existing accounting methodologies so as to arrive at a
8common base for all countries. The ongoing work within the UN, on this subject
is noted as a significant contribution to this process.
Developing the capacity of the individual through a bottom-up approach. This
would require disseminating information with regard to the potential benefits, as
well as training individuals in mobilising support and generating awareness of
the grassroots level.
Advantages of regional cooperation
At the intergovemment level - this requires clarification of the issues on
which cooperation could result.
At the governmental level - this would require a robust and lucid
information package.
At the institutional level - this would require an action plan for
operationalising the programme and for information dissemination on a time
bound basis.
At the people's level - this involves awareness creation and basic training,
and finally,
At all levels - women should be integrated into the processes and structures
of decision making.
Inaugural session: inaugural address
Hon'ble Shri K C Pant
Chairman, 10th Finance Commission
I have great pleasure in sharing some thoughts with such a distinguished gathering of
thinkers, policy makers and representatives of international organisations. This meeting,
I find, will examine follow-up action to be taken on the issues thrown-up by UNCED
(United Nations Conference on Environment & Development) at Rio. I have watched
with great interest the preparations for the Rio conference as well as its outcome. In
fact, I recall that in December last year when Mr Maurice Strong, Secretary General of
UNCED was in New Delhi, TERI had organised a meeting of a select group of persons
which I had the pleasure of presiding over. I found the interaction stimulating and
productive.
Now that the UNCED is over, the time has come for the global community as a
whole, and for the countries of Asia in particular, to evolve an agenda following up on
the UNCED. But this is perhaps a good stage for us to evaluate what was achieved at
Rio and what did not receive the attention that was due. My own assessment is that the
Rio Conference should have addressed issues of poverty and development far more
effectively than it actually did. From the point of view of the South, therefore, Rio has
not quite lived upto the expectations that had been generated. Undoubtedly, in the
months intervening since the conference several governments and non-government
organisations have had time to make a sketch of the road ahead, often referred to as the
'Road from Rio', and I see several reasons why these deliberations and consultations
are both urgent and significant for the future health of this planet and all life that exists
on it. I would like to enumerate some of the major tasks and challenges that I think
need to be discussed and pursued in this seminar, and these are briefly summarised
below:
The Rio agreements have set up a framework for policy making and action for
integrating environmental concerns with development at global, national, state
and local levels. However, this framework needs to be given substance.
In the post Rio phase, we are immediately confronted by the fact that several,
protocols need to be negotiated, the institutional framework for international
cooperation and transfers of resources and technology has to be established, and
developed countries must begin committing funds for sustainable development.
At the national, state, and local levels, policy making and planning must be
reoriented to integrate environmental concerns with development. This will
require legal and administrative action, but more important, the building up of
capacity; skills, technology, and a reorientation of policy making is essential,
and the last is absolutely crucial.
In particular, the challenge is to ensure that sustainabiity concerns do not lead
to a new generation of discretionary controls on economic activity. Further, it
must be realised that policy making is to be effectively formulated in a manner
that is revenue oriented, or even revenue surplus, to address environmental
concerns. In this the developed countries must take the lead to solve the
environmental problems of the globeproblems which have largely been
created by them.
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and in their patterns of expenditure and taxation to ensure adequate resource transfers
to the developing countries.
I would not like to exclude the responsibilities of the developing countries for
protecting the global environment. In many cases there is a distinct overlap between
policies and actions that protect the global environment, and those that sustain the
natural resource base at the local level. This can happen only if we are able to integrate
environmental concerns into development plans. As a start, it is essential to build into
our national income accounts the effects that economic activities have on the wealth of
natural resources for which a society is responsible, such as effects on forests and soil.
The building of local capacity for integrating environmental factors into development
decision making is crucial to the success of any effort in this field. Capacity building
has to become an essential part of each government's plans at the national level as well
as in the programmes that international organisations are pursuing and implementing in
different countries.
There is a fear, perhaps genuine, that environmental concerns would lead to a
new regime of controls and licensing, which would retard economic development and
progress. We have to be very careful about avoiding such an approach. Governments
and Bureaucracies often find it convenient and easy to build in controls and constraints
that only add to the cost of development plans and activities. Environmental aspects
have to be built into plans at the stage of project design and identification itself, and
not imposed as an end-of-pipe addition. In other words pre-emption and prevention are
generally less expensive than mitigation and control. We would have to therefore,
change the way we govern and do business to ensure a healthy and sustainable
approach to development questions.
A meeting like this also gives us opportunity to explore the potential benefits of
South-South cooperation. South Asia could be surplus in foodgrain production if only
we exercised wisdom in the management of water, much of which we share with each
other. Environmental phenomena in the mountain areas of our sub-continent have
impacts on all nations and states downstream. A regional approach, therefore, has
obvious merit.
Finally, what we are addressing in this Seminar is the challenge of transition to
a pattern of sustainable development. The term sustainable development came into our
vocabulary because of the work of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, popularly known as the Brundtland Commission. The definition of the
term is 'meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of
future generations'. I should end by reminding this international gathering that
sustainable development implies primarily meeting the needs of all in the present
generation, because those who are poor and deprived would neither have the means nor
the ability to protect the interests of future generations. Sustainable development,
therefore, essentially requires that we create the means for the poor of this world not
only to service their own needs but also of those yet to come in the future.
I have great pleasure in inaugurating this Seminar.
Inaugural session: presidential address
MrRSPathak
(Former) Chief Justice of India
Dr Pachauri, Mr Dessau, Mr Pant, Mr Khalim, Dr Ghosh distinguished participants in
the seminar, ladies and gentlemen.
This seminar holds a significant place in the deliberations which can be
expected to follow the UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development) held recently in Rio de Janerio. The Rio Declaration seeks to
accommodate the conflicting claims of industrialized societies and developing nations
and the emphasis on environmental protection is balanced against the need for
development. The concept of sustainable development, which is not specifically defined
in the Declaration, may be approached from different perspectives and value
judgements in different situations and will turn on an assessment of the particular
developmental, financial and economic status of the nation as influenced by prevailing
social and traditional cultures. The concept of sustainable development is a dynamic
concept and with an accretion of data, knowledge and experience in the different
dimensions of the environmentdevelopment equation, it can be expected that the
concept will attain further range and depth to meet the challenges of new demands,
recognizing the all embracing dimensions of environmental and developmental
imperatives. The Rio Declaration covers a wide spectrum of related policy concerns.
With human beings as the focus of sustainable development, the Declaration attempts to
create a hannonious and equilibrated world society in which, commencing from the
eradication of poverty as the fundamental impulse, carefully drawn principles define
rights and responsibilities in the connected areas of patterns of production and
consumption,. of population control, of bio;domg indigenous capacity through the
benefits of scientific and technological knowledge and the evolution of an appropriate
equitable international economic system. In its totality the Rio Declaration accepts and
affirms the unity which binds all these concerns and it takes into account the interacting
influences on one other. Each strand of that network depends for its strengths, its
resilience, and its effect upon the operation and efficiency of the rest of the network.
International lawyers will recognise that a new legal philosophy incorporating a more -
compendious range of values has been developing in recent years. With the
establishment of the UN and the growth of international institutions and their
ubiquitous presence in almost every dimension of individual daily life, a complex
system of jurisprudence is taking shape. Among other postWorld War II phenomena,
environmentalimperatives and developmental concerns have drawn international law
into intimate convergence with national legal systems.
The values of one flow into the other. This symbiotic relationship has exercised
a profound influence on both legal systems. Sustainable development cannot be
conceived without national laws being interpreted in a manner consistent with
corresponding international law values and when an international law develops in an
area, it needs to take into account the diverse economic and social cultures of the
nations concerned. With new movements affecting international life such as never been
envisioned before, both international law and national legal systems are moving on to a
new chapter of development. Some indications of this are already embodied in the Rio
Declaration, for we find reference to the need to amplify and flush out the concept of
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sustainable development, including specific emphasis on intergenerational and
intragenerational equity, access to information procedures and legislation incorporating
relevant environmental standards and management objectives and priorities.
Enforcement and monitoring institutions constitute an important feature of the
legal structure. One international institution which needs to be thought of sooner rather
than later is a dispute settlement mechanism to adjudicate on transboundary disputes
arising out of environmental claims by individuals or private organisations, Some
eminent jurists believe that the International Court of Justice is inadequate for that
purpose in terms of its present statute. For in transboundary matters it can entertain
disputes only between one state and another and that also by voluntary agreement of
each party. There is no one forum today enjoying compulsory jurisdiction over
environmental disputes to which an individual or a private organisation may apply
directly.
If there is one truth that emerges from the successive phases of the
environmental movement, it is that the issues that faces today are issues which will
ultimately determine the fate of mankind on this planet. The health and welfare and
indeed the survival of the human race is at stake. It is equally true if that threat is to be
conquered it can only be on the basis of global partnership where the national units of
the global community act as equal partners in combating environmental problems. The
development of underdeveloped nations therefore becomes a matter of significant
importance and in that context the quest for equity and justice assumes the highest
relevance. While maintaining their sovereign right to utilize their resources in the
freedom of the priorities determined by them, the developing countries must be assisted
in raising their levels of development by financial transfers and the supply of clean
technology by industrialized countries on fair and equitable terms. In doing so, the
industrialized countries will be guaranteeing their own security as well. Thus justice,
equity and fair play become the key words for the present task of restructuring the
world community on the basis of sustainable development.
This Seminar is primarily intended for an examination of environmental and
developmental issues affecting Asia. The Asian continent is often perceived as a
developing region, but we must not forget that it is also the home of a few highly
industrialized societies. This has relevance, for in the world of the immediate present
regional proximity can play a material role in the development of national economies.
And yet there is another aspect to which reference may be made; regional economic
communities are now well known, notwithstanding their traumatic journey to
maturation. As sustainable development wears the grim face of environmental and
economic values, regional economic activities will necessarily take up environmental
considerations. And there is a lesson in this. For such a regional system based on the
necessity of cooperation, mutual assistance can become an important factor in reducing
political tension between neighbouring countries. It may truly be said that environment
and development concerns have set in motion forces that can usefully be harmonised in
the common interest of environmental protection, of development and of peace and
prosperity.
Thank you.
Valedictory session: valedictory address
Hon'ble Shri Manmohan Singh
Finance Minister, Government of India
Thank you Dr Pachauri, Shri Kamal Nath Ji, Professor Cyril Poonemperuma, Ladies
and Gentlemen,
I think someone described public office as an opportunity for private education
at public cost. I must confess to you that I have no expert knowledge of the subjects
which you have been discussing. But in the course of my work as Finance Minister,
sometimes I have to browse through voluminous papers that the Ministry of
Environment and Forests produces. I think some of it rubs on to me, and therefore
please treat what I am going to say as a layman's view of the environmental dimension
of managing the global inter-dependence.
We live in a highly uncertain world. As Sir Harold Wilson, the former British
Prime Minister, once said, 'A week in politics is a very long period of time'. Finance
Ministers are notoriously pre-occupied with day to day management, and it is quite
possible that longer term issues of vital importance to the future of our country, and to
the future of the globe, often escape their attention. I, therefore, welcome this
opportunity to learn more about environmental matters, if for no other reasons than, as
the poet P.B. Shelly once said, 'the desire of the moth for the star, of the night for
tomorrow, the devotion to something afar from the spheres of our sorrows', It, for a
moment, takes me away from the impossible task of managing the finances that most
Finance Ministers have to grapple with, howsoever imperfectly.
Having said that I think, one has to recognize that countries of the third world
have a vital stake in the protection of the global environment, in ensuring that the vital
life-support systems of our planet are managed, used and conserved in a sustainable
fashion, and that issues both of intra-generational equity, as well as inter-generational
equity, are in the forefront of thinking about the environment. Indeed, that is as it
should be. After all, the world has a single environment to share. Three-fourths of
humanity lives in the countries of the third world, and although it is not very
fashionable to use the term 'third world', the second world having disappeared, the fact
is that the great majority of people live in the countries of the South or the developing
world. If irreparable damage is done to the environment, whether by way of climate
change of an irreversible nature or whether by way of depletion of the ozone layer, we
will also suffer, and being a majority of humankind we will probably suffer more than
others. Therefore, this new thinking, that environmental issues are not issues of
North-South confrontation, that we have to deal with the problem of environmental
management in a spirit of cooperation and not in a spirit of confrontation, this is
something which we readily accept. That has been our approach as a country and as a
government, in dealing with these problems, the issues that figured at Rio, i.e., the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, the Agenda 21 Action Progranime and
the Statement of Principles on Forests.
Although all these are non-binding obligations, they do set out a framework
consisting of principles and also an action programme. I noted that Agenda 21 has
roughly about 100 programmes in different areas of human activity. So, there is lot of
food for thought in all that. In addition, we have the two conventions which were
agreed to earlier, but signed at Rio: the Convention on Biodiversity and the Framework
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Convention on Climate Change. At the intellectual plane, they do advance our
knowledge of the harm that human beings can do to the environment, that thoughtless
pre-occupation with modernization can at times become highly unproductive.
One favourable fallout of this UN conference has been the explicit recognition
that any programme on Environmental Protection must accept that as far as the poor
countries of the world are concerned, poverty eradication and development have to
occupy centre-stage. It has also been accepted that it is the sovereign right of these
countries to exploit their own resources. But out of this, there is also a danger that a
body of case law might be built, if developing countries are not careful in which
concern with the environment, howsoever desirable, howsoever welcome, might
degenerate into a new sort of imperialism, a new sort of colonialism. I say so, not to
frighten our people. As citizens of the world, it is our duty and obligation to cooperate
with the rest of the world to find acceptable, equitable solutions to the management of
this growing global inter-dependence. But, one must recognize, as I stated some weeks
ago in Washington in a different context, that UN Conferences are important, but it is
no use abstracting from the fact that the world is not a morality play in international
relations. After all that is written in the UN documents. These relations are essentially
power relations. Therefore, if you recognize that fact, there is always a danger that if
you are not careful, seemingly innocuous principles can become fetters on further
progress. For example, take the case of the recognition of the sovereign right to exploit
one's own resources. But, as I read the Rio declaration it also says that activities within
the jurisdiction of a country must not cause damage to the environment of areas beyond
the limits of their national jurisdiction. This is unexceptionable. However, cross-border
externalities are a fact of life, not only in environment management, but in other
activities. Who is going to decide whether damage has been caused? When national
policies of developing countries impinge on others or result in cross border
externalities, the same Rio Declaration says that environmental measures that deal with
transboundary or global problems should as far as possible be based on international
consensus I think, this too is unexceptionable. But in a world of unequal bargaining
power, in a world of unequal power structures, there is a danger that if developing
countries are not alert, this could become a mechanism for imposing thought processes,
production structures and other related aspects, which may do irreparable damage to the
process of sustainable development in poor countries of the world.
I am saying all this not to frighten our people, but to ensure that our research
workers, our policy makers, are sufficiently alert that when it comes to negotiating the
follow-up to the Rio Declaration or Agenda 21, or Statement of Principles on Forests,
that the equitable and balanced management of global inter-dependence is lost sight of.
But this cannot be ensured merely by repeating first principles. I have been associated
with various negotations in UNCTAD. Today, environment is the fashion In the sixties
trade was the fashion. So, there was the first UN Conference on Trade and
Development. Great expectations were aroused. Every four years there has been a
conference on trade and development. But I do not think, franidy speaking, we have
advanced very much in changing international trading structures. The principles
enshrined in the first session of UNCTAD, as I read them today, I think are honoured
more in the breach than in acceptance. I sincerely hope that this is not going to happen
to the Rio Declaration, but that is a danger which can be warded against only if
developing countries do their homework carefully, provided our research agenda throws
up genuine problems, provided there is a proper costing of trade-offs. There is no
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reason why this can not be done, with so much intellectual manpower or womanpower
that exists in the third world. All the estimates of damage to the environment may
have to go back, to quote the Washington based World Watch Institute and, therefore,
all the time we are reacting to what is said or what is written, and since it is a
gathering of research workers, I venture to say that intellectual colonialism is far more
dangerous than the colonialism of the traditional type. The mind set has to be liberated.
But, unfortunately in all these matters again power relations do come in. If our
intellectuals want to make a mark, they must be quoted in the footnotes written by
some great experts in the first world, and it is the first world scholars who really
determine what is good scholarship, what is good science, what is good economics.
Therefore, that way, the whole agenda of scientific research, the whole agenda of social
research, the whole agenda of technological research, can be easily distorted. One
cannot wish away this global interdependence, one must not draw into a cockpit of
one's own, but we must, I think, develop in our societies, in our research institutions,
capacity for independent thinking, capacity to look at our problems in their own setting,
and with a mind-set which is in tune with the realities that prevail in the countries of
the third world. Otherwise, there is a very considerable danger that noble principles
could become another millstone around the necks of the countries of the third world.
The same way, if you look at the Agenda 21 Programme, there is large-scale
collation of principles and follow-up programmes of action, and I notice more than 100
programme areas covering social and economic dimensions of sustainable development,
conservation and management of resources for development, strengthening the role of
major groups, the means of implementation, all very valuable areas. In particular, if you
look at the section on conservation and management of resources for development,
various items are listed. They all are very worth-while areas, in which unless the
countries of the third world throw up their own solutions, our development will be
slowed down, and in this process our bargaining power in dealing with the countries of
the North will also be damaged beyond repair.
Therefore, the message that I do want to give to this distinguished group is: you
have all these issues stated, but let us look at these issues with a liberated mind-set.
The second thing that I do wish to say is that it is, indeed, good that the Rio
Declaration accepts that poverty removal has to be an integral part of a policy of
sustainable development. The chapter on poverty in the Action Programme addresses
these issues of eradication of poverty, removal of hunger, and the management of
natural resources in a sustainable manner. But it is necessary to translate all this into
credible strategies of sustainable livelihood. And here, I feel, there is a need for a very
fruitful inter-disciplinary research, in which scholars of Asia can contribute a great deal.
As Kamal Nath Ji has said, our development cannot be a carbon copy of the
development path and lifestyle pursued elsewhere in the world. If we pursue those
paths, I think you would have a very small minority of our people living in affluence,
the great majority being condemned to abject poverty. The concomitant of that would
be massive social upheaval, social unrest, political and economic uncertainties and
chaos. Therefore, that clearly is not a sutainable means.
At the same time, one has to accept the reality that what is happening at the
global level is also happening in our own countries. We say one thing, we do another.
In our own societies, therefore, this gap between the affluent minority and the vast
number of people is growingone life style for a small minority of people, another life
style for a great majority of our people. And we have reduced through television the
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mass of our people marching on the course of this process of modernization. Most of
them probably will never have a chance to own all this sophisticated gadgetry which is
shown on television. We are, therefore, creating a society of looking through the glass,
with the aspiration that one day the life would become better, which would engulf our
societies. Therefore, there is need for new thinking about sustainable livelihood
patterns, sustainable livelihood in the area of rural development. Evolving technologies
which will raise the productivity of large farmers, but are also equally accessible to the
small fanners and the marginal farmers. Sustainable patterns of human settlements
which would ensure that most people can aspire within their lifetimes to have access to
shelter of which any civilized society can be reasonably proud of. Therefore, building
technologies, the whole thinking about how to ensure that these houses provide
reasonable comforts without all these sophisticated gadgetry of the post-industrial
societies are challenges which have to be faced.
Some years ago, in this country, we had a distinguished group of citizens of
our country under Charles Correa who produced a very impressive report on the urban
chaos that awaits India. It is gathering dust. There has been very little intelligent
discussion of this tremendous problem that faces India in the next decade, and I am
sure that what is going to happen to India is going to be true of many other countries
of the third world. The way most cities in the third world are growing, the divide
between a very small affluent class and a great majority of the people, is widening, and
you will have, if this process persists, only very rich and very poor people living in our
cities. Very rich because they can afford it, also because they have access to the
coercive agencies of the state and in countries like Philippines they can engage also
private protection forces, and the very poor who do not mind sleeping on the
pavements. So in this whole area of human settlements, an area which is listed in the
Rio Declaration, there is need for a lot of intellectual effort to think about viable
strategies which would bring about a certain amount of equality in access to basic
goods, the quest for affordable technologies. Unless we do that, I think, the process of
growing inequalilties in consumption and patterns of living is going to overtake us all
with all the disturbing consequences that it is likely to bring in its frame.
Similarly, I was reading the chapter on protecting and promoting human
healthcare. I think, there are very valuable concerns in this Rio Declaration, and yet we
all know, that the way our societies are growing, this will remain a pious wish of
having western oriented hospital centered medical systems that the countries of the
third world have followed. It has no chance of ensuring that decent health care will
become ever accessible to the great majority of the people in India, or in other parts of
the third world. Even countries like United Kingdom, countries like United States,
today find that the hospital bills and the medical bills are rising at such a fantastic rate
that they are throwing up their hands, and their fiscal systems are not able to cope with
these problems. Therefore, here is another fruitful agenda for thought. May be we ought
to shift this emphasis from a hospital-centered curative approach to medical services to
greater emphasis on preventive measures. But in our country, I find in our medical
colleges, we look at what are the prestigious areas of work; no professor likes to work
on public health engineering. Therefore, the result is that a wrong sided development is
taking place. We satisfy our conscience by writing plan documents, every plan
document mentions access to health care and universalization of education. Plan after
plan we note our failures to achieve them. We feel satisfied that we have done our
duty, we have recognized our defects. But, this thing cannot go on. In all this, there is a
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certain element of hypocrisy where the ruling classes in all developing countries say the
right things, but when it comes to doing the right things, the means are not provided,
the agenda for research is distorted and the priorities of allocating resources are
distorted.
Nobody would talk of giving the disenfrenchized people of our country the same
amount of voice. This year, for example, the Government of India was short of
resources. We cut some funds for the Universities. There was a very loud protest, may
be rightly so. But the fact is that year after year, primary schools in several parts of our
country do not have blackboards, do not have teachers. Now, that does not arouse the
same amount of protest. It is because the people who control the media, people who
control the processes of Government, civil servants, politicians, they all come from a
background in which the needs and aspirations of the disinfrenchized majority of our
people do not get adequate recognition. I think we have to change this if we really take
sustainable livelihood as a serious proposition, and not merely as a passing fad.
I, therefore, feel the countries of the third world have to do a lot of homework.
Quite honestly, whatever the developed countries may say, it would be utterly wrong on
the developing countries to assume that for these tasks they are going to get money on
a large scale from the developed countries of the world. That will be simply
self-deception. After all what is it that the developed countries have committed
themselves to? They said they will endeavour to provide 0.7 per cent of their national
income as concessional developmental finance. This was the commitment made in the
year 1961. There is a famous General Assembly Resolution, and the world has not
changed. It is 'endeavour', there is no commitment. The richest country among the
developed countries, the United States, simply disowns all this altogether. The average
today is lower than it was in 1961 in terms of the percentage. Therefore, I think we
cannot really depend upon the first world to find solutions to these problems. We
should welcome the spirit of human solidarity. If help comes, we should welcome it. It
is our duty that when help comes it must be properly used. Since concessional
resources are scarce, it is our obligation to ensure that they are used to promote genuine
development, helping the poorest sections of our society, but do not count on that like
Manna, there is going to be a providential gift which is going to provide resources for
dealing with the problems of sustainable development in the third world.
The secretariat of the UNCED, I am told, did study that if you have to carry out
this Agenda 21, then on an annual basis you need about $600 hundred billion, and of
that $125 billion must come from the developed world. Well, the first test is going to
come in a few months. The next replenishment of IDA is to be negotiated. The last 9th
replenishment was roughly about $15.5 billion and if you want even to maintain the
real size of IDA, I think you need roughly about $17.5 billion. There has been a talk of
an 'earth increment' of $5 billion and even of that they say that $1.5 billion would
come from the interest income of the World Bank. So, we will test it. From my
soundings, quite honestly, concessional money is going to become more scarce then
ever before, and therefore, do not build castles in the air.
If sustainable development is in our interest, and it is in our interest, we must
build these concerns into our development processes, environment impact analysis must
become an integral part of our development process, and in the same way the national
accounts of our country must be amended to take account of the damage that various
economic policies do to the environment. In fact, if you do proper environmental
accounting and if it is built into the processes of national accounting, what appears as
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output would simply be appearing on input side, and this is another area where I feel
there is need for greater understanding, greater co-operation among countries of the
third world, to build a new consensus as to how environment impact analysis and
environmental accounting can be built into the whole system of national accounts.
Similarly, when you come to areas like Biodiversity, now, of course the two
conventions are a compromise and depending upon who is your audience, you can
always point out what we have achieved. As far as the United States is concerned, I
think, they ought to be congratulated for their being more honest, had they felt that this
convention is inconsistent with their conception of what should be the role of
intellectual property rights. Many European countries and others feel the same way, but
they feel it is polite, after all we are writing only a few words. Therefore, let us buy
peace. When it comes to negotiating in GATT on intellectuals property rights, we will
see what happens there.
Therefore the challenge: how are we going to ensure this solemn affirmation to
this biodiversity convention, that the intellectual property rights system that will emerge
from GATT is consistent with it. There is lot of research work that needs to be done in
this country. Quite honestly, I was ashamed when Mrs. Calra Hills came here and she
was talking to me. Contrary to the image that people have that she is a very harsh, very
tough lady. I found her very receptive and she said, 'I would like to get from you an
authoritative document about what is the impact on India if you accept the US
proposals on intellectual property rights'. And she told me their people have done their
homework. They find that 95 per cent of the Indian pharmaceutical products are
off-patent any way, and she said that it was her honest conviction that the cost to India
is going to be minimal. Yet in vain, I look for an Indian study which would tell me
what exactly would be the cost to India if we did accept the intellectual property
regime which is being talked about by the United States under Super 301, or the cost of
the intellectual property regime which is implicit in the Dunkel draft. I am saying that
there is need for lot more intensive intellectual work, so that whenever negotiators go
into these forums we are better equipped, we are better informed. This is also a fault of
our negotiators because the world of knowledge and the world of administration, often
function in compartments. The challenge of our times is, since knowledge is becoming
more and more an important influence on policy making, how to break the walls
between these two cultures in the famous words of the late C P Snow.
In some areas of Biotechnology, the convention on Biodiversity does mention
that countries which have genetic resources have to be consulted, that they have to be
active participants in the research work and in sharing the benefits that come out of that
research from the use of those genetic resources. I have read somewhere that although
this figure is uncertain, there are about 10 million species of various genetic resources
and two-thirds of them happen to be in the tropical countries. In the United States, for
example, out of these plants, the retail value of drugs that are sold in the market is
roughly of the order of about $40 billion. Now, how can we then have a regime, a
global regime which recognizes the great and immense promise of biotechnology, and
at the same time works out an arrangement which ensures that the fruits of this
progress are equitably distributed. This, I think ii the challenge before humanity when
it comes to dealing with the promises and potentialities of biotechnology. Scientists and
other administrators in the third world, in my opinion, have to apply their minds to
these issues.
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Finally, we look at the other convention, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, the issues that are of concern to us. Now we are here in area of uncertainty.
We cannot quantify whether what is happening will necessarily bring about irreversible
changes in climate. But, in human affairs, precaution is better than cure, and since we
are as interested in the future of humanity as anybody else, we have, therefore, a vested
interest to cooperate with the rest of the world in ensuring that no irreparable damage is
done to the climate, and that global warming is controlled. But what are the optimal
strategies to deal with these problems from the third world angle? How can the
management of forests, the conservation of forests, the development of energy systems
in our countries, how can these be developed, in a manner that nobody would accuse
the countries in the third world that they are being a nuisance. We owe it to ourselves
because, whether we like it or not, we cannot follow the energy-intensive patterns of
development of Western countries. As I have often said, the challenge before the sub-
continent India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutanis not to wait for the American
levels of per capita income to abolish poverty, but to find credible strategies to remove
abject poverty at a per capita income of no more than $400 to 500. That, I think, is the
biggest single challenge for social engineering, in which our scientists, our
technologists, and our administrators must cooperate. If you are going to wait for the
growth of per capita income levels to US or even of South Korea, then, I think, quite
honestly, you must confess that poverty would remain as the Victorians used to say the
'the poor have been with us, they will continue to be with us, so what?' If you really
take the removal of poverty seriously then we have to look at the whole system of
sustainable management of forests, natural resources, the use of energy systems. How
can energy use be expanded without damaging the environment and how can energy
supply be made more accessible to the poor people of the country? I do recognize, the
problems of fuelwood are important. But if you are going to treat rural India all the
time as a second class citizen, I don't think the people of rural India will accept that
title. There will be, if you do not improve the quality of living in the rural India,
reckless migration of people from rural areas to the cities. Even though they cannot get
jobs, they will float around in the hope that one day some of them will get jobs, and
you will have urban chaos.
The way to beautify India's cities is to start by beautifying India's villages.
Therefore, do not perpetuate the solution that rural India can accept the use of old
fashioned fuelwood while the rest of India will shift to LPG or electricity. I think rural
electrification and more modem means of meeting the needs of energy in the rural
India has to be accepted as a priority, if you want the end of premature migration of
rural people into cities. We have to create new functional townships. These functional
townships which will have in my view all the facilities of modern life. People can cycle
to these functional townships to take advantage of those facilities, and yet can continue
to live in their villages. Thereby we avoid excessive investment in social overhead
capitalin housing,in sanitationthat should come later on. But, improving the quality
of life in rural India has to be along modern ways, We cannot simply say modem life
is for a small segment of our population which lives in urban areas and 75 per cent of
our people would continue to live in drudgery, and that they would accept that fact year
after year. Therefore, I submit to you that in the management of energy systems,
meeting the energy needs of rural areas in a cost effective manner, has to be high on
the agenda of research and policy planning, and this is another area where I feel there
is need for lot more co- operative and creative enterprise.
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These are some of the thoughts which occured to me as I came to this meeting.
As I said to you, I have not made a detailed study of environmental issues but I do
have to deal with them in my day to day working as Finance Minister, and I feel that
some of these issues are important. There are one or two more issues that I do want to
talk about.
The whole issue of nuclear safety. There is almost a conspiracy of silence. We
have to face that issue. I think nuclear energy is a fact of life. In India it is a fact of
life, in Pakistan it is going to be used, but there are aspects of ensuring that this supply
is as safe as humanly possible. What are its implications ? We have in our country a
mechanism to ensure safety. But there is very little public discussion of these issues.
Some day, some accident happens and then the whole thing will come into disrepute.
But this issue should, I believe, be discussed, debated, so that the country has the
assurance that things like Chernobyl never happen in countries like ours. We are an
open society, and that is the advantage of open societies, of democratic systems, that
we can take advance action, whereas totalitarian setups wake up when it is too late. I
think, our scholars should take full advantage of the opportunities of working and
researching in the framework and in the atmosphere of an open society committed to
free debate and freespeech.
Finally, the whole area of education. Ultimately, the defence of the environment,
and the defence of the ecosystem, and for that matter the defence of secular values,
must rest in the minds of our people. Where do you began except when you start
educating a child? I think it was a great merit of the Father of Our Nation Gandhiji that
he appreciated that truth more than anyone else among modern thinkers. He wanted to
relate education to the needs of life of our people. He wanted to have an educational
pattern which would teach people to live in harmony with nature, unlike this western
pre-occupation of control over nature. The Gandhian value system always emphasized
on man or woman living with harmony with nature. Now, it may be that we cannot
replicate what Gandhiji said. May be it is too idealistic. But, I think, that in our
educational processes, concern for environment and concern for equity, must be integral
parts of our thought processes. It is only then that you can build a society which will
value environmental protection, which will, at the same time, be an integrated society
and a society which the coming generations could be proud of. There are today many
good things happening in our societies, but there are many things which are a cause of
worry and a cause of concern. Let us wake up before it is too late and in ushering in
that brave new world, I think, knowledge has to be the most important input. The
famous Cambridge economist Lord Keynes once said that 'for good or for bad, ideas
are often far more important than vested interests'. I think that is the challenge to all
those who are committed to intellectual endeavour. That is the hope, that is the
inspiration which ought to be guiding us.
Valedictory session: presidential address
Hon'ble Shri Kamal Nath
Minister of State for Environment and Forests
Hon'ble Finance Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, Dr Pachauri, Mr Dessau, Mr Cyril
Poonamperuma and distinguished guests.
I am very happy to be here at the Post-UNCED Seminar which is perhaps the
first of its kind being organized after the Rio Summit. What do we look at when we sit
at this seminardo we look at the future or the past? In 1972 there was a conference
on environment at Stockholm. On that occasion Mrs Gandhi drew attention to the
linkages between environment, development and poverty. Twenty years later 115 Heads
of Government assembled at Rio de Janeiro and the issue was environment and
development. The greatest single gain for the South was the recognition by the North
that poverty and development are central themes to environmental protection. We
cannot isolate environment and poverty and development. Over the last two years spent
in negotiations, whether over the Biodiversity treaty, whether the climate change treaty,
whether the wranglings over Agenda 21, or whether over the Rio Declarations, it was
very important that the North comprehends this fact.
In 1972 the central global issues were how man would survive with man. In
1992 the issues were how man would survive with nature, and these shared concerns as
well as the intent to act on these concerns was what made 115 Heads of Governments
come to Rio. Prior to that a great deal of effort had been spent in negotiating the
various Conventions, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. The road from Rio that you
have been deliberating on for the past two days is not an easy road. We have the
Framework Convention on Climate change, biodiversity and the huge document,
Agenda 21, which takes into account cross sectoral issues cutting across the entire
spectrum relating to sustainable development. Another major gain from Rio is the
greatly increased awareness about these issues, and I see this manifest in India not only
in enlightened NGO groups but also in small villages various districts. Issues that were
known 10 years ago only to scientists or major NGO groups are now known to school
children. This is the major change that has taken place in India and across all countries.
The environment is not an issue only within nations, but is transnational, It affects the
globe, and country on this planet.
What you have deliberated in the last two days is very important. Environment
cannot be a issue for Government alone to deal with. It has to be a Movement of the
people. We cannot control pollution by an inspector or a meter. It has to happen by
awareness of the people, citizens groups, NGOs and individuals. Government can
merely act as a catalytic agent.
When we look at the Post-Rio scenario, looking at our region we find so many
commonalities in terms of culture, poverty and development, in terms of economic path
we have been following. But how do we harmonize these in our region so that we
specific problems encountered by others. No country can possibly ape another country.
India's development path cannot be same as that of countries of the North. We have a
repository of knowledge about how some of them are the world's biggest polluters.
How their per-capita pollutant load is the highest on this planet. We have the figures of
energy consumption patterns at the start of the industrial revolution. We have the
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present day figures for Japan and USA. What should we choose? Could we have our
agricultural revolution merely by tractors. It was not tractors that led to an agricultural
revolution in India. Tractors are for 30 acres or 40 acres of land. Our land holdings are
much smaller. We have to look at country specific methodsIndia specific methods.
Of the total energy used in our country fuelwood accounts for 40 to 50%. Our total
input by the forestry sector to the Indian economy outside the market economy is in
excess of Rs 20,000 crores per year. If we were to calculate the fuelwood collected by
the poorest of the poor in our country (which is a rare subsidy to the poor) and attach a
value, to fodder for 430 million cattle, adding it up gives us a staggering a figure in
excess of 20,000 crores per year which is not reflected in our market economy
accounts. If our forest management systems did not help us to service this need of 160
million tones of fuelwood, what would be the quantity of alternative energy source
required? What would it cost our country? How cOuld Dr Manmohan Singh find the
foreign exchange to import the oil? How would the poor be subsidized: 400 million
people? A population larger than that People bigger than the size of Europe who
depend upon the fuelwood serviced by our forest sector. Now these are India specific
situations.
But while at the negotiations on the forestry principlus our stand was that we
have managed our forests. True we have had our problems. A year and half ago we
went to the IMF. Dr Manmohan Singh, had he chosen the forestry route, cutting a
small portion of our forest in the North-East would have got him the required 500 odd
million dollars that he needed. But India as a country did not choose the forestry route.
The revenue of the US or Canada may be 50 billion dollars in terms of timber revenue,
but for us our forests are not a revenue resource. While looking at the future we have
to look at India specific situations. We strongly opposed the forestry convention,
because we cannot look at forests as CO2 sinks, or emissions sinks or look at the
forests through dust particles. Forest have to be perceived in the India context
differently. We could manage our forests with International cooperation. First and
foremost for the benefit of our people and then as a concerned and responsible country
in the world. Our forestry legislation is perhaps the toughest in the world and all
countries subscribing to such conventions do have the kind of such legislation that we
have had for years. So we would like to see in the future, international co-operation in
our forestry sector, which also helps us preserve our bio-diversity. Commensurately, in
terms of impacts on climate change, we would be fulfilling our responsibilities and we
would look at the North countries in terms of stabilization and reduction of emissions.
We would like the North to talk of transfer of technology, while talking about global
environment. We have to talk of clean technologies and not cleaning up technologies,
and this means transfer of these technologies in non-commercial terms, because here we
are talking of a shared concern. From Rio we came out in another orbit-an orbit of a
partnership-outside the conventional political and economic blocs. So we would like to
see the transfer of these technologies and the modalities Qf such transfers to be worked
out. We have a Framework Convention for this, from which protocols have to flow,.
and these protocols must take into account the modalities of the transfer of
technologies. We cannot get into this while respecting intellectual property rights
(IPRa). JPRs cannot become an instrument to negate what we sought, or will seek in
the future. There has to be transfer of technology on non-commercial terms if we are to
have a global partnership. If we are talking of burdens today, we are in the threshold of
development. This applies not only to India, but to our neighbors, SAARC countrie.c
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and our neighbors outside the SAARC countries. So we have to talk about who would
share the burdens of incremental costs, and what will the incremental costs come with,
and what kind of conditionalities will be involved. The same kind of conditionalities
that we have seen in the past or would they come out of shared or differentiated
responsibilities. What kinds of funds flow are going to have in the future.
The Rio Declaration signifies the political will of world leaders-that political
will has to speak louder than words. The G7 meeting held two months ago does take
into account the commitment of Rio, but, they must flow into concrete programmes.
We have agreed on a reaffirmation of the GEF. And we would like that GEF recognize
these concerns and not merely be a window of the World Bank. The multilateral
funding mechanism is accountable to the Conference of Parties. It should have the
edge, the tone of bias if we are talking of shared concerns. We did see this in Rio, we
had some difficult movements.
Our SAARC region possesses some of the greatest biodiversity on this planet.
We have to maintain linkages between bio material and bio diversity. We have
preserved, maintained our bio diversity. Looking at the last 100 years we find how the
North chose a path where they did not care about biodiversity. Consider the forests in
Finland and Sweden. When were these planted. A very fascinating picture emerges, and
it has nothing to do with biodiversity. Forests were planted for industry. This was
60-70 years ago but they were not needed 20 years ago. Alternate energy sources
were available. Forests were planted for the steel industry. The point I make here is
that while being country specific, we should be region specific also. We have here a
major responsibility because our country in this region, and some countries a lit bit
outside this region have as I said the greatest bio diversity on this planet. This bio
diversity is now extremely important because great strides in biotechnology in terms of
agriculture, medicine, phannaceuticals. In terms of future sustainable paths,
Biotechnology has a very major role to play. The Biodiversity Convention has
established a linkage between biomatenal and biodiversity. And I do hope that we
would be able to set this off the ground in the months ahead.
In India our ethos, mythology, our religions have close linkages with the
environment. For many years, we have had a national pollution abatement policy, a
national conservation policy, and a national forest policy since 1988, and these were not
made for Rio. We how have to inbuild environmental concerns in what we do, but of
course we cannot place environment before people or development. The perceived
differences between environment and development should be blunted not sharpened and
we have to work on the financial mechanisms, the financial incentives. Our national
pollution policies lay down that the fiscal instrument will be used-to solved the
pollution problem of cities. In Delhi 65% of pollution is altributable to vehicles. Shut
down all travel and buses and we can bring it down to 15%, but is this the solution? It
has an economic dimension. It is easy to say to get the vehicles 10 years old off the
road. When families survive on it, when movements of goods depend on itwhat we
require is unleaded fuel for which we need catalytic convertors. Just a few examples.
With these policies before us, the fiscal instruments are to assist, to catalyze the
building in environmental concerns into what we are doing in our projects, in our path
to development. Of course, we would like such instruments to be as revenue neutral as
possiblem but some times it may be possible and sometimes it may not be. In the
matter of the environment India has been a responsible country. We look at the future
with hope. We are optimistic about the interface with our neighbors and with developed
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countries, because we are not in this as a Government but all of us (you, me and all of
us) are trustees for the future.
Thank you very much.
An overview of post-Rio political economy issues
Akshay Jaitly
Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi, India
Introduction
This paper attempts, in two parts, to examine some impacts of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janerio on particular political
economy issues related to global environmental governance. Part I examines political
economy implications of the Rio process through an analysis of the major documents
originating from Rio.' It outlines some implications for major issues including su-
stainable development, sovereignty, the development of international law, the
international economic system, financial mechanisms, the status of local and indigenous
communities and the prescribed policy instruments.2 Part II identifies the minimum
requirements of a successful multilateral regulatory regime (the Convention-Protocol
model) as identified by a number of analysts. Using information from Part I, the Rio
regimes are compared with these in an effort to gain a preliminary view of their
relative success and failure and an insight into their potential for the future.
The dual process of conflict and accommodation between contending positions
taken by developed countries and developing countries in UNCED is evident from all
the documents emanating from UNCED. This is perhaps best exemplified in the Rio
Declaration which is portrayed as the international consensus on the future direction of
global environment and development. Further, it is designed to give a more formal
structure to the 'global partnership' considered necessary to operationalize
environmental imperatives related to development and growth. The Declaration provides
a framework of values welded into an attempted integration, but the specific Conven-
tions show up more clearly areas of conflicting interests. Apart from balancing these
interests, local political, social and economic perspectives will also enter into the
process of predicting the future scope of specific rules or principles outlined by Rio.
The task is bound to be complex, and it is difficult to conceive of an easy unanimity in
the results of the process.
Part Ithe conventions examined
General commentsimplications for international law
The Rio Conventions are a hybrid of two types in the commonly accepted taxonomy of
treaties.3 The first kind of treaty is of a norm creating character or forms the basis for
'The documents being considered are the Rio Declaration, the Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the Biological Diversity Convention.
2lmplications for transfer of technology and associated questions of the subsequent status of intellectual
property rigbts are not being considered for reasons of scope.
'For an elaboration of the different types of treaties and their relative application, see Henkin, Pugh,
Schachter and Smit, International Law, Cases and Materials, Second Edition, West Publishing Co., St. PaUl,
Minnesota, 1989.
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the creation of a general rule of international law. The second establishes a
collaborative mechanism for states to regulate or manage a particular area of activity.
The norms that the Rio treaties are trying to create (in the context of the first type of
treaty) relate to the acceptance of sustainable development as a fundamental principle
of international economic and environmental organization. This forms the background
of the UNCED process. More specifically, the individual treaties attempt to regulate
particular types of activity that have implications for sustainable development. These
are: the preservation of biological diversity and of the climate system. This second type
of treaty is typically characterised as an international regime or as international
administrative law. Within this framework, the treaties develop different mechanisms to
address specific problems.
An important feature of the entire process is that it represents a new stage in the
progressive development of international environmental law. The three Rio documents
take up the thread of certain principles of international environmental law and policy
and have codified them in the context of the specific problems that they address. It
would be naive, however, to imagine that ambiguities related to international
environmental law have disappeared as a result.
Despite the fact that the Rio Declaration is non-binding, its worth as an interna-
tional (legal) document cannot be ignored. The Declaration perhaps possesses the
potential which the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) did when it was
adopted. The latter document provided the basic framework from which followed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, as also a host of declarations and conventions
concerning specific human rights issues. The Universal Declaration, along with the two
Covenants, are regarded today by a substantial body of responsible legal opinion as part
of customary international law. If subsequent state practice roots itself in the Principles
of the Rio Declaration, as can be expected, it may prove to be an important source of
interpretation in the formulation of global environmental law and policy, and an
important sector of customary international law could come into existence.
This is reinforced by the fact that the Climate Change Convention and the
Biological Diversity Convention, which will become binding, contain Articles based on
specific Principles in the Rio Declaration. Through the course of this paper we identify
areas in which the Rio Declaration along with the Climate Change Convention and the
Biological Diversity Convention are providing the impetus for the further development
of emerging principles of international law. These include, as we shall see later
principles such as intergenerational equity, the right to development, the precautionary
principle and the necessity of environmental impact assessments.
All the documents acknowledge human responsibility for causing the specific
global environmental problem that they address. Also, the message of the Rio process
is quite clearly anthropocentric. Only the concerns and rights of humans are implicated
and there are no provisions for rights of animals or any other living or non-living
entities. We now turn to an examination of specific political economy issues.
Sustainable development
Sustainable development constitutes the stated goal of the UNCED process. However,
an analysis of the documents reveals that they provide no clear definition of the
concept of 'sustainable development' and that sufficing interpretations have to be drawn
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from the texts. The literature on the meaning and content of sustainable development is
too extensive to review here, but a brief statement may be essayed.
Definitions
The most widely accepted definition of sustainable development is provided by the
UN's World Commission on Environment and Development, which described it as
development that 'meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.4 This articulation of sustainable
development has led to attempts to spell out in greater detail the specific features of
this concept. Some alternative definitions that outline the content of sustainable devel-
opment are given below.5
An economic definition places greater emphasis on the use of 'renewable natural
resources in a manner that does not eliminate or otherwise diminish their.. .usefulneas
for future generations' Alternatively, in a welfare state perspective, sustainable
development has been described as development that improves health care, education
and social well being.7 A third, technology based interpretation is that sustainable
development includes a 'rapid transformation of the technological base of industrial
civilization'8 with the use of new technologies that should be cleaner, more efficient
and less natural resource intensive.9 An ecological definition of the concept is that it
involves 'improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity
of supporting ecosystems'.'°
There do, of course, exist linkages between each of these concepts\
interpretations of sustainable development, which indicate that these could be con-
sidered aspects of the same process. These definitions are intended to be merely
pointers in terms of content and not a description of the debate on the subject.
4World Commission on Enviranment and Development, 1987, Our Common Future, Oxford University
Press, New York.
5These are based on definitions provided in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-93,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1992.
6Robert Goodland and George Ledec, "Neoclassical Economics and Principles of Sustainable
Development, Ecological Modelling Vol 38 19870 p 36. Quoted in World Resources 1992 -93.
7United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1991, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1991. Quoted in World Resources 1992-93.
James Gustave Speth,"The Environment The Greening of Technology," Development, Vol.2, No.3,1989.
Quoted in World Resources, 1992-93.
9George Heaton, Rqbert Repetto and Rodney Sobin, Transforming Technology: An Agenda for
Environmentally Sustainable Growth in the 21sf Century, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., 1991.
Quoted in World Resources 1992-93.
10IUCN-the World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme and World Wide Fund
for Nature, Caring for the Earth, IUCN, UNEP and WWF, Switzerland, 1991. Quoted in World Resources,
1 992-93.
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Interpretations
The Rio Declaration contains numerous references to sustainable development. In the
absence of an explicit definition, a proximate interpretation can be derived through an
examination of the text of the various Principles. Its implicit contents may be some or
all of the following:
'a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature,' (Principle 1);
'environmental protection is an inherent part of the development process,'
(implying perhaps that development that does not protect the environment is not
sustainable) (Principle 4);
'eradicating poverty,' (which is seen as an indispensable requirement for
sustainable development) (Principle 5);
as related to 'production and consumption,' and 'appropriate demographic
policies,' (Principle 8) and;
involving 'exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhanc-
ing the development, adaptation and diffusion of new technologies, including the
transfer of technologies' (Principle 9).
In line with the different definitions listed in Section 2.1 above, (a) and (b)
cOuld be said to represent the environmental or ecological aspects of sustainable
development, (e) involves the technological component and (c) and (d) relate to the
economic and human aspects. Developing country concerns around the UNCED process
have predominantly related to (c) and (e).
Poverty eradication is a priority in developing countries and the focus of most
development measures. The Climate Change Convention and the Biological Diversity
Convention both explicitly recognize that economic and social development and poverty
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries with respect to
the fulfilment of their commitments under the Conventions.
The importance of the technology transfer issue is obvious from the protracted
wrangling over the Climate Change and Biological Diversity Conventions. The
developing country argument, as is well known, has been that to follow sustainable
development paths and to fulfil obligations that may arise under the two conventions,
the transfer of funds and technology are essential. The crux of the post-Rio environ-
mental debate will relate to the mechanisms to deal with poverty eradication and
transfer of technology."
Likewise, the two conventions contain references to sustainable development.
The Climate Change Convention describes sustainable development as requiring 'access
to resources' (Preamble), and recognizes that sustainable development for developing
countries means an increase in energy consumption. It states that all countries have the
right to and should promote sustainable development (Article 3 (4)) and also holds that
an open and supportive economic system would lead to sustainable development in all
countries, especially developing countries. This is hard to swallow. First, it can be
argued that a commitment to using more resources contrasts with the WCED definition
of sustainable development, which aims to minimize the use of such resources. Second,
"The debate over mechanisms relates not only to institutions that will be set up to oversee the Rio
agreements, but also over the appropriate policy instruments for the process. Developed countries are likely
to argue that market friendly mechanisms and respect for intellectual property rights are essential, while
developing coutries will argue in favourS of easy access to technology and the right to determine the
appropriate domestic regimes to n erationalize sustainable development policies.
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as will be discussed later, it is difficult to imagine that there would be no losers
whatsoever (at least in the short run) as a result of instituting an open and supportive
economic system. (See Section 4 below).
The Biological Diversity Convention is fundamentally based on promoting the
sustainable use of the components of biological diversity. This is defined as 'the use of
the components of biological diversity in a manner and at a rate that does not lead to
the long term decline of biological diversity, thereby meeting its potential to meet the
needs of present and future generations' (Article 2).
The cumulative message from Rio as related to sustainable development is
generally in keeping with the WCED interpretation. It is however entirely possible that
national and international efforts to bring about sustainable development will lead to
changed interpretations and a sharper focus on the issue. A close reading of Agenda 21,
which intends to spell out the contents of a global sustainable development policy will
be required to determine possible conflicts (in the context of both Conventions) with
existing notions of the concept and with (potentially non-sustainable) development in
general, since difficult choices, manadated by scarce resources, will probably have to be
made at a later stage.
Intergenerational equity
The concept of intergenerational equity has as its basis a determiriation of the
obligations of current generations to future generations and, consequently, the rights of
current people to use resources available on the earth. This requires a focus on the
relationship that each generation has to others. To define the notion of intergenerational
equity, it is helpful to view the human community as a continuous partnership across
all generations, whose purpose is to realize and protect the well being of every
generation and to conserve the resources of the planet for this purpose. The Rawisian
notion of the 'veil of ignorance' implies that each generation will want to receive the
planet in at least as good condition as every other generation.12
Intergenerational equity can also be defined in terms of intergenerational (inter-
temporal) externalities.13 An intertemporal externality would be one which involves
benefits accruing to the present generation, reaped at the cost of future generations
(and, possibly, the other way around as well). It is the imposition of a cost at a time
later than the time at which the benefit is received.
Two kinds of equity are embodied in the WCED definition of sustainable
development quoted in Section 2.1. The first is equity for people living now, who do
not have access to natural resources or social and economic goods; and the second is
intergenerational equity as defined above. There exists the potential for conflict between
these two notions, especially since the two Conventions do not always draw clear
distinctions between them. Equity, therefore, is an obvious subject for future
protocols.14
t2For an elucidation of the concept of a veil of ignorance, see John Rawis, A Theoiy of Justice, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971.
13Gerard C Rowe, 1991, 'International Environmental Sustainability: Policy and Law, The Science of the
Total Environment, 108, (1991).
'4For reasons of scope, we do not discuss details of various equity formulations in this paper.
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Some analysts point out that environmental issues in developing countries
cannot be resolved without alleviating poverty, and call for redistribution of wealth and
incomes spatially, both within countries and between rich and poor nations. Others
stress intergenerational equity and focus on the need for reducing current consumption
to provide for investments that build up and maintain resources for the future. Despite
the fact that sustainable development implies, primarily, intergenerational equity, it is
necessary to be aware of the ways in which uncorrected interspatial equities may mask
or contribute to the existence of intertemporal equities.'5 Where spatial inequities are
not prevented, or at least compensated for, societies tend to be unaware of possible
intertemporal inequities and the capacity of institutional structures to prevent them are
likely to be absent.16
The Rio documents seem to follow the line of argument that it is possible (and
necessary) to do both. In calling for transfers of financial resources across nations, they
try to address the issue of equity between nations (though not within nations). At the
same time they all stress the need for intergenerational equity, both in terms of their
embracing the concept of sustainable development and more explicitly, in their
reference to intergenerational equity itself. This is done in the following manner.
Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration states that the right to development must be
fulfilled so as to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations. In the Climate Change Convention intergenerational equity is referred to
both in the Preamble and in Article 3 (1), in the context of the protection of the climate
for present and future generations. Likewise, in the Biological Diversity Convention,
this temporal form of equity is referred to in the Preamble, which resolves to conserve
and suitably use biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations.
Further, in Article 1, the sustainable use of biological diversityboth in terms of needs
and aspirationsis defined in terms of intergenerational equity. This could perhaps be
interpreted as further delineating the concept of intergenerational equity, introducing a
greater subjective element, since 'aspirations' could prove extremely difficult to define.
The right to (sustainable?) development
There are two moral and political imperatives behind the right to development itself
which are based in the history of North-South political economy.'7 The first of these
can be traced back to UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) Resolution 626 (VII)
of 21 December 1952, which referred to the right of member states to freely exploit
their natural resources, and is based on the principle that the individual State should
have the right to control its own economy and thus develop in its own way. The second
imperative is the idea that economic development as such is inadequate and that the
performance of an economic system should be related to qualitative criteria based on
human rights standards as well. Our analysis looks at the effect that UNCED may have
'5Rowe, 1991.
'6A person intent solely on providing for basic needs is unlikely to be aware of his or her contribution
to degrading resources that are necessary for use in the future.
tlThis section draws on Ian Brownlie, "The Human Right to Development," Commonwealth Human
Rights Unit Occasional Series, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1990, for the history of the right to
development.
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had on the first set of imperatives relating to the right to development and will not refer
to the latter.
The credit for the formulation of a formal right to development belongs to an
eminent Senegalese jurist, Keba Mbaye, writing in 1972. By 1979, ECOSOC
(Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council) of the United
Nations had begun studying the right to development and in 1986 the UN had adopted
a Declaration on the Right to Development based on the report of the Commission, The
legislative history of the right is thus firmly based within the human rights agenda of
the General Assembly and ECOSOC, two UN bodies traditionally dominated by
developing country interests.
The December 1986 UNGA resolution contained an annex with a 'Declaration
on the Right to Development' which spelt out the details of the content of the right to
development. Elements of the right were held to be the following: the right of peoples
to self-determination, the right of peoples to full sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources, an element of international economic justice, people-oriented
development, development assistance and consequently the flow of funds from richer to
poorer nations, international cooperation, disarmament and popular participation in the
decision making process. This Declaration is not the only source of interpretation of the
right to development but supporting evidence of the content is provided by a number of
other international documents.'8
The process of global environmental governance may be altering the content of
the right to development. In stressing sustainability and intergenerational equity, the
focus seems to be shifting from equity between present people (in different nations or
in different parts of an individual nation) to include intergenerational equity.
Developing nations need to be careful that this interpretation does not come to
dominate the international environmental arena, and that issues relating to international
inequities do also remain an issue on the agenda.
Sovereignty
One of the principal concerns of developing countries in the global environmental
process has been to prevent any international jurisdiction over of what are considered
national natural resources. This has been an important aspect of their position for a
number of years. The Principles of the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment declared that states have the 'sovereign right to exploit their own
resources, pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure
that activity within their own jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'.
While today the use of these resources is important mainly in the context of
their economic value and exploitation, the depth of sentiment in developing countries
on this issue must be seen against the backdrop of their shared colonial experience.
This is the perception that many of their current economic problems (poverty, debt, low
international commodity prices etc.) can be traced to policies of colonial regimes,
which exploited the natural resources of colonial territories for their own advantage and
deprived those territories of the opportunity of self-development.
Another argument is that for states to be equal players in a global partnership, it
is essential for them to have independent natural resource exploitation policies. This
'See for instance, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
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exercise of their sovereign rights, it is felt, is the only way to ensure their meaningful
participation in any global process. They believe that the right and opportunity to
exercise an autonomous exploitation of their own natural resources is a powerful factor
in the maturation of a people to the full dimensions of statehood. These concerns were
brought to Rio by developing countries,
A natural corollary to this perspective on sovereignty is the concern that interna-
tional jurisdiction over natural resources should supplement and not supplant national
controls. Further, that inclusion of global perspectives in the formulation of national
economic policies should not necessarily imply the supersession of autonomous national
control by any form of international jurisdiction.
This classic developing country concern is addressed in each of the Rio docu-
ments.'9 The sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources, pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies.., is clearly acknowledged in the Rio
Declaration. The wording of this principle, however is not unambiguous. States are
recognized as possessing sovereign rights over their 'own resources', without any
details of what these include. It becomes especially necessary to define 'own resources'
because things like the atmosphere, earlier considered unlimited free goods, have
become scarce in the context of GHG accumulation. The enjoyment of these sovereign
rights are limited only by consideration of their transboundary environmental impacts. It
is possible to interpret this principle as defining the limits of 'own resources,' i.e.
resources cease to be national to the extent that their exploitation can have adverse
transboundary impacts.
A cautionary note needs to be sounded with reference to the sovereignty
principle. While the existence of national control over natural resources is an important
principle of international law, it must be recognized that any process of cooperative
international decision-making requires, almost by definition, a degree of sacrifice of
sovereign rights by states parties.
The Conventions recognize the fact that the activities being regulated lie within
the realm of national jurisdiction. However, even the presence of non-binding exhorta-
tions to change this pattern of activity and to cooperate in international efforts can have
the effect of restricting sovereignty. While most measures envisaged in the two
Conventions depend on individual state action, states are under an implicit obligation
not to carry out activities that go against the spirit of each convention, even if such
activities are otherwise legitimate. The primary method of enforcement of such a prin-
ciple is 'peer pressure' exerted by other nations that are part of the same treaty
arrangement. It is also important to note the impact of the differential power of states in
the international arena on this process.
More specifically, in the Climate Change Convention, commitments envisaged
under Article 4 (1) and (2) envisage nations altering patterns of development and life-
styles, moving to less greenhouse gas intensive paths. To accept this implies some
restrictions, voluntarily executed, but internationally determined. This is specifically
true of developed country commitments under Article 4 (2), where a specific target of
returning to 1990 levels by the end of the decade is alluded to. Again, while this is not
a binding commitment, the existence of a specific number and date puts pressure on
states to follow it.
'91n Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, the Preamble in the Climate Change Convention and Article 3
of the Biological Diversity Convention.
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In the Biological Diversity Convention it could be said that sovereignty might
be affected due to the promise of access to biotechnology. Sovereign rights will be
given up, albeit in a contractive framework that. Article 16 (1) states that access to
resources is essential for the success of the convention, which can be construed as an
implicit encouragement to give up sovereignty.
The international economic system
Global economic inequities have been part of the North-South political economy debate
since the process of decolonization began after World War II. Traditional developing
country demands for a new international economic order have diminished, but fears of
economic imperialism linger and must be addressed by any process implicating the
global economy.
One of the main (stated) priorities of developed countries is to move towards an
international economic system that encourages or at least allows (if only in principle)
freer trade and access to foreign investment (especially in developing countries). While
the necessity of global partnerships and assistance to developing countries is accepted
in principle, there is a concern among developed countries that the possible changes in
lifestyles, the 'new and additional flows' necessary to enable developing countries to
carry out environmentally sound development measures and the internalization of envi-
ronmental costs to the polluter will distort current patterns of international trade and
investment.
The meaning of an 'supportive and open' international economic system (which
is held to promote economic growth and sustainable development in all countries) is
also of potential importance to developing countries. Supportive could variously be
interpreted as supportive to developing countries, implying concessional aid, technology
transfer, easier access to markets and the like. On the other hand, supportive as
interpreted by developed countries could mean an economic environment within
developing countries that would support direct foreign investment, allowing easy access
to exports and conforming to developed country intellectual property rights. Likewise,
'open' could be interpreted to mean open economies with free trade and direct foreign
investment or, on the developing country side, easier access to technology and the
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Developing countries, therefore, are concerned
that an operational interpretation of 'open and supportive' does not lead to unfavourable
terms of trade and investment and does not attenuate their economic sovereignty.
There is some ambiguity involved in the wording of Principle 16 of the Rio
Declaration, which also finds expression, in a slightly altered form, in Article 3 (5) of
the Climate Change Convention. In this principle, national authorities are encouraged to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments,
on the basis of the polluter pays principle discussed below. At the same time nations
are urged to do so without distorting international trade and investment. If the meaning
of 'distort' in this formulation is loose and refers to deviations from the 'rules of the
game' (i.e. free trade and an open investment climate), then the Principle has some
meaning. If, on the other hand, the interpretation is a strict economic one, then it is
difficult to understand how distortions will not take place as a result of changes in
comparative advantage that will come about as a result of changed cost structures (as a
result of the mternalization of environmental costs to the polluter/producer). These
issues will require resolution in the future.
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Financial mechanisms
One of the most crucial questions that Rio poses is that of the structure and functioning
of the international financial mechanism that will oversee financial transfers envisaged
in the two conventions. This is so particularly because of the problem of developing
country debt problems and repayment issues that loom large over international relations
in this area,
In the Climate Change Convention, Article 11(1) defines a mechanism for the
provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis. This is to be
accountable to the Conference of the Parties established under the Convention. The
Conference of the Parties is to decide its policies, programme priorities and eligibility
criteria. The Article goes on to say that the operation of the mechanism will be
entrusted to one or more existing international entities.
Paragraph (2) of the same Article states that the financial mechanism shall have
'equitable' and 'balanced' representation of all parties within a 'transparent' system of
governance. This is crucial because the extent of say that different groups of countries
(developed and developing) will have over the disbursement of funds related to the
financial mechanism and the basis on which lending will be carried out hinges on it.
Developing countries will be eager to ensure that the functioning of the financial
mechanism does not allow donors to direct and determine economic priorities (a la
structural adjustment) in the countries they lend to through the FM (Financial
Mechanizm). There is therefore a need to clarify the exact meanings of the terms in
quotes above. Article 21 deals with FM and envisages that GEF (Global Environmental
Facility) of the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP will be the international entity entrusted
with this task. For the GEF to carry out this role in accordance with the guidelines in
Article 11, its restructuring will become essential, with membership becoming
universal.
Similar arrangements exist in the Biological Diversity Convention. Article 21(1)
states that the Conference of the Parties shall determine the policy, strategy, programme
priorities and eligibility criteria relating to access and use of financial resources
collected under the Convention. It envisages that the mechanism shall operate within a
'democratic' and 'transparent' system of governance. Article 39, on interim financial
arrangements, again designates the GEF with the job. It specifies that the GEF must be
fully restructured in accordance with the requirements of Article 21.
The financial mechanism and the restructuring of the GEF has implications for
the process of decision making in the international ar'ena. Thus far the GEF has
functioned as a part of the World Bank system, with weighted voting on the basis of
the number of shares held by members. This introduces an inherent bias in the system
towards developed countries, especially the United States, which hold 'the majority of
shares. The future structure of the GEF will have to be fine tuned in order to
accommodate developing country concerns outlined above; this again could be the
subject of a future protocol. It will also have to be designed in a manner that will
ensure continued participation of the United States and other intransigent donor
countries, who will obviously prefer the World Bank system for weightage according to
contribution.
Indigenous and local communities
Some interested parties (especially representatives of various indigenous communities
and their organizations that gathered in Rio in the parallel Global Forum) would
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consider that the greatest failure of the Summit (and the Conventions that came out of
it) was its inability to safeguard concerns of indigenous and local communities relating
to their community resources and practices. A number of aspects of traditional lifestyles
are implicated by the issues discussed at Rio. The treaties fight shy of accepting tradi-
tional rights, and leave this issue to the discretion of governments, which may not act
in the interests of these communities.
Rio Declaration acknowledges that indigenous peoples and their communities
and other local communities have a vital 'role' to play in environmental manage'ment
and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. Further it says
that states should 'recognize' and duly 'support' their identity, culture and interests and
'enable' their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.
Note that there is no mention of any rights nor does the Declaration explicitly prohibit
activities that may harm traditional ways of life.
The Biological Diversity Convention implicates such traditional communitis far
more directly than either the Rio Declaration or the Climate Change Convention.
Genetic resources (or the living matter that contains them) are often an integral part of
life in these communities and regulatory attempts are extremely likely to affect tradi-
tional uses of these resources. The Biological Diversity Convention, in its Preamble,
recognises the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources and the desirabil-
ity of sharing equitably the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge,
innovations and practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components.
Article 8 (j) encourages states, 'subject to national legislation', to respect,
preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the conservation
of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge;
innovations and practices. Further, Article 10 (c) urges states to protect and encourage
the customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural
practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements.
Also, 10 (d) encourages states to support local populations and develop and
implement remedial action in degraded areas where biological diversity has been
reduced. Finally, the contracting parties are encouraged, in accordance with their
national legislation and policies to encourage and develop methods of cooperation for
the development and use of technologies, including indigenous and traditional technol-
ogies of the objectives of the convention. The language throughout is dilute.
The words used: 'respect' 'promote', 'protect' and 'encourage', contain no
stxong directives to States Parties to actually incoiporate measures that take into
a,eount the interests of traditional communities. This is an area of weakness in the Rio
process. Traditional communities have in the past been adversely affected by
development projects, especially those with significant environmental impacts. At the
same time, there is an expanding consensus about the value of the knowledge' systems
developed in these tnditional communities, which revolve around the sustainable use of
resources available in their environment. Much of this knowledge and information has
not been documented or recorded as yet. The principle of scientific uncertainty could
have been extnded to apply to indigenous knowledge, and this could contain clues as
to useful applications. Also, if events in the recent past are any indication, local
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communities can organize in resistance to development projects that they feel go
against their interests. Any far sighted policy maker would be well advised to consider
the interests of these communities in framing policies and implementing projects that
implicate these communities.
Anticipated policy instruments
We look here at the extent to which the conventions further the progressive develop-
ment of international regulatory instruments for the control of the environment. Legal
liability regimes, economic regulation and environmental impact assessments are
envisaged as possible instruments in the Rio Declaration (Principles 13, 16, 17
respectively), though not all instruments are emphasised in each Convention.
Polluter pays principle
In the Rio Declaration the polluter pays principle is stressed both in terms of the
development of national laws of liability and compensation and the development of
economic instruments. The idea behind the principle is to internalize the costs of
pollution to the polluter. Principles 13 and 16 specifically address legal liability and
economic instruments, respectively, though no mention is made of how an appropriate
choice would be made between the two. The selection of a particular instrument can
have deep implications for developing countries, since they place differing burdens of
responsibility and cost on them.2°
The Climate Change Convention does not explicitly accept polluter pays, though
are implict indications that this concept is at play. The Preamble notes that the largest
share of GHG emissions originated in developed countries, and throughout the
document, 'common but differentiated responsibilities' are referred to in addition to
capabilities. It could perhaps be construed that these are outlined on the basis of a
historical polluter pays principle for GHG accumulation.
The Biological Diversity Convention contains references to liability in the case
of harm caused due to the release of genetically modified organisms as under Article 8
(g) and (h). Article 14 (2) empowers the Conference of the Parties to examine the issue
of liability and redress, including restoration and compensation, for damage to
biological diversity, except where such liability is a purely internal matter. For both
Conventions, more sophisticated liability instruments could be. developed as a protocol.
In formation and notification
Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration refer to information and notification
requirements in case of transboundary environmental harm. The issues addressed by
these principles appear to be far more dilute than what may be mandated by environ-
mental realities. Principle 18 for instance, requires states to notify other states of any
natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects
on the environment of those states.
Further, the international community is enjoined to make every effort to help
states so affected. The language of the principle is ambiguous. What is implied by
'other emergencies' is unclear. If disasters such that at Chemobyl is the target, then the
Principle has some value, otherwise, it remains fairly toothless. Secondly, the interna-
20See P. Ghosh and A. Jaitly, Legal Liability vs. Administrative Regulation: the Problem of Institutional
Design in Global Environmental Policy, paper presented in this Seminar.
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tional community is required oniy to make 'every effort' to assist the affected states,
with no firm commitment necessary to repair damage.
The interpretation of Principle 19 depends, to a great extent, on that of 18. In it,
states are required to provide 'prior and timely notification and relevant information to
potentially affected sates on account of activities that may have a significant adverse
transboundary impact' and to consult with those states at an early stage...'. The
meaning of this phrase hinges on what was meant by 'other emergencies' in the
Principle 18. If this addressed the Chernobyl type situation, then it could perhaps be
assumed that Principle 19 is aimed at activities that contributed to other (global)
environmental problems that are slower to develop (such as climate change).
In the Biological Diversity Convention, Article 14 (1) (c), (d) and (e) deal with
similar information and notification requirements. Article 14 (1) (c) encourages the
states parties to promote, on a reciprocal basis, the exchange of information, notifica-
tion and consultation on their activities 'that are likely significantly to affect adversely
the biological diversity of other states or areas beyond their jurisdiction'. Clause (d) of
the same Article enjoins states to immediately notify potentially affected states of
threats to their biological diversity in the case of grave or imminent danger or damage
originating under their control.
The requirements under the Rio Declaration are merely for states to notify,
inform and consult, with no mention made of methods to solve the problems created by
such activities. This can set a dangerous precedent for future environmental policy
making based on the Rio Declaration. In the Biological Diversity Convention, however,
clause (d) enjoins states to initiate action, in addition to information and notification
requirements, to prevent or minimize such danger or damage.
Environmental impact assessments
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs), already a part of environmental language
and policy all over the world, are also strongly recommended as a policy instrument by
the Rio process.
Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration advocates the adoption of EIAs as a national
instrument, for activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the
environment. These are to be made subject to the decisions of a competent national
authority. The Climate Change Convention refers to EIAs in Article 4 (1) (f), which
refers to the introduction of climate change considerations in policy formulation. It may
be significant that EIAs are the only instrument specifically mentioned as an
'appropriate method' to minimize the effects of climate change on the economy, public
health and environmental quality. Article 14 of the Biological Diversity Convention
encourages contracting parties to introduce appropriate procedures requiring EJAs on
projects that are likely to have a significant adverse effects on biological diversity, and
further, allowing for public participation in the process.
Part Ilsuccessful international regimes
Was Rio a success? Did concerned parties come away with what they were looking
for? A basic condition for the success the arrangement is political acceptability. This,
at the risk of stating the obvious, forms the basis for the successful conclusion of any
negotiated process and each of the features listed below help in making the convention
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politically acceptable.2' We identify here six features considered necessary for the
success of an international regulatory regime and see how the Rio Conventions compare
with these.
Flexibility
A Convention-Protocol model of international regime must be flexible in its ability to
deal with, among other things, scientific uncertainty and different national concerns.
Both Conventions recognize different groups of countries, based primarily on
varying types of national concerns. The primary classification of countries is on the
basis of the developed/developing country distinction. This divides the signatories into
two distinct groups, with different sets of commitments. Developed country commit-
ments are somewhat more stringent and are implicitly based on first, their responsibility
for causing the problems and, second, their ability to pay for measures to solve them.
A secondary set of classifications is on the basis of more specific characteristics,
such as those dependent on fossil fuels as users, producers, exporters and importers and
countries that, for different reasons, are considered more susceptible to the negative
impacts of global warming or the loss of biological diversity. These include least
developed countries, small island states, countries with low lying coastal areas, those in
semi-arid regions, or those with fragile mountain eco-systems. One of the reasons
behind this method of classification could have been to provide the flexibility required
for different countries to sign and, further, to adhere to their commitments.
As mentioned above, it is also important that any arrangements to deal with
climate change and the loss of biological diversity take specific account of the
prevailing uncertainty. This will enable future responses to be tuned to deal with poss-
ible changes in the associated scientific facts, given an adequate review mechanism.
Article 4 (2) (d) of the Climate Change Convention provides for the review of
developed country commitments in the light of best available scientific information.
Based on this, the Conference of the Parties can take appropriate action, including
recommending amendments to the Convention. Article 7 (2) (a) enjoins the Conference
of the Parties to 'periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional
arrangements... ' in line with the 'evolution of scientific and technological knowledge.
In the Biological Diversity Convention, similar arrangements exist under Article 23,
which gives the Conference of the Parties the task of review, on the basis of, in
paragraph (b) of the Article, scientific, technological and technical advice. The process,
therefore, does allow for sufficient flexibility.
Inclusiveness
For a comprehensive solution to global problems with multivariate causes, a convention
must look for inclusiveness: of actors, of all the sources of the problem being addressed
and of possible solutions.
21Details of what the features of a successful convention should be were gleaned from, amongst others,
the following articles: Ajay Mathur, Political Issues in the Formulation of a Climate Change Convention,"
paper presented at the Global Forum, Rio do Janerio, June 1992, Ligia Noronha, "Background Note on the
INC Negotiations," Tate Energy Research Institute, New Delhi, 1991 James Sebenius, "Designing
Negotiations for a Successful Regime," international Security, Spring 1991 (Vol 15, No.4) and Oran Young,
"The Politics of International Regime Fonnation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment,
international Organization, Vol 43, No.3, 1989.
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One of the features of the Convention-Protocol model of international agree-
ments in which universality is desired, is that in an effort to appeal to a wide group of
countries, principles often have to be diluted; this has been called the 'lowest common
denominator' 22 This can reduce the value of the treaty arrangement as a whole. If, on
the other hand, this is not done, it can be expected that some countries----or groups of
countrieswill not become part of the treaty arrangement.
The Rio documents have suffered from both the above problems. The Declar-
ation attempts to be all things to all people, perhaps because it is a declaration and not
a convention, and also because it purports only to provide a framework to guide envi-
ronmental law and policy making in the future. In the Climate Change Convention, it
was hoped that developed countries would arrive at specific (CO2) emissions reduction
targets. United States refusal to accept such targets consigns the subject to the realm of
a future protocol, even though some nations might adopt unilateral reduction targets. In
the Biological Diversity Convention, despite the presence of weak and mitigating
language, the United States refused to accept provisions relating to the transfer of
biotechnology and associated implications for intellectual property rights and did not
sign the Convention. This significantly detracted from its value and the failure to
include the United States is one of the primary weaknesses of the process.
It is also necessary for a convention cover all the sources or activities that cause
the problem being addressed. In the Climate Change Convention all activities
generating all types of GHGs (except those covered by the Montreal Protocol i.e.
CFCs) are covered and no differentiation is made between different sources of GHGs.
The Biological Diversity Convention refers to the protection of all sources of biological
diversity.
Accommodating domestic constraints to international
cooperation
Countries can face a number of purely domestic constraints to international cooperation.
These could reduce their ability to contribute to and participate effectively in
implementing the rules and mechanisms established under the regime. These constraints
need to be accommodated.
Global environmental issues are not generally the subject of popular debate in
developing countries, primarily because of the pressures they face from the requir-
ements of development itself. Such pressures can include growing populations, low
standards of living and various other social and economic problems. The imperatives of
development are recognized throughout the Conventions, and as we have seen in Part I,
the right to development has been strongly reaffirmed, though in the altered garb of.
sustainable development. In the Climate Change Convention, the Preamble recognizes
that energy consumption in developing countries will grow to meet the needs of social
and economic development. The extent to which development concerns will predomi-
nate over environmental ones under the Conventions remains to be seen.
Interest groups within each country have a role to play in the run-up to a
country's ratification of a convention. This is particularly true if the regulated activities
are likely to have a significant effects on the domestic economy and lifestyles. These
groups, if powerful enough, can affect the stability of governments, cause major
22Sand, Peter H., 1990, Lessons Learnt in Global Environmental Governance, World Resources Institute,
Washington, DC.
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changes in policy orientation and form coalitions that could make the domestic
functioning of a treaty regime extremely difficult.
With respect to the Climate Change Convention, the major interest groups that
could be negatively affected by its ratification include oil and coal producing
companies, power producing utilities and GHG emitting industry in general. The
Convention therefore fights shy of setting specific targets for emissions reduction --
something that would seriously affect these groupsand seeks instead to accommodate
the positions of powerful lobbies such as oil companies, by referring instead to the need
to cater to the interests of countries (oil-dependent, producers, exporters) that would be
affected by international GHG emissions standards.
In the Biological Diversity Convention, the main industrial interest groups with
a stake are pharmaceutical companies and other biotechnology patent holders. These
groups have had a large role to play in the United States' non-ratification of the
Convention. These groups feel that the transfers of biotechnology envisaged under the
Convention would compromise resources invested in R & D. The Bush Adminis-
tration's position on the Convention, in line with the above thinking, has therefore been
that it affords inadequate protection to the holders (current and future) of intellectual
property rights.
Another group whose interests will be affected by the Biological Diversity
Convention are indigenous and local peoples. However, as we have seen, these groups
have not gained any major benefits under the Convention, and some analysts would
point out that their position could be worse after the Biological Diversity Convention
comes into force. These interest groups, however, have less leverage on their govern-
ments, which therefore feel that they can be sidelined.
Enhancing the scientific and technical capabilities of developing countries can
also enable a country to meet its commitments under a Convention. The Climate
Change Convention, in Article 4 (1) (g) and Article 5 refers to such capacity
enhancement. The former refers to the necessity of promoting scientific and other
research related to climate change and clause (c) of the latter enjoins Parties to 'take
into account the particular concerns and needs of developing countries and cooperate in
improving their endogenous capacities and capabilities' and, to participate in efforts
related to support and develop international and intergovernmental efforts to deal with
climate change.
Politically acceptable rules
The actions prescribed by a Convention-Protocol model have to be acceptable and lie
within the realm of practical possibility. It is therefore necessary to defme at the outset
the distribution of rights and responsibilities arising from the conventions.
In the case of the Climate Change Convention, this translates into possible
future resource transfers, which hark back to the question of intergenerational vs.
spatial equity. Developing countries were concerned that in focusing on the needs of
future generations, current perceived imbalances in global patterns of production and
consumption will be ignored in measures for the protection of the environment. In this
framework, it was claimed, there was no scope to do anything for external indebtedness
and the eradication of poverty.23 The Climate Change Convention deals with the issue
by giving poverty eradication and other development concerns an important place as a
23lndian position paper on global environmental issues.
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basic principle, while at the same time referring to the necessity of providing for inter-
generational equity. The spatial equity issue, however, is not adequately dealt with and
will undoubtedly need addressed in a subsequent protocol.
At the same time, there should be no perception of infringement of national
sovereignty as part of the process, even if in reality some sovereign rights have to be
given up. Sovereignty is reaffirmed as a guiding principle and the success of the
conventions is made contingent on national enforcement. However, as we have seen,
the Conventions limit sovereignty in various implicit ways, but evidently this has not
been sufficient to deter most countries from signing the Conventions. Thus, Rio has had
mixed success in framing politically acceptable rules.
Transparency
To be credible and to increase signatory confidence, any international arrangement has
to be transparent, with actions under it open to scrutiny and debate. In the case of the
Climate Change Convention, transparency is required in the accounting of GHG
emissions, the steps taken to control them and evaluations of the efficacy of these steps.
Mechanisms exist for review by the Conference of the Parties, and national inventories
of GHGs and steps taken to address the problem have to be regularly published. The
Biological Diversity Convention could face problems relating to transparency. The
requirements of disclosure in the treaty are restricted to the country providing genetic
material and the country receiving it in order to develop biotechnologies. This allows
for situations where the country developing the biotechnology to exploit this asymmetry
due to its stronger position with respect to information and resources.
Transparency is also essential in the working of the financial mechanisms that
fund activities related to a Convention. In the case of the Conventions being examined
here, the Global Environment Facility is the financial mechanism designated to effect
the allocation and distribution of funds, on the condition that it be made transparent. It
remains to be seen how this is done, because thus far, no details of how transparency
will be brought about have been discussed in the document.
Issue Linkages
Issue linkages are considered essential in order to demonstrate the common advantage
of adhering to a convention and later to a protocol to the different parties involved.
The history of negotiations relating to the 1958 LOS (Law of the Sea Conference) illus-
trated the necessity of establishing issue linkages. The package relating to the 1958
Convention envisaged three 'mini conventions' that dealt with specific issues. The
disadvantage of such a process is that states can choose to adhere only to those conven-
tions that leave them with a net advantage. This in turn leads to disagreement and
confrontation and ultimately in the case of the 1958 LOSto failure. For countries or
groups of similar countries a single issue represents a clear gain or loss and therefore
may prove non-negotiable, unless it can be combined with agreements on other issues
that offset the losses. In the latter case, there may exist the possibility of an 'exchange'
around issues for joint gain.
Issue linkages form part of both the conventions and also find a place
in the Rio Declaration. To start with the latter, population is linked with production and
consumption. On the one hand, developing countries have been concerned that their
See Sebenius, 1991.
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high population growth rates should not bear primary responsibility for global environ-
mental problems. On the other hand, developed countries are reluctant to accept
changes in lifestyle patterns that would be made necessary if what has been described
as their 'unsustainable' patterns of production and consumption are made the primary
focus of environment and development problems. Principle 8 of the Declaration links
the two in the following manner: in order to achieve 'sustainable development and
improve the quality of life for all people' it recommends that states should reduce and
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production while at the same time promoting
appropriate demographic policies This ensures that taking steps on both groups of
activities become part of the agenda.
More specifically, in the two Conventions the transfers of technology and the
provision of new and additional resources are promised in return for the fulfilment of
commitments by developing countries. In the Biological Diversity Convention access to
genetic material in linked to access to biotechnology by the country providing the
resource. This linkage, however is inadequately dealt with in the Convention.
Conclusions
The international community can expect to see much negotiation and policy (both
international and domestic) oriented activity that follows up on the areas implicated by
Rio. One of the more obvious of these is that of negotiations for the development of
protocols or other arrangements that will defitie clearly and put into practice actual
instruments that will make the functioning of the conventions possible. These include,
amongst others, areas such as equity determinations, emissions standards, the definition
of new and agreed incremental costs, technology transfer and intellectual property rights
and issues of liability and compensation.
A clear picture of the cumulative impact of the UNCED process will probably
take years to come to light. The mechanisms that Rio has attempted to put in place are
complex and are related to many different areas of international relations. The
functioning of the global economy, lifestyles of people all over the world; the very
process of development itself could conceivably see significant changes, even perhaps
before the end of the decade. For this to happen, however, it is necessary that
governments demonstrate a will to deal cooperatively with the issues involved.
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The Earth Summitbenchmark or non-event?
C Suriyakumaràn
Honorary Adviser to the Government of Sri Lanka
Introduction
UNCED, 'Brazil 92', the Earth Summitthese were the words by which the UNCED
(United Nations Conference on Environment and Development), decided upon by the
United Nations General Assembly, was described, and which came to an end in June
1992. Its stated purpose, from the beginning, was clear enough. It was to confront
seriously the impending ecological disaster, possibly even collapse, that the Earth was
facingon the one side by the uncontrolled development of the North and on the other,
by two phenomena or factors for the South, one present, the other impending. The first
factor was the ongoing and threatened pollution of the environment from its
overwhelming poverty, accompanied by unbridled population growth. The second was
that, if the South developed as the North has, there would result an unbearable addition
to the toll on the Earth's resources and to its carrying capacity, as to spell disaster for
all of us together. The Earth, after all, was the source of all resources, and the sink of
all wastes.
The Conference was styled as being on environment and development. The
means for attaining what was required for both these ware encased in the catch word
popularised by the Brundland Report named after the Prime Minister of Norway who
headed the Commission called 'sustainable development'. As if also to distinguish itself
from the Stockholm Conference of 1973 on the Human Environment, the Earth Summit
'92 was advertised as emphasizing development for the developing countries, as much
as environment for all. Even in 1973, after a brief flirtation with the developing
countries, in order to attract them to Stockholm, that (like labour intensive industries in
economics) the poor countries would have a chance to attract 'pollution intensive'
industries, the whole matter was set right when Indira Gandhi simply declared at that
Conference that for the poor countries poverty was the greatest pollution, and
development its sole answer. Thereafter UNEP (the United Nations Environment
Programme) invented words like 'eco-development', giving a lot of satisfaction, though
nobody clearly knew what it meant; and 'development without destruction', though
there is never any development, let alone existence, without destruction', until
Brundtland came along and said 'sustainable development'.
Even this last phrase, around which the entire Earth Summit was in fact
drummed up, was without clear definition or methodology, too often, in practice,
interpreted to mean the mere elimination of poverty for the poor countries, with no
'strategy' for real development alongside a sustainable environment. This indeed was
the 'Achilles heel' of the Brundtland slogan of 'sustainable development', and held the
seeds of the weakness of UNCED.
'In other contexts, this writer has quoted the 'trinity' of the Vedantic Reality as of 'Creation, Preservation
and Destruction', as the Buddhist Doctrine of 'Impermanence', and the Gospel (of St. John) in which the
seed must fail and be destroyed before tmay live again.
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Environmental equilibrium
For this type of higher level of development, which was also in economic and
environmental equilibrium, means:
I. that rich countries had to redefine their life styles and consumption targets, and
2. that in their own interest as much as of the South, they had to make freely
available their new environmental management technologies to the South in
order to [a] contain the pollution accompanying rapid development; [b]
maximise the use of alternative resources through invention, technology
application, and various other means which only development could create.
Obviously, the North had not arrived at that point of being willing to talk on
these positions whether at the Earth Summit or in the two years of the preparatory
processes, that went before it. This was best seen at Rio, where of the two agendas
essential to the Conference, namely, an 'Environmental Programme for Conservation'
and an 'Environmental Programme for Development' only one was there, and the other
was missing. The result was that UNCED became simply a matter of discussions and
attempted conclusions on climate, on biodiversity, on forestry and so on, which, while
in many parts highly commendable, were all in the group of what is best termed the
'qualitative' management of the environment namely the question of how to manage
the enormously increased resources that the South would necessarily be using into the
year 2000 and beyond, whether the North liked it or not.
Responsibilities
Surprisingly, the North was not the only party responsible. UNEP had, since
Stockholm, build up a very responsible agenda, with delivery of results, on the
qualitative side of environment, and had allowed the quantitative, development related,
side, despite motions of studies on 'environment and development', to go completely
by default. UNCED simply copied this, not able to show more creativity, even under
the urging of its proclaimed conference title and its masthead of sustainable
development. The poor countries of the South themselves compounded this failing of
UNEP and UNCED in not emphasising the developmental aspects of 'sustainable
development'. They did not clarify their position to the North, that they too would
become developed countries, albeit over a period of time, but extending over large
areas of the globe. In that event, while they would protect their own environments, they
could not be expected to do likewise for the global environment, owing to limitations at
their reosurces and technology. This would mean that, either the North see its 'own self
interest' in global ecological security and lend its technological support to the South, or
the world would go under. This is, indeed no idle future scenario. For, as that practical
seer, Lee Kwan Yew expressed not long ago, enormous areas of the Asia-Pacific,
including China and Indo-China, almost certainly India, and large areas of Latin
America would arrive at this position.
This never figured at UNCED. Indeed, the South kept on asking at Rio for the
traditional aid and trade concessions, which in any case they have been voicing at
dozens of economic forums elsewhere. The results should have been predictable. The
North which, at the first United Nations Development Decade of the sixties, almost
agreed to 1 percent of GDP as its aid target, subsequently attained, and only in parts, a
mere 0.7 per cent down the years. The offer now to reach up (even this without firm
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commitment) to 0.7 per cent, made at the Earth Summit, is therefore no great success
by any means to anybody2.
As for the Conventions, UNEP itself under the persistent leadership of the
professorial Mostapha Tolba, its Executive Director, had carried all these ideas and
more, and even succeeded brilliantly in getting countries togetherthe latest example
being the Montreal Convention. So in this way too, the Earth Summit simply did not
score any great success. The point is, there was no need for an Earth Summit to do all
this.
The conclusions
What then is left of it? Verbiage? Yes. Zeal and sentiment to groups and School
generations? Yes. Chance of any real redress to ecological deterioration? Hardly any
prospects yet.
Who is to blame? Apart from the secretariat, the North, primarily, had not given
that lead in survival and growth together. The phrase 'environmental space' itself, by
which the South sought to persuade the North was not a happy one. Both history and
experience of environmental management had shown, if we cared to look at it, that it
was not 'sharing' a 'fixed space', but vast increase of resources and enlargement of
opportunities to all that served the peoples. This also created new 'technology', that
then made continued management of the environment feasible.
As strongly pointed out earlier, the South's thinking on its strategy was itself
totally wanting, by its failure to declare its position as one of rapid development,
inviting the North to give or not give its response in such situation. In that event,
'lapse' meant accepting an ecological 'collapse'. Funding should have flowed implicitly
from these positions and the acceptance of them as given. The principles following
from themand not the setting of target figures of percentages as Aidwould have
yielded far better co-operation and collaboration between North and South.
People in their thousands would now have returned home from that Summit,
clutching conventions which for the most part only the North can implement, and
'Action 21' (the agenda for the 21st century) carrying hopes without assurance of any
fulfilment of them. Perhaps now the pieces need to be picked up. Quiet follow-up by
the South and getting on with their development, with the North progressively facing
up to the Earth's sustainability should perhaps be the next scenario. It is more than
noteworthy that, amidst the outcries of the South, there were none heard from South
Korea or (by proxy) from Taiwan. It is also noteworthy that Japan, whom everyone was
turning to for aid was also another developing country within memory. These remain
good lessons for the South to pick up and a good basis ultimately for a world that
would be more co-operative in working together, and safer economically and
environmentally.
Future
Thus the position was that the Earth Summit, billed as the world's largest conference so
far, concluded with its outcomes inconclusive, but its message clearthat the poor
was a case of 'arguing' about the size of the zero, as Gainani Corea, the last Secretary-General of
UNCTAD, told an Ambassador of the 'Group 77' at Rio on the morning of the final negotiating sessions.
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countries must find their environmental solutions in the context of development, and
not outside it.
It is now no more a question of how good 'Brazil' was, but of facing the future,
into the year 2000 and the 21st Century. In that sense, the problems of the poor
countries were not simply of global pollution and the 'global commons', though they
were of serious concern to them, their solutions lying dominantly with the rich
countries. The major problem of the poor countries was how to manage their resources
of the environment, while pursuing growth that required massive increases in the use of
these resources.
It was not just the elimination of poverty, which 'bred not only pollution, but
also bred people'. Yet, the policy packages being used by the poor countries for
environmental management were, unfortunately, the policy packages devised by the rich
countries for themselves, and handed over by them. A new approach was necessary. At
least, the thinking for that was available; and the future lay in that.
As for policy positions and strategies, the developing countries themselves, and
not only the North, are standing environment 'on its head'. We all claim to be experts
on environmental pollution and degradation. Nobody has answered the question how
environmental resources management has to be handled in the factual situation, to
which we pretend ignorance, of at least 5 to 10 times the resources that we are using,
being needed, taking that convenient time post, by the year 2000, for minimum
economic and welfare satisfactions of peoples (not reaching out to anything like the 20
or 40-fold standard of living of the North). Even that, former, more modest target
requires,
resource management techniques, of which the environmentalists are simply
unaware now; and
from, the World Bank and the countries symbolised in it, a commitment to
supply, not 'dirty' industries, but technology in range, scale and terms, to meet
these needs, of which we have no signs yet.
Development should not be 'destruction'; and 'environment' should not be
stagnation. In a felicitous phrase some years ago, the King of Thailand stated that
'Development is the creation of a liveable environment'. If the latter does not exist,
then there has been either under-development or over-development; the former as much
seen in the poverty of the poor countries, as in their international debts, inflations, and
social deterioration; and the latter, in the environmental profligacy and planetary threat
by the rich countriesas also, sadly, in an 'imitative' profligacy by the poor countries,
typically in their urban enclaves.
UNCED, despite its verbiage, proceeded in ignorance of these needs in
environment action or development cooperation. So much so, that while it provided a
forum for loud Third World argumentation on their needs, it in fact had no agenda on
them, but had, what we called, an agenda for instituting an 'environmental programme
for consumption'. What had been left, at Brazil, was a swallowing of the West's
prescriptions for environmental management, with all the attendant effects on poor
country prospects and welfareas, of course, longer-term ability to manage their own
environmental resources.
The implication is that these peoples will be permanently ensconced in future
stagnation and dependency on the rich, beside which past historical parallels of unequal
relations, of colonisation, or of the 'gap', would each be a lesser phenomenon.
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Policy issues
(I) The North
The issues before us were, and are, being presented, among others, as of
one Earth, of global warning, the ozone layer, tropical forests, wild life, and
the third world's population growth. It is that there is one environment, and
one question, namely the threat of planetary collapse, or possible
redemption by immediate action by all countries.
Yet the reality has been that while the Environment is a common concern
of the North and the South, there were divergent perspectives. The North
took the lead in identifying issues, but there were largely of little relevance
to the South. On the other hand, the needs of the South were largely
neglected in the policy framework of the North. These related to the
eradication of poverty, and concessional access to technology, both for
development, as well as for environmental protection.
In important ways, the North has by now developed an excellent
environmental agenda for itselfon the one side, by internationalization of
environmental costs, by increasingly impressive pollution control and
treatment methods; and on the other, by visible re-cycling programmes and
even if slowly, acceptance of limited air and water pollution. All this has
been made possible only through a pervasive development of technology
across all the areas of environmental management and economic production.
For 'Development is not merely the cause of resource use, but also the
means to resource sustenance'. (In the early seventies, a UK white paper
had already been declared that development is the means in fact to solving
mOst, if not all, of the environment problems themselves.)
4 To recall what all this adds up to is that, of the two types of management
essential to a true environmental programme, only one, the 'qualitative'
management of the environment was addressed by the North. The aspect of
'quantitative' management of its Environment has received little recognition
and even less implementationthat is, both of excessive resource use by
the 'North', and heavy resource need by the 'South'.
5. This means that the level of use of the world's resources by the 'North', by
far the greatest user, has remained the same, and threatens to increase.
(ii) The South
Where do countries of the 'South' stand in this? By one extremely valid
reckoning, that for the 'North', on an average, an individual uses/disposes
as residues or wastes about 20-40 times that in the 'South', the population
of Europe for example, 400 million is, 'environmentally' in fact, 8,000
million.
To stem the growth of population of some countries of the 'South', poverty,
as we said, is not only a polluter, but a 'breeding ground' of people; and it
is the 'mass' change (as opposed to 'marginal' change) of development that
will, in fact, finally arrest population growth.
By way of comparison, too many countries of the 'North' have a higher
density of population per square mile than the South, without at all
attracting any policy structures. For when, during their industrial
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revolutions, their populations spurtedpicturesquely called 'the vertical
invasion of the masses'in Europe in the last century and around, their
levels of resource use increased in parallel tremendously, by domestic
exploitation and external expansion.
The almost explicit request to the 'South' now to use resources more
modestly for development, emerges in this light as an 'asymmetrical'
prescription from the 'North' to the 'South'. The international community
completely overlooked the enormous question of the levels of resources use
at both ends of the 'quantitative' side of environmental management.
Examples abound on the failure of this quantitative management in the
North, are too many to list here. One estimate had it that the USA used
40% of the world's resources, with 6% of its populationit would have
been more profound if it had attained its successes using only 6% of the
world's resources. Another estimate was that if India used the same energy
levels as the USA in its agriculture, all known oil reserves would be over in
12 years. And so on.
What remains the moral for us in this, both 'North' and 'South'? Again, we
draw from our previous observations. The massive technological capability
that the 'North' has developed for itself and continues to, in pollution
control, treatment, re-cycling, alternative sources, and even stopping
pollution at source, has placed it within sight of warding off a global
environmental cataclysm.
However, this has a premise. Namely, given little Northern intentions to
share technology or money, the South does not use the same, or anything
like the resources in 'replaceable development', as the North is continuing
to do. For, then, the World would certainly collapse environmentally on
both accounts, namely (a) the vast new mass of resource use levels; and (b)
on a base of environmental management technology that is primitive and
totally insufficient. The apocalypse then, would be for sure. The Agenda of
the 'North' is based on this unspoken premise, and the appurtenant theory
of the Apocalypse.
This is the crux, containing the two 'problematiques' of Environment and
Development, whose 'intersections'to use the phrase of Ph. de Seynes,
former USG of the United Nations, are still to be found. And this, was not
in the Agenda of 'Brazil 92'.
The 'South' needs, as we said, on a modest estimate, at least 5-40 times the
resources it is using now for development, and for environment. Thus, the
'South's environmental priority at Brazil was not less resources, but far
more resources than now.
Measures
How may this be achieved and the earth too kept in ecological balance?
Firstly, an ideal is for the North to come forward to participate in a research use
containment programme for itself, apart from all other current agenda.
The context for this is that very significant areas of the 'South', by the year 2000
or there at, will surge forward as developed countries, with enormous additions to
the World's resource use levels, whoever likes it or not. When that happens, the
global Environment at the given levels of technology will become unmanageable.
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Left in that situation, pollution on large scale will occur, until these countries too
become fully developed; and can use those technologies that will manage, contain
and solve the problems of the environment alongside growth unless, well before
that stage, the world environment itself collapses; or unless the 'North' brings
down its technology and resources to the 'South'.
It is, thus, more than a question of what we are prepared to 'give' as donors, or
'do' as receivers; or 'bargaining' on either. In the compulsive future that will
evolve, there must occur a massive use of resources and massive development all.
over, if we go in one way, with safeguard to the Earth and to world order; if in
another, with cataclysm and conflict.
The 'contribution' to co-operation needs, therefore, to be seen not as aid, but as
'own self interest' and as global contribution to the global eco-system, outside the
economic aid and assistance frameworks that we see entrenched now.
Such an agenda, given good sense, had to be found place in Brazil, with vision
into the year 2000 and beyond; but was not.
If these may become so, then a set of (a) principles, (b) programmes, and (c)
special activities can be seen as below, which must, in one way or another, be
adopted.
Principles
recognise the historical ' asymmetry' in resource use levels as countries struggle
to become developed.
agree that development is the means ultimately to commanding the Resources
and the Technology for the same environmental threats that Development and,
before, poverty created.
agree that the 'North' will increasingly set resource use limitation targets for
itself.
agree to set out appropriate resource use expansion targets for the 'South'.
accept that development, in the striking phrase of the King of Thailand, is 'the
creation of a liveable environment'.
reject the 'consumerist, mercantilist and commercial' type of development as
manifest in many cities/enclaves in the South passing off for development.
agree to a set technology supply/transfer targets from the 'North' and financial
resources for successful environmental management in the 'South'.
agree to set global pollution control targets, for 'North' and 'South' as
appropriate.
accept the setting of consumption targets for select resources, such as tropical
forests, genetic resources and other select renewable and non-renewable
resources.
in that connection accept the relevance of the 'polluter pays principle', also at
international level.
commit to the support of resource 'expansion' targets as set out, using
combination of technology with Restoration, and maintenance methods, the use
of renewable and reusable resources and wastes, and search for alternative,
'friendly' sources, in all areas.
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Programmes
Establish 'resources balance sheets'global, regional, sub-regional, nationalor
all major resources (macro-level; ex-ante)
Account all key natural resources as 'capital stock', with provision for
depreciation, re-equipment etc; and with 'reverse discounting' in strategic cases.
Conduct EIAs (the micro-level; ex-ante) only on the basis of prior resource
balance sheets as above.
On the basis of the above, move towards converting all EISs into Integrated
Environment/Economic Cost-Benefit Systems, fully integrating all costs and all
benefits.
The 'North' to take technological/financial responsibility (with 'South' co-
operating) for Global Warming (CO2, Sea Level rise, Ozone, CFC and other
issues of the Global Commons.
All projects in the South using renewable or re-usable resources and wastes to be
eligible for grants/low interest loans from the International lending countries and
sources.
Implementation of an international polluter pays principle ('cost sharing') for the
world's tropical forests (as its 'carbon sinks'), genetic Resources Conservation
and related areas.
Accept and foster the UN initatives for establishing expanded Environment-
Economic SNAs (mcro-ex-post).
Accept and foster the development and use by enterprises, agencies and others
concerned, of Environmental ('green') audits, which are also development
'sensitive' (micro-x-post).
Subject to the foregoing, the 'South' to be fully responsible for all
degradation/pollution during its development, as its commitment to the global
eco-system, and to itself.
Special activities (academic, research, etc.)
Vast fields of study await attention of the world's universities, institutes and
other centres, in all sectorsin ideas (e.g. the future of city planning, transport
and the motor car); in science research (e.g. as energy alternatives, pollution
prevention, bio-technology); and in across the board technology development
promoting both the economy and environment.
Socio-political fields need fundamental thinking on policies, administration and
systems, with need for distinction between 'protectionist' and 'productionist'
approaches. Legislation must distinguish between enforcing the law on poor
polluters of wastes, and enforcing system for their 'conversion', by governments
and agencies, into economic product ('from being a residue to be disposed of, to
a resource to be converted').
The entire education content of environment management needs fundamental re-
arrangement, from pure pollution orientation to resource restoration, management
and use.
The world's NGOs have a particular function and capacity in all these to help
environmentalists and governments to do their 'home work', and (b) to 'speak
for the grass roots and intercede with authority on the one hand; and to interpret
the government to the grassroots on the other'.
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A 'new economics' absorbing environmental resources management, awaits
formulation out of the foregoing thinking, with no room by either discipline to
conceive of themselves as 'opposites'.
Over the decades, economics has, in fact, absorbed 'on-economic categories' in
the past; and will do so again, given effort by the environmentalists, to go
beyond the 'slogan' of sustainable development, to the methodology of
'sustained Maintenance of future resources levels' called for above.
A Draft Convention, embodying commitments on the foregoing, would have
been a truly appropriate contribution from Brazil '92, for the future peace and
welfare of the planet. The difference between prosperity for all, and disaster
must lie in the ideas presented here. Not accidentally, they seem fully in accord
with the call by the US President at a Post-Iraq declaration, for a New World
Order, as he puts it, in 'a partnership united by principle ... and supported by
equitable sharing,, of ... cost and commitment'. Since well forgotten it seems, it
is still capable of recall.
Regional co-operation
The scope for regional co-operation and capacity building for sustainable
development, including a possible 'Compact' for sustainable development in
Asia, has rightly been raised as a policy instrument.
This paper does not go into their specifics, since the organizers of this meeting
have proposed to place a Draft Compact themselves. However, certain select
substantive points may be flagged below.
At least two major areas of key importance must be noted:
(a) The first is the need for positive and innovative designs, at macroand
microlevels, for integrating environment and development.
Obviously research at University levels, sadly deficient, or superficial, or
segmented if in-depth, has to be pursued intensively, as well as priorities
in education and training. (b) Secondly, the development of indigenous
environmental technologies must be given top-most priority. Energy
remains a key element, but the technology priority should obtain for all
areas and all related disciplines.
Both these require, without doubt, the ingredients of sensible, professional and
co-ordinate Regional co-operation mechanisms.
Across the broad co-operation by Governments, United Nations bodies covering
Asia and, in particular, the Asian Development Bank, must be forged, and be
forthcoming.
At the level of Inter-Governmental Organisations, ASEAN and the South Pacific
Forum have successful environmental Co-operation Organizations (ASEP and
SPREP).
For South Asia, the most obvious thing to do is to give political support to the
full use of what is known as the South Asia Co-operative Environment
Programme (SACEP), established in February 1981, as the Inter-Governmental
Organisation for this region. (All these incidentally were initiated by this writer
during the Seventies and the turn of the Eighties from the United Nations.)
Yet, the South Asian countries themselves have been forgetting their first lessons
in co-operation by initiating somewhat confused parallel programmes in SAARC,
which obviously has its own separate rationale and high purpose over-all.
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Fortunately, the most recent Governing Council of SACEP held in Colombo this year,
inaugurated by the President of Sri Lanka, himself one of the prime movers of SACEP
in 1981 and current Chairman of SAARC, emphasised the unique role of SACEP as the
basis for South Asia's future environment. If the countries were to become serious
about co-operating with their own mechanism and its goals, then the next steps may not
be considered problematic.
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Annexes3
In a climate of much emotion and generalisation, and confrontation between
Development and Environment, this Document sets out, as Annexes, a set of practical
designs in the following matters.
An operational Framework on 'Environmental Designs and Policies'.
A brief schematic display of Macro Level (ex-Ante) Resource Management
under 'Resource Balance Sheet' exercises showing also its link to the next Micro
(ex-Ante) projects assessment stage.
The Micro (ex-Ante) presentation of an 'Integrated Economic-Environment Cost-
Benefit Presentation', as above.
An 'alert', drawing attention to the new Macro (ex-Post) Satellite System of
Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA). This is not
presented here, as the best reference is the excellent work already initiated within
the United Nations, at New York.
A Framework Presentation of the components of Micro Level(ex-Post)
Environmental ('Green') Audit requirements for major production areas such as
firms, agencies and others.
Purely as going beyond 'lip service', an Urban Traffic Design of a City without
the use of cars is presented, called 'Pedestrapolis - Future City' (in the words of
Carlo Ripa di Meana, Environment Secretary of EEC, making it a case of 'car
free cities, also a lot cheaper').
3The Documents mentioned above are not attached hereto, but are available for reference.
Sustainable development and the evolution of
international policy and law
Mukul Sanwal
Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India
The full meaning of the term 'sustainable development' is yet to revolve and the path
to its attainment is not clear as yet. The term will evolve in multilateral fora, as. it is no
longer possible for a country to formulate an appropriate environmental or economic
policy entirely on its own. The success of UNCED (United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development), held at Rio de Janeiro, in June 1992, has initiated a
process between interaction between States characterised by interdependence,
converging objectives and global integration. The subordination of internal processes to
the interactive processes of nations will lead to a formal structure to the global
partnership based on shared values relating to the natural environment, its use and
maintenance. The challenge will be to link environment and development so as to
channel the forces of change in a manner that improves living standards in the
developing countries.
This paper seeks to trace the impact of the UNCED on the evolution of
international policy and law. The first part specifies the factors providing for global
integration. In the second part, the factors dividing developing and developed countries
are analysed. The third part indicates the options and the growing importance of
multilateral, regional and intergovernmental institutions. The assessment is made on the
basis of available evidence and judgement, the decisions will be taken by States.
Global integration: common concerns
The significance of Rio for environmental policy and law is the universal recognition
that environmental quality, as an essential life support system, is a common concern not
more important than national interests but that it is important to national interests.
Three approaches for operationalismg global integration are already becoming apparent;
for integrating societies, peoples, policies and states.
First, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the
Conventions signed at Rio have emphasised the eradication of poverty as a prerequisite
for safeguarding environmental quality for future generations, blurring the existing
separation of economic and political issues in international relations. Converting this
statement of values for sharing global prosperity, into norms and obligations will be a
key element in securing the continuing commitment of all States to common values;
because of the ensuring benefits in terms of providing services, increasing options and
enhancing capabilities.
Second, considerations of environmental quality provide a process of global
interaction opposed to the current philosophy of the international economic system and
its assumptions informing economic policy, where costs to the environment are
externalized. This common concern, based on the environment rather than on function
or territory, provides a, new role for multilateral diplomacy in adjusting interests among,
but also within, groups; reducing the possibility that solutions are affected by
differences in political and economic strengths of the parties; underlining the equality
and interdependence of states in the international systems; and, identifying the
opportunities for improvement through market instruments.
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Third, the States have voluntarily accepted a new kind of central authority, the
Commission on Sustainable Development as well as Subsidiary Bodies on
Implementation in the Conventions signed at Rio, to review the programmes for
sustainable development. These institutions have specific functions that go beyond the
purely technical and specialized nature of tasks, which characterises existing
international organizations. Their mandate includes controversial political areas that are
inherently 'expansive', as they recognise 'joint decisions' and 'delegation' of decision-
making to the new organs; which are permitted to promulgate guidelines and channel
benefits, This common purpose constitutes a significant step in the cumulative process
of change in the nature of relations between States towards global integration.
The priority allotted to specific global environmental problems and goals, the
methods for achieving these goals and the pace of fulfilment will vary in different
national settings, as the costs of protecting the environment relative to other priorities
vary across countries. A balance would need to be struck between precautionary action
for long-term environmental protection and the immediate requirement of survival
facing the majority of the world's population, and their need for capacity building to
increase options.
Definition
In defining sustainable development a distinction needs to be made between its
objectives, normative and procedural components. The objectives component is the
composition, structure and distribution of ecosystems which affects the ways in which
they exchange energy and materials. The normative component is the judgernent on the
'desirable' combinations of consumption patterns and productive technologies that will
be based on an understanding of the scientific assessment and social conditions, which
will intum determine the strategy that will be acceptable, and to what extend. The
procedural component includes requirements like transparency, capacity building,
people centredness and participation.
Sustainable development links environmental, technological and social concerns
into the economic decision-making process of the market. In determining the relative
importance, in human-nature interactions, to be given to precautionary measures or to
capacity building, some key issues are going to dominate future negotiations on the
character and distribution of economic growth.
Regimes related to environment, development, aid and trade will no longer be
developed in isolation from each other. At the international level, institutional
arrangements for coordination of policies, guidelines for the use of various economic
instruments, indicators for measuring performance and procedures for sharing
information and resolving disputes will emerge to achieve a balance of interests
between countries. At the national level, technologies to be adopted reflected in
capacity building to identify sectoral strategies, as well as measures, priorities and
investment opportunities for the transition to sustainable development, will become the
focus of national planning. The procedures and character of bilateral, as well as
multilateral, assistance will change to encourage private sector investment and
technology flows.
There will be greater interaction between the organs of the United Nations and
the Bretton Woods system. Their role will shift from a pUrely technical one to that of
'bridging institutions' to harmonise and promote economic activities across countries.
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The multilateral negotiating process will increase the chances of finding solutions
acceptable to all affected parties.
Elements
The Rio Declaration clarifies as well as further defines the concept of sustainable
development. It includes elements regarding state responsibility for the well being of its
citizens and harm caused by them to the environment; in striking a balance between
the two it recognises the primacy of development.
The Stockholm Declaration, while bringing environment onto the international
political agenda, did not say anything how the aims were to be achieved; the Rio
Declaration introduces priorities and procedural requirements for operationalising the
concept of sustainable development and goes beyond looking at technological solutions
to environmental problems. The Rio Declaration shifts the international focus from
conservation to contamination; from identifying limits of natural resources to
determining sink constraints of the environment; and, from supply to demand related
issues.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, unlike the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment, attaches greater importance to the social over
the physical environment. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which is the only
principle recognised as soft law, has been amended by stipulating that States have a
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and
developmental policies. The additional reflects the recognition that development must
not be constrained by the generalised rules of international law for the environment.
This principle, along with the addition, has been incorporated in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, giving it a wider legal validity and acceptance.
The Rio Declaration achieves a balance between the substantive requirements of
sustainable development and the procedural requirements for implementing
environmental prntection. In relations between States the Declaration recognises:
[11 human beings as at the centre of concerns;
right to development;
environmental protection as an integral part of the development process;
eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development.
The Declaration also requires States to adopt certain procedures to ensure
environmental considerations are integrated into decision making:
effective environmental legislation;
public participation in environmental decision making;
application of the precautionary approach;
promotion of the polluter pays principle;
adoption of environmental impact assessment;
notification in the case of emergencies and activities with significant
transboundary effect.
Elements of international cooperation for sustainable development, for the first
time in international environmental negotiations focusing on economic issues, are also
laid out to:
decrease disparities in the standard of living;
strengthen endogenous capacity building by improving scientific understanding
and transfer of technology;
promote a supportive and open international economic system;
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prevent the transfer of harmful activities and substances;
develop a legal liability regime as a transboundary regulatory instrument.
The Declaration envisages a 'global partnership' to not only conserve and
protect but also restore the 'integrity and health of the Earth's ecosystem', through five
steps
[11 reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption;
promote appropriate demographic policies;
exchange scientific and technical knowledge;
enhance the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of new and
innovative technologies; and
promote a supportive and open international economic system.
Principles of the Declaration relating on the one hand to the right to
(sustainable) development and priority to the eradication of poverty and on the other
hand to adopting precautionary measures and environmental impact assessment have
been incorporated into the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Convention for Conservation of Biological Diversity. This has made them a part of
international law. Policies fleshing out these legal principles will follow two parallel
tracks.
First, the Rio Declaration achieves a balance between the obligations accepted
by the developing countries to prevent further deterioration of the environment and the
responsibilities of the developed countries for causing the damage. The principle of
common but differentiated responsibility for global environmental degradation has been
accepted, with the developed countries acknowledging their responsibility 'in view of
the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies
and financial resources they command'. The case has been made for transfer of
resources and technology based on the advantages that have accrued to developed
countries and not on purely altruistic considerations.
Second, while the Stockholm Declaration was concerned with the conflict
between the sustainable use of natural resources and transboundary pollution, twenty
years later the understanding of both the content and the context of the human
interference with the ecosystem has changed. The policy focus is no longer the
apprehension that environmental considerations will restrict the right of States to exploit
their natural resources, but the impact on sovereignty of restrictions over activities
affecting the natural environment. With this widening of the scope of agreed
restrictions, sovereignty is acquiring a new meaning.
The significance of the Rio Declaration lies in its requirement that for the
fulfilment of its principles, the further development of international law in the field of
sustainable development, not only in the field of environment, is needed. The policy
focus now is on the content and pattern of economic growth itself.
The future debate for implementing sustainable development will be on the
relative importance of production or consumption activities in the measures for
reducing contamination, the approach to risk management, and equity considerations.
Measures
The convergence of four major themes, with conflicting but related measures, will
dominate international relations as countries seek the transition to sustainable
development:
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safeguards for the geophysical degradation of the environment and its continued
use as a sink, a balance between disposal of hazardous substances and activities
related to forests;
changing consumption patterns and eradication of poverty, in the context of the
relative importance to be given to local or global environmental concerns;
transfer of financial resources to compensate and assist developing countries,
incorporating new arrangements involving multilateral organizations, non-
governmental organizations and transnational corporations in aid flows; and
[41 the use of trade measures to influence environmental policies in other countries,
involving of interventions ranging from transfer of environmentally sound
technologies to new barriers being erected against imports produced under less
strict standards.
Despite the intrinsically domestic character of the problem and the policy
choices to be made, environmental issues have become internationalized because of the
irreversible nature of the changes in the environment, and the need to adopt
precautionary measures.
Global conflict: determining priorities
The issues that will divide developing and developed countries is the emerging concept
distinguishing local and global concerns related to impacts, benefits and resources. The
issue of determining priorities for action was left unresolved at Rio.
With the tightening of global environmental controls, the local economic
implications, both in social terms for meeting developmental needs and in terms of
determining costs in a highly competitive global marketplace, become issues of
concern. Incremental costs incurred by developing countries for global environmental
considerations are being defined only as that part of the expenditure that is not offset
by nationally appropriated benefits, which could impose a greater burden than is
warranted by their contribution to the problem. Environmental considerations are sought
to be incorporated into development strategies, but external assistance is largely limited
to capacity building for evolving strategies, preparing investment projects and building
awareness. National resources, like forests, that have global significance are being
treated as shared resources, for whose management all States have a joint responsibility.
The argument being made is that global concerns require policies to be made at the
global level, but increased resources must largely be generated from within States.
Global environmental pollution cannot be dealt with without tackling its national
origins. At Rio, despite the acceptance by developing countries of problems of global
pollution, developed countries avoided any commitments towards increasing ODA
(Overseas Development Assistance) for so-called 'local' problems related to poverty;
or, even problems for dealing with local pollution, like sewage treatment. Arrangements
for global integration will not have the support of citizens in developing countries
unless they first establish and safeguard equity considerations.
Since global concerns will come to be regulated by international institutional
mechanisms, the prioritization of concerns will globalise economic policymaking. This
will influence national development priorities through the assistance, on grant or
concessional terms, provided by the Global Environment Facility. The mechanism will
be National Reports, which have now become a feature of all international
environmental agreements. Global policies will emerge in the fields of energy,
agriculture, forests, trade, debt and technology transfer as these activities have led to
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environmentally damaging behaviour. Similarly there will be multilaterally agreed rules
to guide countries in formulating their own environmental policies. As these policies
will evolve in inter-governmental forums, they will incorporate the concerns of all
States.
Implementation will require institutional reform, including that of national policy
institutions, to reach agreement about solutions which carry high social costs, whether
in terms of future benefits foregone or present benefits given up. Tension will remain
as long as there are large disparities in standards of living, and the eradication of
poverty is not recognised as a 'common concern'.
Agenda
The agenda for sharing responsibility and prosperity will be set by the way issues are
defined. Since the stress will be on preventive action, a scientific consensus will
precede negotiations of a more overtly politicaleconomic character. Preparatory
meetings will assume greater importance, with the policy sciences increasingly
becoming more consequential than the social and physical sciences.
This trend will be paralleled by two developments. First, debates on the
composition of the scientific bodies to have experts, and not representatives of
governments; and, with these bodies, whether to give stress to econometrics or
sociology. Second, the separation of data generation from data interpretation; the former
will increasingly come under the purview of UN bodies, like UNEP, and for the latter a
greater role will devolve on international non-governmental organizations and trans-
national corporations. The role of scientists, non-governmental organizations and
corporations in determining policy will become more important.
The agenda for sharing global prosperity will not be formally negotiated, and
will need to be introduced by the developing countries during the discussions. The most
appropriate forum would be in the development of international environmental law,
through a legal liability regime. The ongoing process in the International Law
Commission would need to be given direction.
Options: global and national
In the globalization of environmental policy governments will not be the sole actors;
their role will gradually be limited to implementing a set of internationally agreed
measures.
Participation will take on a new meaning. On the one hand, at the international
level the scale of involvement of (international) non-governmental organizations in
international negotiations will grow, giving formal recognition to their guardianship-
type role. On the other hand, within nations, the role of governments will be pivotal,
with a new lease of life for central planning. The policymaker will be required to take
into account an overview of the whole economy. The balance of costs and benefits to
the economy will depend heavily on externalities; the externalities will require a
weighing of social, rather than private costs and benefits. It will be important that these
judgements are made by decision-makers accountable to an electorate, leading to
greater community participation in decision-making.
The tensions between governments accountable to an electorate and non-
governmental organizations committed to a cause, over agreement on facts, the
significance of particular facts, value judgements and interpretation of evidence,
coupled with scientific uncertainty, will open up spaces for conflict over interpretation.
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This will lead to the setting up of multilateral arrangements for dispute settlement,
which will give international non-governmental organizations an almost equal status as
States.
Policy
The risk and the distant time horizon of policy will call for an explicit or implicit role
of governments in the removal of subsidies in the use and exploitation of natural
resources as well as financing new infrastructure, including research. Transportation
will be a major sector of concern; for developed countries the focus will be on user-
charges for roads and for developing countries on affordable mass transportation
systems. The second sector will be energy, where nuclear power will gain greater
attention world-wide. The third sector will be agriculture, with biotechnology leading to
specialization and increases in productivity across geographical regions with a reduced
dependence on chemical fertilisers, pesticides, and water. The impact of these
technologies on the ecosystem will still be there; carbon dioxide and hazardous
chemicals will be replaced by radioactive waste and genetically modified organisms; in
lesser quantities but with environmental contamination which could be irreversible,
without reducing the dependence on the use of natural resources.
Institutional reform within nations, for building domestic consensus about
relevant problems and proposed solutions, will facilitate consensus in, and development
of international regimes. The three key problems are lack of policy integration
(reflecting the systemic and interdependent nature of the problem), strategic knowledge
(assessment of long term trends, risks and options) and public participation in decision-
making. Consultative processes, both inter-governmental and national, will be set up for
determining priorities.
Economy
The central concern for environmental management will be agreeing on certain values;
that the limits to growth are social, as well as environmental. Economic activity means
using up natural resources, including the sink constraints of the atmosphere; recent
scientific findings even link climate with the origins of biodiversity. On the one hand
economic growth enriches society, and enables investment in cleaning up pollution. On
the other hand, though the technology uses less resources, effects can be nullified if
consumption is not curtailed, including stabilisation of population. With stifi too many
poor people, continuing growth in only one part of the world is unfair to future
generations in the other.
Consequently, the responses will differ. In the developed countries, policies to
produce a steady-state economy will be considered; while in the developing countries
the policy debate will be on how to increase options. The debate will take on
philosophical undertonesdoes growth lead to greater happiness? Should, or can,
economic growth go on far ever?' A consensus will take time, but these questions will
be asked with increasing frequency.
The structure and rules governing international trade are being re-examined to
harmonise environment and trade. At the international level the debate will be whether
trade liberalisation helps or hinders environmental protection, the role of appropriate
domestic environmental policies in the process, and the degree to which jurisdiction
should be asserted over other nations' environmental priorities and practices. The
primary question in the debate is no longer 'efficiency' but 'enforcement'. GATE
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(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) is likely to be used to take authority away
from national governments for setting environmental standards. Simultaneously, it is
also likely that agreement will be reached that international treaties on environmental
resource management should take precedence over GATT. The result will be that
unilateral action to influence environmental policies by reducing access to markets will
be replaced by negotiated guidelines for an international agreement on standards.
Technology
The substantive issues in the evolution of the 'new' values for sharing prosperity will
be to consider environmentally sound technology as a shared resource, and not as
private property. The methology for the transfer of environmentally (safe and) sound
technologies will continue to be debated, purchases to place technologies in the public
domain, subsidy for particular equipment, assistance for research and development and
dilution of patent regimes or investments of transnational corporations will be some of
the options to be considered. Prolonged negotiations can be expected in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Convention for the Conservation of Biodiversity and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; as well as in the United Nations General
Assembly.
Burden sharing
At the heart of the debate is the issue of who should pay for cleaning up existing
environmental damage, and for ensuring that further damage does not occur. The inter
relation of economic policies and technologies will become important as these affect
the incremental costs to developing countries, which developed countries have agreed to
meet. Implementation of this concept will follow two tracks. First, the definition of
'technology transfer' will be expanded to include supportive policies and investment
opportunities. Second, developed countries will aggressively seek markets in the
developing countries to implement the programmes of Agenda 21; Japan is likely to
take the lead with the thrust on technology diffusion and joint research with institutions
in developing countries.
The widespread adoption of 'clean' technologies of production will conserve
resources, use less energy and produce low quantities of waste Capacity building will,
therefore, need to be the key element for these transactions to become a part of the
global partnership, agreed to in Rio.
Targets
Within this framework, negotiations will revolve around the determination of
comparable methologies, performance standards and targets affecting policies for
economic growth and environmental protection. The trend towards greater globalisation
will be reflected in the setting of common standards for pollutants, methologies for
monitoring and data analysis in the various national reports, criteria for determining
costs of environmental improvement, parameters for evaluating sustainable development
policies and identification of technologies for the programmes and projects. Economic
instruments for determining policies will include both supply and demand
considerations and the valuation of environmental services.
The nature of the targets will determine the content (sharing responsibility or
prosperity) as well as the mechanism (verifying prohibitions or developing capacity
building) for the arrangements at the international level, for facilitating the transition to
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sustainable development. In this process international organizations will take on a more
proactive role.
Institutions
The institutions set up at the international level will increasingly take on a legislative
character, with the international bureaucracy carrying out tasks at present performed
nationally. The challenge will be regards sensitivity to national concerns, transparency
and playing a facilitative role in capacity building.
With increasing interdependence and flow of benefits, special majorities, in
place of unanimity, will gradually become acceptable for an increasingly larger number
of issues. In the redefinition of sovereignty the scope of 'shared natural resources' will
expand to include forests, water and even soil. Monitoring will increasingly become
networked through computers and satellites; and less intrusive. With the end of the
Cold War, high resolution military satellites will increasingly be used for environmental
monitoring.
Differences will arise on the applicability of international law to particular
situations. Guidelines, rules, and precedents, will give rise to issues of interpretation,
especially in the relatively new area of concern relating to standards of living and
production and consumption patterns. The issues are among the most sensitive in any
society, where scientific understanding also comes down to a matter of subjective
judgement. Even fair minded individuals, however well informed, can differ
substantively on where to strike the balance. Adjudication on points of interpretation, as
well as disputes, will become acceptable as they will be taken in multilateral fora.
Regional groups
The trend towards the globalisation of environmental, aid and trade policy-making will
increasingly be inter-related and integrated through the hannonisation of standards; a
parallel trend will be the emergence of regional blocks. Three developments will
follow.
First, with the worldwide decline of the public sector, the initiative will be taken
by the private sector to develop new markets, particularly in the services, information,
communication, power, sewage treatment and hazardous substances treatment sectors;
trade and investment patterns will determine the common environmental standards
within regional blocks.
Second, issues particularly regarding who will pay the developing countries for
much of their environmental activities, will oscillate between whether market based
mechanisms should depend on prices (charges, taxes, or subsidies) or on quantities
(tradeable permits); as well as between multilateral and regional forums; options will be
reduced for those countries who are not part of regional arrangements. The Framework
Convention on Climate Change recognises joint implementation of commitments.
Third, regional groups based on shared natural resources, with liberalised trade
and investment will produce the financial resources for environmental improvements as
well as in standards of living. The Convention on Conservation of Biological Diversity
recognised the need to value biodiversity and to share the profits of its commercial
exploitation.
Policy problems will appear in valuing goods and services outside the market
economy, which are a feature in developing countries. New economic policy
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instruments will also need to be developed that recognise explicitly social and
environmental factors in the way costs and benefits are defined.
If the investments lead to a rise in general standards of living, international
diplomacy will gradually shift the focus of multilateral negotiations from transfer of
resources to public health concerns, reflecting a common global environmental priority;
otherwise, claims over the use of environment will lead to conflict.
Cooperation
The integrating theme for international cooperation will be provided by negotiations on
debt reduction, implemented through at least three mechanisms related to the use and
distribution of natural resourcesdebt for nature swaps, emissions trading and
technology diffusion. The key actors will be the major groups UNCED, non-
governmental organizations and transnational corporations. Key institutions will be GEF
(Global Environment Facility), GATF and SDC (Sustainable Development Commission
on the UN), for recommending policies, enforcement and review of sustainable
development, respectively.
Developing countries
These trends provide both possibilities and options to developing countries. Their
ability to shape events to their advantage will depend primarily on their adopting a new
development paradigm based on sustainable values, through changes made in internal
policies for greater equity to better manage the local environment; and the extent to
which they can restrain the growth of consumption without affecting social
development. The challenge for developing countries will be in using the increased
flow of assistance for capacity building and not consumption.
The evolution of regional blocks will provide increased options to developing
countries. Negotiating coalitions will form around specific issues, which wifi be another
factor pushing countries into regional blocks. Present patterns of resource use, where
one-quarter of the world's population uses three-quarters of the resources will change in
the process as free-trade areas develop, facilitating the flows of technology and
investment. The development of regional blocks, consisting of countries at various
stages of development, will be a significant outcome of the global transition to
sustainable development.
These developments will affect the pattern of relationships within the G-77
grouping of developing nations, which so effectively dominated the Preparatory
Committee and shaped the outcome of the Rio Conference. Just as the categorisation of
developed countries now includes 'Economies in Transition', groupings of developing
countries, like the Non-aligned Movement, will take up economic issues, eventually
focusing on sustainable development.
The next steps
The distinction between developed and developing countries, which is based in terms of
material consumption, will soon become blurred. Natural resource accounting will
replace gross national product as the measure of identifying and valuing environmental
effects of economic activities, economic output, social wàlfare and ecological
sustainability. Sustainable development will then achieve greater clarity, while allowing
flexibility and diversity in approaches for its implementation
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Conclusion
The evolution of the concept of sustainable development has been based on
consideration of the part of the policy process being addressed. Stockholm, in 1972,
was concerned with specifying the casuality and significance of the problem. Rio, in
1992, dealt with assessing options for action. The next conference will make and
implement decisions.
The implications of Agenda 21an overview
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Introduction
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de
Janeiro from 3-14 June 1992 was an important milestone in international cooperation to
tackle environment and development issues. While the 1972 Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment initiated global awareness about environmental issues,
UNCED affirmed the importance of the twin issues of environment and development
being addressed in a balanced and comprehensive manner. As a result of UNCED, the
protection of the environment has been accepted as being inseparably linked to the
promotion of development and has emerged as one of the few areas where a
meaningful North-South economic dialogue is in progress.
Perhaps the most important operational output of UNCED was the agreement
reached on Agenda 21. While Agenda 21 is not legally binding, its endorsement by
more than 180 countries, of which over a hundred were represented at Rio at the level
of Heads of State/Government, clearly reflects the importance assigned to it by the
global community and the high level political commitment to its contents.
Preamble: political aspects
The overall focus and sense of direction to Agenda 21 is provided by its carefully
negotiated Preamble, which constitutes the first of its 40 chapters. The Preamble
specifies that the integration of environment and development concerns and the
devotion of greater attention to them will lead to the fulfilment of basic needs,
improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer,
more prosperous future. It emphasises that nations acting alone cannot achieve this
objective. They can, however, do so through a global partnership which builds upon the
premises of UNGA Resolution 44/228 of 22 December 1989 and the acceptance of the
need for a balanced and integrated approach to environment and development. While
stressing that the successful implementation of Agenda 21 is 'first and foremost' the
responsibility of governments, the Preamble also states unambiguously that international
cooperation should 'support and supplement' rather than seek to supplant national
efforts.
To achieve the development and environment objectives of Agenda 21, the DCs
will require a substantial flow of 'new and additional' financial resources to cover the
incremental costs of their actions to deal with global environmental problems and to
accelerate sustainable development. This crucially important reference for DCs has been
deliberately included in the Preamble. Following intense negotiations, a secondary
reference has consciously been given to the economies in transition, with the Preamble
acknowledging in a subsequent paragraph that 'special attention' should be given to
their particular circumstances.
The entire text of Agenda 21 was negotiated during the UNCED process and it
thus reflects the agreements reached amongst participating States. The Preamble,
however, makes clear that Agenda 21 is a 'dynamic' programme which could 'evolve
over time' in the light of changing needs and circumstances. Moreover, the Preamble
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recognises that Agenda 21 will be carried out by the various actors 'according to the
different situations, capacities and priorities of countries and regions'. These inclusions,
which provide the necessary flexibility, also allow for a subsequent review of Agenda
21, and are important since Agenda 21 addresses not only the pressing problems of the
day but also aims at preparing the world for the challenges of the next century.
It is of interest that the term 'sustainable development', though widely used, has
not been defined either in Agenda 21 or in any of the other texts emerging from
UNCED. Nor was any serious attempt made during the negotiations to work out such a
definition. The meaning of 'sustainable development' could, however, be distilled in
many instances from the context in which the term is used as the link between
environment and developmentthe twin concerns of UNCED, the essence of the
concept of sustainable development, however, lies in the process of improvement of the
quality of human life, doing so within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems.
Preamble: economic aspects
The Preamble demarcates sustainable development concerns. These include intra- and
international equity, 'poverty, hunger, ill-health and illiteracy, and the continuing
deterioration of the ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. The ecosystem
is accordingly, viewed in strictly anthropocentric terms, a position also unambiguously
articulated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. While fulfilment
of basic human needs are considered to be at the core of sustainable development, the
focus on equity is limited by an assertion of the expectation of strict Pareto
improvements ('improved living standards for all') through 'integration of environment
and development concerns'. Further, since flows of 'new and additional financial
resources' are aimed solely at covering 'incremental costs' that may be faced by DCs
(Developing Countries) for actions to be taken by them, the equity content of the
document does not encompass any principle of sharing global resources, internationally,
or intergenerationally. While the Preamble does not mention the 'polluter pays'
principle, which could be urged simply as a means of efficiency, without invoking
equity considerations, later sections of the document speak of employing this principle
in specific contexts.
Governments are identified as the key agencies for implementation, by way of
'national strategies, plans, policies and processes'. Implicit in this assignment is an
acknowledgement that environmental protection and its harmonization with
development cannot be left to unregulated private markets. At the same time, the
reference to broadest public participation and active NGO involvement points to the
need for the involvement of all in order to make Agenda 21 a success.
For ease of consideration, Chapters of Agenda 21 subsequent to the Preamble
could be broadly classified into four parts, viz., Part-I addressing 'Social and Economic
Dimensions' (Chapters 2-8), Part-il concerning 'Conservation and Management of
Resources for Development' (Chapters 9-12), Part-ill regarding 'Strenghtening the Role
of Major Groups' (Chapters 23-32) and Part-IV on 'Means of Implementation'
(Chapters 33-40). The rest of this paper is also structured along these lines.
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Social and economic dimensions
Political aspects
This part of Agenda 21 focuses on those areas of the environment-development debate
which are more directly linked with developmental issues, in particular their economic
and social dimensions. The importance of a supportive international climate for
achieving environment and development goals has been emphasized, and for this
purpose sustainable development is to be promoted through trade liberalisation, making
trade and the environment mutually supportive, providing adequate financial resources
to DCs for dealing with their international debt, and encouraging appropriate
macro-economic policies. An open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and
predictable multilateral trading system in which the commodity exports of DCs can find
markets at fair prices, and without the imposition of unjustified trade barriers, has been
viewed as an importantly requisite for sustainable development.
The Chapter on poverty recognizes poverty as a complex, multidimensional
problem, in whose solution country specific programmes would be crucial. It is
accepted that the eradication of poverty and hunger, greater equity in income
distribution, and the development of human resources are the major challenges around
which all countries mustcooperate and share responsibility. It is particularly noteworthy
that Agenda 21 acknowledges as a matter of grave concern that, while poverty results
in certain kinds of environemental stress, the major cause of the continued deterioration
of the global environment is an unsustainable pattern of consumption and production,
particularly in ICs. Agenda 21 further recognizes the need to develop strategies to
mitigate both the adverse impact on the environment of human activities as well as the
adverse implications of environmental change on human populations. Expectedly, the
protection and promotion of human health has been looked at as part of an overall
strategy for achieving the WHO target of a minimum standard of 'health for all' by the
year 2000.
The Chapter on promoting the development of sustainable human settlements is
of particular importance since over one billion people around the world do not have
access to safe and healthy shelter. However, the provision of adequate shelter and
improvement of urban infrastructure and municipal services in DCs would require
generation of considerable domestic resources over and above international cooperative
efforts and aid flows. The identification of domestic finances to make the proposed
action programme a success has correctly been left to each country. The reshaping of
the planning process is another area where domestic changes in many countries may be
required if Agenda 21 is to succeed. The main thrust of the Chapter on integrating
environment and development is to urge nations and industrial enterprises to integrate
at the outset environmental protection, degradation and restoration costs into decision
making.
Economic impilcations
In contrast to the acknowledged need for government intervention for sustainable
development in national policy contexts, trade liberalization is asserted to be generally
conducive to environmental conservation, in addition to development goals. Further, the
harmonization of national policies with a (supportive) international economic
environment is asserted to be essential.
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A strong result from economic theory is that under fairly tight assumptions, free
trade is Pareto efficient, i.e., facilitates growth. One key assumption involved in this
result is that in the presence of environmental externalities, property rights are created
and costlessly enforced over environmental resources, in addition to conventional
valued resources. In other words that a norm of 'internalization of all external effects'
(a generalization of 'polluter pays') is embodied in a regulatory framework at the level
appropriate to the externality impacts, i.e., local, national, regional, or global. Some
multilateral regimes, e.g., the Montreal Protocol, the Biodiversity Convention, and a
few others, attempt to do this. At the national level, the instances are more numerous,
for example the U S Clean Air Act, etc.
Clearly, efficiency gains from trade would be increasingly realized as
environmental regulation at appropriate levels becomes more comprehensive.
The document also implies that making 'trade and environment mutually
supportive' is an independent condition for achieving environment and development
goals. In fact, this condition is completely contained in the first, i.e., requiring the
assignment of property rights in the environment. Of course, in the absence of fully
liberalized trade with environmental property rights, there may exist scope for
employing trade restrictions for environmental protection, although in this case there
may not be any efficiency improvement over liberalization without environmental
property rights.
DCs are concerned that environmental protection should not be a pretext for
instituting non-tariff barriers on trade. One rider in the document is that account should
be taken of the fact that 'environmental standards valid for DCs may have unwarranted
social and economic costs in DCs'. Efficiency requires that standards must be related
both to valuations of environmental damage by the impacted publics, as well as the
costs of abatement. Two kinds of standards may be involved. Applied to processes,
efficiency considerations would clearly debar trade restrictions premised on uniform,
local or national environmental impacts. For processes whose environmental impacts
are global, unilateral advances over global standards that may be adopted could be
justified in terms of additional national objectives. However, if trade liberalization is an
independent global objective, i.e., in addition to global environmental protection, a
conflict may arise over these further national objectives, and the global imperative of
trade liberalization. If efficiency is a strongly pressed global policy premise, the conflict
must be resolved in favour of trade liberalization.
The possibility also exists that countries may attempt to subsidize
environmentally benign technologies in export sectors. One issue that may arise is that
other countries participating in multilateral trading regimes (GATT) may perceive such
subsidies as intended to confer a competitive (financial) advantage to the sector, and
thus violative of the multilateral regime. How exactly such a dispute would be resolved
by the appropriate resolution mechanism is unclear. Another aspect is that a strong
result from the economic theory of environmental regulation suggests that, under fairly
general assumptions, such subsidies may, by encouraging entry into the (subsidized)
polluting industry, increase the overall level of environmental damage.
Environmental impacts of products (i.e., after manufacture and sale) would
relate to their impacts in use and disposal. If these are all contained within national
jurisdictions, efficiency considerations may be used to justify unilateral, but uniform
standards related to just these impacts, without regard to country of origin provided
there are no other discriminatory (i.e., across countries of origin) barriers, either tariff
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or non-tariff. This would retain the competitive advantage of the most efficient
suppliers.
Accelerating the diffusion of (at least) process technology is a clear means of
reducing environmental impacts. This could impact IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights)
regimes in which trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiency are captured in the
tension between weaker and stronger IPRs protection. Faster diffusion with strong
incentive provisions for knowledge creation in IPRs regimes would imply a greater
committment of financial resources to pay for such technology transfers.
Liberalization of foreign investment, debt relief, and general macroeconomic
stabilization are urged in the document as significant for SD. The causal links between
these and conventional GDP growth is well understood, but those with environmental
protection require elaboration. Capital inflows and an outward orientation of national
economies both facilitate and require greater technical efficiency in the use of natural
resources, acknowledged by economists and policy makers to be an important attribute
of SD. GDP growth itself, given appropriate policies, enables the adoption of
environmental protection measures in national economies, since these may involve real
resource costs. If such growth is also translated to the removal of poverty, people could
alter unsustainable lifestyles, for example based on exploitation of common property
resources, e.g., forests, grazing pasture land, and fisheries.
The subsection on poverty incorporates several paradigm shifts in the
development literature that have occurred over the years, including by indirection that it
has historical origins in national dominance, through acknowledgement of the 'shared
responsibility of all countries' for the problem. At the same time, the assertion of
poverty being a complex multidimensional problem may refer to its links with social
structures, as well as culture, that have been discussed in the literature.
Approaches to poverty imply repudiation of subsidy based approaches to
increasing consumption, or of significant intra- or international redistribution of
resources. The focus is on (political) empowerment of the poor, including
disadvantaged groups (women, indigenous communities), and human capital formation,
primarily through education and professional training. In addition, emphasis on access
to (not ownership of) productive resources, and income equity, involve a clear rejection
of 'triclde down' growth. Indeed, a shift of emphasis from growth as the principal
development criterion is manifest in requiring policies 'to simultaneously address
development, sustainable resource management, and poverty eradication.' The currently
believed strong causal linkages between poverty, women's status, population growth,
women's access to health care, infant survival (breast feeding, clean water, and
sanitation), are clearly embodied in the document.
Unsustainable patterns of production and consumption ICs (in International
Countriess) are asserted in the document to be the major cause of global environmental
degradation, aggravating poverty. Several themes have been articulated. These include
redefinition of notions of growth to account for natural resource depletion, and of living
standards which reflect SD concerns. Also, greater efficiency in production and altering
consumption patterns, as well as of development in ICs, which have served as models
of growth in many DCs. Policies to encourage these shifts include (largely) incentive
based instruments to implicitly incorporate externality costs of resource use,
dissemination of, increasing access to, and promoting R & D in environmentally
friendly technologies, energy efficiency, use of new and renewable energy and natural
resources, and assistance to DCs.
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These recommendations, however, stop short of advocating major changes in
ICs life styles, or advocating alternative growth paths in DCs. Incentive based
instruments, which economists would tend to support unless market distortions were
pervasive or administration costs were major, are not urged on efficiency
considerations, but (apparently) in order that a decentralized decision process rather
than fiats, accomplishes these objectives. A value judgement in favour of
decentralization, also evident in the general emphasis in the document in empowerment
of special groups and local communities, would be involved here. Efficiency
considerations (broadly defined) are also implicit in amending concepts of GDP and
redefining living standards.
Together with production and consumption, world population is asserted to
stress the life-support systems of the earth, besides other critical resources. Once again
a paradigm shift is evident. Earlier approaches to population increase, i.e., emphasis on
technical means of reproductive choice, as well as material incentives for limiting
family size have been eschewed. The document advocates, first, deeper research based
understanding of population change and its links with technology, culture, natural
resources, and life-support systems. Second, integration of population growth concerns
in a wider environment and development perspective. For example, this would include
urban management and local government issues in DCs.
This approach equates the issue of unsustainable production and consumption
with that of population in terms of potential for environmental degradation of a life
threatening kind. In addition, the avowedly holistic approach to population, would rule
out any near term or 'big-bang' schemes for stabilization, and by implication, the world
is committed to significant population increase in the medium term. The question of
equitable entitlements to global resources given this committed increase, and the
implications of such allocations for restraining present unsustainable production and
ôonsumption patterns, besides population growth itself, are not addressed.
Human health is viewed in the document as an instrument for 'sound
development', rather than as an independent attribute of SD. Health risks are
acknowledged to result from environmental impacts of development, and also from lack
of development. A responsibility for governments in addressing health issues is evident.
In fact, a stress on 'doing with' rather than 'doing for' could be interpreted as viewing
health as a private good with some externality benefits, rather than as essentially a
public good. This may have deep implications for designing systems of delivery of
health care.
Proposals for promoting sustainable human settlements envisage a
comprehensive approach to shelter, urban management, infrastructure, equity in land
use, transportation, safety, and the construction industry. Clearly, but implicitly, much
initiative would vest with national and local governments. What is missing? The urban
settlements sector is extremely capital and skills intensive. The question of skills is
addressed, that of resources is implicitly left to national governments. The latter aspect
also involves the question of institutional structures within countries to tap domestic
resourcàs and operate infrastructure and utilities, besides mass transportation,
efficiently. The question of such institution building in the urban settlements sector is a
clearly a major challenge for sustainable development.
The principal field for capacity building remains policy making. Most DCs are
short of the critical human resources of entrepreneurial, managerial, and administrative
capacity. Further, generations of policy makers in DCs have acquired the reflex of
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making policies by sector i.e., piecemeal, employing instruments which attempt detailed
case by case regulation by fiat, and which are accordingly intensive in the use of
bureaucratic resources and information. Agenda 21 proposals regarding policy making
for SD envisage a sharp reversal of these practices. In particular, the integration of
planning in all relevant areas of environment and development is envisaged. Further,
while the use of decentralized regulatory instruments, in particular those which work
through market signals, as well as the removal of distortionary incentives, is
recommended, there is also emphasis on a broader range of public participation. This
latter aspect may be owing to the fact that in several areas of economic activity, market
failures may occur on the demand side, including for example, environmental quality,
and social and physical infrastructure, and accordingly, unregulated market approaches
may be inefficient.
Conservation and management of resources for development
Political aspects
Noteworthy in the Chapter on protection of the atmosphere is the importance attached
to reducing uncertainities in areas such as climate change and climate variability, air
pollution and ozone depletion. The intention behind this focus is to improve the
scientific basis for decision making. It is equally interesting that the chapter on
protecting the atmosphere does not mention fossil fuels, covers all greenhouse gases,
and limits commitments for corrective action to the agreements reached in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). It is also of considerable
significance that Agenda 21 identifies the importance of the growing reliance that
would have to be placed on environmentally sound energy systems, particularly new
and renewable sources of energy. The debate over whether environmentally 'safe and
sound' energy systems should be considered for promoting sustainable development or
whether environmentally 'sound' energy systems would suffice was a major contentious
issue which only got resolved on the final day of UNCED. While a consensus was
ultimately reached, a couple of delegations from oil producing States, insisted on
placing on record their objections to what they described as the promotion of the
utilization of 'unsafe and environmentally unsound technology and energy sources, such
as nuclear energy'.
Agenda 21 also visualizes an integrated approach to land resource use which
would involve simultaneous consideration being given to environmental, social and
economic issues, Similarly, the chapter on the 'Conservation and Rational Use of
Forests' emphasizes the importance of recognizing the social, economic and ecological
values of forests and the need to incorporate such values into national accounting
systems. The contents of this chapter are further buttressed by the adoption separately
of a 'Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All
Types of Forests'.
The problems posed by desertification and drought for a very large number of
DCs has been focussed upon in a separate chapter. Priority has been accorded to halting
the spread of deserts by adopting preventive measures, particularly for lands which are
not yet degraded, or which are only slightly degraded. At UNCED agreement was,
however, reached to elaborate an international convention to combat desertification in
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those countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, particularly in
Africa, and such a convention is to be finalised by June 1994.
Like the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the Agenda 21 chapter
devoted to biodiversity recognises the sovereignty of States over their genetic resources,
and its contents essentially parallel the matching provisions of the Biodiversity
Convention. The chapter on environmentally sound management of biotechnology calls
for the transfer of biotechnology to DCs and the creation of the the necessary
infrastructure as regards capacity building and human resource development in DCs.
The chapter on the protection of the oceans recognises that the rights and
obligations of States set out in the UNCLOS (the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea) provides the international basis on which to pursue the protection and sustainable
development of the marine and coastal environment and its resources. It is specifically
recognised that the implementation by the DCs of the activities listed in the chapter
would be commensurate with their individual technological and financial capacities and
priorities in allocating resources for development needs, and would ultimately depend
on the technology transfer and financial resources required and made available to them.
An intergovernmental conference would be convened under UN auspices with a view to
promoting the effective implementation of the provisions of UNCLOS on straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. However, the work and the results of that
conference would have to be fully consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, in
particular, those relating to the rights and obligations of coastal states and states fishing
on the high seas. The chapter on protection of the quality and supply of freshwater
resources is of particular interest to DCs. As regards drinking water supply and
sanitation, it bases proposed activities on the four guiding principles of the New Delhi
Statement of 14 September 1990, which formulized the need to provide, on a
sustainable basis, access to safe drinking water in sufficient quantities and proper
sanitation for all, emphasising the 'some for all rather than more for some' approach.
Freshwater management is proposed to be holistic, and based on a balanced
consideration of the needs of people and the environment.
The chapter on environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals includes
a separate programme area on prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and
dangerous products and incorporates noteworthy references to the prior informed
concent procedure. It is noteworthy that the chapter on environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes includes as an overall target the requirement of
ensuring that environmentally sound hazardous waste management options be pursued
to the maximum extent possible within the country of origin ('self-sufficiency
principle'). Governments are also required to ascertain that their military
establishments conform to their nationally applicable environmental norms in the
treatment and dsiposal of hazardous wastes. Of particular interest in the chapter on safe
and environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes is the requirement that
states not promote or allow the storage or disposal of high level, intermediate level, and
low level radioactive wastes near the marine environment unless scientific evidence,
consistent with the applicable internationally agreed principles and guidelines, shows
that such storage or disposal poses no unacceptable risk to people and the marine
environment or does not interfere with other legitimate use of the sea.
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Economic aspects
The impacts of anthropogenic activities on key resources: atmosphere, forests, land,
oceans, freshwater, etc., are profoundly uncertain. A major thrust of proposals for
resource management, accordingly, centre on reducing uncertainties through research.
A second focus of proposals on resource management is the development of
capacities and capabilities for research on impacts, planning and policy making, and
technological innovation and absorption.
A third area of emphasis is the empowerment of groups which would be
adversely affected by degradation. The underlying belief is that public policies have
major impacts on conservation of natural resources, and that by such empowerment,
policy making could be influenced in the direction of sustainability. Since many of
these potentially impacted groups, for example indigenous people, might also be
identified as underprivileged, there is an apparent synergy between equity and
sustainability concerns.
One major resource which is adversely impacted by economic activities is the
atmosphere. This is because of its close links with energy supply and use. The
atmosphere is the principal recipient of environmentally damaging discharges from the
use of fossil fuels. The impacts may be at all levels: local, regional, global. In
particular, the costs of global impacts, largely on climate, may be very high, but are
uncertain over wide limits Uncertainties are involved both in mapping the build-up of
pollutants from specific energy use activities, as well as how they translate to adverse
climatic and other externality impacts. Accordingly, the proposals on protection of the
atmosphere focus on the production and use of energy.
Energy production and use is, of course, intricately linked to economic activity,
and is a principal determinant of living standards and development. The tension
between development and environmental protection, sought to be resolved in concepts
of SD, is nowhere sharper than in the energy sectors.
Energy is a ubiquitous input in production, and in the long-run, a substitute for
(or may be complemented by) other inputs: Land, labour, capital. It is also an important
good in both private and public consumption, besides constituting a major revenue
source through indirect taxes, royalties, and leases. Policies that impact energy supply
and use, can thus, through inter-industry linkages, and changes in factors use, impact all
sectors, besides incomes, savings, investment, and public and private consumption.
Changes in international comparative and competitive advantage could also clearly
occur, affecting patterns of trade. Any scheme for environmental protection focussing
on the energy sectors will, therefore, have to address the potential wideranging impacts
on the economy.
Agenda 21 proposals attempt a fairly comprehensive approach, recommending
national planning to integrate energy, environment, and economic policy in a
sustainable framework. The internalization of environmental costs through economic
(incentive based) and regulatory (fiats) measures is also urged as a planning goal.
Economists generally prefer incentive based instmments which, in effect, price the
resource to the user, to fiats. The former, under a set of assumptions, will permit a
given level of environmental quality, to be reached at the least resource cost. Several
incentive based instruments., e.g., pollution taxes, tradeable permits, may also be
designed to raise significant revenues for funding SD measures, or meeting equity
concerns. However, Agenda 21 does not urge the adoption of (economic) regulatory
instruments in a multilateral framework, i.e., with States as the regulated agents.
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One important set of policies which may have significant complementarities
with economic efficiency goals is increased energy efficiency and conservation. The
reduced use of primary energy, in particular fossil fuels, through increased energy
efficiency will reduce polluting emissions and discharges, and thus promote
sustainability. Accordingly, the document also proposes the development and use of
energy efficient technologies, setting goals for energy efficiency, and technology
transfers to DCs. Of course, under the Climate Convention, the responsibilities of DCs
for implementing national abatement strategies is conditional not only on the fact of
such technology transfers, but also on the '(agreed) full incremental costs' ('agreed':
under norms to be decided) being met by ICs. Questions relating to the appropriate
depth of technology transfer would need to be addressed in future negotiations. Several
energy sources are identified as 'sustainable' and therefore as meriting increased
research. These include solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, and biomass (including
wood). All of these, of course, have a range of environmental impacts. On the other
hand, nuclear power may, on balance, have lower eivironmental costs than these named
sustainable energy sources. The listing of 'sustainable' energy sources thus, does not
appear to have been examined on the basis of economic (efficiency, equity,
sustainability) criteria.
Land resources are also subject to stress from a diversity of economic activities.
The objectives of land resource conservation measures are articulated as the allocation
of land efficiently, i.e., maximization of sustainable net benefits, with the empowerment
of potentially impacted groups a matter of additional emphasis. A focus on private
property also reflects economists' belief that the common property nature of many land
resources fosters their unsustainable use, leading to degradation. A review of the
regulatory framework, including legislation, is urged for promoting sustainable land
management, but also to restrict the transfer of arable land to other uses. This may
conflict with efficiency, and represents an a-priori political determination that the
diversion of agricultural land to other uses is not desirable from the viewpoint.
Proposals for forestry conservation recognize the use of this resource in multiple
economic uses, besides ecological, social and cultural uses. This reflects the belief that
deforestation arises largely from the failure of existing institutions to internalize the
value of externality benefits which are in the nature of non-excludable public goods,
leading agents to neglect societal costs of deforestation. However there are major
difficulties in designing policy instruments to accomplish such internalization by
decentralized agents, and the principal means of arresting deforestation remain direct
government regulation, and recognizing and enhancing the rights of traditional users of
forest resources. There are large uncertainties in computing the value of external
benefits of forests, and accordingly, their incorporation in national accounting systems
may also present serious difficulties.
Some approaches to conservation in the document include promoting non-wood
forest products, eco-toursm, and more efficient fuelwood harvesting and use. These
may enhance the private benefits from forestry, and accordingly reduce deforestation
rates.
Capacity building in the forest sector is a major focus of the proposals. This
follows from recognition of the multi-disciplinary nature of forestry management, which
is the key to effective Government regulation of the resource.
The priority in combating desertification is preventive measures on lands not yet
(or only partly) degraded. This may reflect an assumption that the net benefits of
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investments in prevention are likely to be greater than in the case of reclamation. The
possibility of serious contributions from indigenous knowledge to scientific research in
these aspects is recognized. However, some traditional livelihoods may have become
unsustainable due to drought and population increase, and these may be altered. The
fact that cultural transitions may be involved is, however, not addressed. This accords
with the omission of human culture as among the attributes of sustainable development.
Droughts may lead to disaster and refugee problems. While relief measures are
proposed, the question of drought (disaster) arising as a result of external activities,
meriting compensatory rather than paternalistic responses by the concerned entities, is
not discussed.
Mountain ecosystems are a valuable component of global ecosystems.
Approaches to conservation of the resource focus, first, on the fact that it is still
inadequately researched, and second, on the development of alternative activities at the
village level which could be undertaken in sustainable ways.
Approaches to agriculture focus on removing policy distortions in many
countries, as well as trade barriers. This may enable DCs in general to realize their
competitive advantage in many agricultural commodities. There is, however, no specific
mention of price stabilization. A framework for food security is recommended,
including the transfer of storage and distribution technologies. Other interesting
proposals relate to ensuring access to agricultural resources to underprivileged groups,
extending financial networks (which may require increased research and
experimentation in credit delivery methods to undeiprivileged groups), sharing benefits
of R & D in plant breeding and seed production, integrated pest management, and soil
fertility management. In particular, an energy transition in rural areas is necessary: this
may increase reliance on fossil fuels.
Conservation of biodiversity is, of course, a principal aim of the entire
movement for sustainable development. Proposals for biodiversity generally reflect the
principles involved in the Biodiversity Convention, but do not elucidate the contractive
framework facilitating access to national genetic resources in return for (resultant)
biotechnology transfer. The use of EIAs (Environmental Impacts Assessments) for
evaluating projects likely to impact biodiversity is advised: The technique is, however,
still difficult to translate to actual cost-benefit analyses, an evaluation methodology with
which policy makers and international agencies are generally familiar, because of
problems of information. Further, while the use of economic incentives for conservation
and sustainable use is recommended, whether the opportunity costs of conservation, i.e.,
the net economic benefits lost from not employing the resource to the best alternative
use, should be forthcoming from multilateral sources, is not addressed. In fairness, this
should be the subject of future protocols under the biodiversity Convention.
The document points to the emerging promise of biotechnology in numerous
applications, and to the potential for cooperation between ICs and DCs, in indirect
reference to the contractive framework. in the Biodiversity Convention. The document is
also a little stronger than the Biodiversity Convention on the issue of entitlements to
commercial and economic benefits from biotechnology for indigenous peoples.
Proposals for ocean resources focus on sedimentation, pollution, injurious
fishing practices, and climate change. Land based activities are asserted to adversely
impact the ocean's biological resources. The creation of Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ) are asserted to be conducive to natural resources conservation. This generally
accords with economic logic.
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Another significant dimension of conserving ocean resources relate to climate
change impacts. The emphasis is on global exchange of research based information, in
particular of small island states, which are particularly threatened. Such states are to be
assisted for adaptation by ICs, but the document is silent on the question of liability for
damage, an issue touched upon in the Climate Change Convention.
Freshwater resources are another important subject of Agenda 21. It is
recommended that discharge standards may be set as well as 'polluter pays' invoked.
As pointed out above, there is, however, an essential dichotomy between standards and
incentive based instruments (including liability regimes) embodying polluter pays. The
former do not, in general, ensure cost minimization for a given environmental standard,
while th latter do so under some assumptions. The proposals also include research on
the impact of climate change on freshwater supplies, and for contingency planning.
The safe use of toxic chemicals is another focus of Agenda 21. The proposals
include improved risk assessment, as well as the right of communities and individuals
to information. It is recommended that governments should employ the principle of
producer liability. The rationale for this principle derives from the likely assymetry of
information on risks between producers and users, including intermediate handlers.
The management of hazardous waste is another theme of Agenda 21. Policy
approaches recommended in the document focus on international cost-benefit guidelines
for hazardous waste production and management. By implication, the major evaluative
principle is economic efficiency. The question of equity would then presumably be
dealt with by national authorities, involving an assumption that impacts would be
limited to national jurisdictions. The ethically sensitive issue of international trade in
hazardous waste is adverted to in several ways. While no outright ban is proposed, a
ban may apply when recipient countries lack the capacity to handle them in
environmentally sound ways. Further, recipients are urged to treat wastes in a manner
consistent with regulations in the country of origin: Presumably this will ensure a
measure of reduction of impacts. illegal trade will require penalties, legislation,
monitoring, and enforcement.
Agenda 21 proposals for solid waste involve programs to minimize waste
creation, reuse, and recycling, principally by incentive based instruments, international
standards for environmentally sound treatment and disposal, and extending waste
handling services through national planning and international cooperation. The efficient
level of reuse/recycling will vary across countries, depending on their resource
endowments. In general, labour rich DCs may be enabled by properly designed
incentive based policy instruments, to accomplish higher levels of reuse/recycling than
labour scarce ICs.
Radioactive wastes are also considered in Agenda 21. One proposal is to
enhance transfer of technology for storage, transport and disposal to DCs. This is
interesting because one barrier to increased investment in nuclear power generation by
DCs is lack of such waste handling technology.
Strengthening the role of major groups
Political aspects
The Preamble to this chapter recognizes that the commitment and involvement of all
social groups would be critical to the effective implementation of the objectives,
policies, and mechanisms agreed to under Agenda 21. Separate chapters address the
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crucial role of women, youth, indigenous people, NGOs, local authorities, workers and
trade unions, business and industry, science and technology and farmers in this regard.
The chapter on women urges governments to address directly the question of the status
of women, provide girls equal access to education, reduce the workload of women, and
take a variety of measures so as to secure the full participation of women in all aspects
of cultural, social and public life. As regards youth, a target has been set by which
governments are urged to ensure that by the year 2000, 50% of their youth are enrolled
in or have access to secondary or equivalent education or vocational training
programmes. The chapter on indigenous people recognises that the developed world has
much to learn from indigenous people as regards sustainable development methods, and
urges their involvement in the global partnership.
Economic aspects
An important dimension of sustainable development concerns is the status, entitlements,
and say in family and societal decision-making, of women. It is now conventional
wisdom that development programs frequently, Often through neglect or oversight at the
stage of formulation and/or implementation, impact women. These impacts are typically
adverse, because planners and analysts are usually not sensitized to women's issues.
Accordingly, the emerging sustainable development paradigm makes it imperative to
conduct Gender Impact Analyses of project and programs, so that the women's
dimension in development is fully taken account of in the policy-making process.
Environmental degradation in DCs is now believed to usually have significant
differential and unfavourable impacts on women. Entitlements to food may be reduced,
and because of the increasing difficulty of collecting fuel, drawing water, and grazing
livestock, there is increase in drudgery. Time spent on infant and child care is also
reduced, adversely affecting the health and prospects for the literacy of the next
generation. Environmental degradation may also increase the demand for child labour
time in household chores and petty tasks of livelihood, reducing further the chances of
school enrollment and retention.
Proposals in Agenda 21 on actions for women's status and welfare recognize
that their education and empowerment, in the family, in society generally, and
politically, can have deep impacts on population growth, schooling, infant mortality,
sanitation, nutrition, and resource conservation. The proposals accordingly focus on
these two objectives, i.e., women's education and empowerment.
Specific proposals include, first, formulating a strategy for eliminating
constitutional, legal, administrative, cultural, behavioral, social and economic obstacles
to women's participation in sustainable development and public life. Second, priority
measures are recommended for disseminating gender-relevant knowledge and promoting
the enhanced value of women's roles in educational curriculum. Third, measures to
eliminate female illiteracy, assure universal access to girls' primary and secondary
education, as well as increase their opportunities for technical and professional training.
Fourth, enhancement of women centered and managed health care, including
reproductive services, and making them more accessible. Additionally, equal
employment opportunities and equal pay for women should be supported by day-care
and parental leave. There are several further recommendations.
Other groups, identified as 'social partners for sustainable development' include
youth, indigenous peoples. NGOs, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business
and industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers. Proposals seek
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to identify their interests, and possible roles in sustainable development. In particular, it
is recommended that youth be involved in decision making relating to their future. The
long-standing relationship of indigenous peoples with their lands, and their holistic
scientific knowledge of natural resources and the environment is recognized. Further, it
is recommended that their participation in national and international sustainable
development decision making should be enhanced.
Means of implementation
Political aspects
Financing of implementation of Agenda 21 was a major issue of contention before
UNCED. While, in general, such financing is to come from a country's own public and
private sectors, UNCED recognized that for DCs substantial new and additonal funding
for sustainable development and implementation of Agenda 21 will be required.
Moreover, developed countries reaffirmed their commitment to reach the accepted UN
target of 0.7% of GNP for ODA and to augment their aid programmes in order to reach
the target as soon as possible. Some developed countries agreed to reach the target by
the year 2000. The Commission on Sustainable Development would regularly review
and monitor progress towards this target and review process would systematically
combine monitoring of the implementation of Agenda 21 with a review of the financial
resources available. Funding for Agenda 21 and other outcomes of UNCED is to be
provided in a way which maximises availability of new and additional resources and
which uses all available funding resources and mechanisms. The summit called for
'special consideration' to be given at the forthcoming meeting of IDA Deputies to the
statement made by the President of the World Bank in the UNCED Plenary, in which
he had made a compelling case for providing IDA with additional funds to help the
poorest countries meet their environmental objectives. Developed countries and others
in a position to do so are to make initial financial commitments to give effect to
UNCED decisions, and are expected to report on such plans and commitments to the
47th UNGA. In turn, DCs are expected to begin drawing up national plans for
sustainable development to give effect to UNCED decisions. While UNCED was never
meant to be a pledging Conference, it is noteworthy that some developed countries
indicated at it specific financial commitments for enhancing the capacity of DCs to
tackle environmental and linked developmental issues. Japan, for example, will increase
aid for sustainable development to $7-7.7 billion over the next five years. The EC
pledged $4 billion and Germany agreed to meet the ODA target of 0.7% of GNP for
development aid. The UNDP, GEF and others are also expected to provide increasing
funding for environment projects. The cost of implementing Agenda 21 has been
estimated at US$600 billion per annum, including US $125 billion in technical and
economic assistance to be provided by the developed countries. It is, however, pointed
out that these cost estimates are indicative in nature, have been prepared by UNCED
Secretariat, and were not reviewed by governments.
Agenda 21 also addresses both the issues of improved access to and transfer of
environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how to DCs on favourable
terms (including on concessional and preferential terms as mutually agreed) and the
strengthening of institutional capacity in DCs.
A key element amongst the decisions taken at UNCEDwith a view to the
implementation of Agenda 2 1was a recommendation to the 47th UNGA to establish a
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high-level Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). The 47th UNGA would
determine the specific organisational modalities of the work of the CSD, including the
question of its composition and membership, relationship with other UN bodies,
frequency, duration and venue of its meetings, etc. The CSD would report to the
UNGA through ECOSOC. It would have a crucial role to play to maintain the
momentum created at UNCED so as to ensure that decisions reached at UNCED are
effectively carried out.
Economic aspects
The question of technology transfer is at the core of practical measures for sustainable
development. Technology transfer is defined to include knowledge, goods, services, and
organizational procedures. Support to DCs is asserted to be necessary to build up their
economic, technical, and managerial capabilities.
The issue of IPRs protection is the central issue in transfer of environmentally
benign technologies. While it is asserted that much relevant technological knowledge is
not covered by IPRs (i.e., is in the public domain), the role of international business in
transfer of proprietory technology is emphasised. The question of access to state-of-art
technologies by DCs through facilitation and financing is emphasised, together with
providing fair incentives to innovators.
The traditional policy concern in design of IPRs regimes is to trade-off diffusion
possibilities (disclose of knowledge to the public), which enhance static efficiency,
with incentives for innovation (i.e., property rights over created knowledge), which may
motivate innovation, in order to realize dynamic efficiency. The introduction of
environmental protection concerns does not fundamentally alter the nature of this
tradeoff: the benefits of enhanced environmental quality (as well as the costs, including
the resource costs of R & D for environmentally benign technologies) may be valued,
and inserted into the (dynamic) cost-benefit calculus. However, since DCs may value
environmental quality differently from ICs, and their choice of social discount rate may
(quite legitimately) also differ, a case is apparent on simple efficiency grounds, without
invoking any equity considerations, for differential levels of IPRs protection in DCs and
ICs. If (future) environmental benefits are valued lower in DCs as compared to ICs, and
their social discount rates are also higher, both reasonable assumptions, the (dynamic)
efficient levels of IPRs protection in DCs should be lower, since it is current diffusion
rather than future innovation that would yield the greater relative benefits in their case.
Such lower levels of IPRs protection would, however, result in reduced IPRs rents to
ICs innovators.
'Capacity Building' in terms of Agenda 21 proposals is the prima-donna of
international cooperation for sustainable development. Capacity building comprises
developing a country's human, scientific, technological, organizational, instittitional, and
resource capabilities. Each country is urged to complete, by 1994, a review of its
capacity building needs. Programs should improve countries' ability to respond to
long-term, rather than only immediate problems. Capacity building also, clearly,
involves technology transfer.
Sustainable development involves major reorientation of the process and
objectives of growth. It has assimilated the lessons of the development experience over
the last four decades, and seeks to integrate poverty removal, resource conservation,
different categories of equity concerns, empowerment of women and other
disadvantaged groups, financial and technology transfers, research and development,
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besides economic growth, in a holistic framework. The entire approach is
multidisciplinary, local as well as regional and global in scope, and relies on a range of
institutions: governments, markets, NGOs, and others. The question of enhancing the
human capital resources of countries, their knowledge base, and institutional capabilities
is obviously crucial to this effort.
Cooperation in capacity building is not a straightforward Notth-South affair.
DCs too possess significant resources of human capital and know-how, and
South-South, as well as regional cooperation, are alternative approaches. These may
also be more cost-effective than a preoccupation with North-South capacity transfers.
Conclusion
Agenda 21 represents a serious attempt at harmonizing current understanding of the
development process and environmental protection, with political perceptions and
priorities. These could change over time, and accordingly Agenda 21 is designed as a
dynamic document
Apart from questions of provision Of new and additional financial resources and
technology transfer, a crucial element in effective implementation, is national capacity
building. The building up of technical skills, administrative capacity, policymaking
sildis, and institutional design is a major focus of the proposals, in which there exists
considerable scope for multilateral cooperation involving all sectors and players.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change
Chandrashekhar Dasgupta
Additional Secretaiy, Ministry of External Affairs
Covering as it does vital questions of energy production, consumption, as well as
forestry and land use patterns the Framework Convention involved one of the most
significant environmental as well as economic negotiations undertaken in recent years.
The negotiations were driven by a political decision to conclude an agreement in time
for the Rio Summit. It was remarkable that a Convention of such complexity and
import'nce was indeed concluded in little over a year, to be precise 15 months. The
logical framework of the exercise is reflected quite clearly in the Convention. However,
given the time factor, it should come as no surprise that in some respects, the
negotiations were not truly completed and a number of important questions were left
for subsequent resolution after the Conventior comes into effect.
The object of my talk is two fold.
To indicate an outhne of the logical framework or rationale of the Convention.
To spell out the questions which remain to be addressed.
The most important feature of the Convention is that it provides a framework for a
logical set of actions by the international community to deal with Climate Change
problem. The basic features of the Convention can be summarized as follows:
The general commitments (Article 4.1) are based on 'Common but differentiated
responsibilities'. The Convention recognizes in its Preamble 'that the largest share
of historical and current emissions of GHGs has originated in developed countries,
that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low, and the
share of the global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet
their social and development needs'. The Convention therefore logically concludes
that, 'the extent to which developing country parties will effectively implement
their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective
implementation of developed country parties of their commitments under the
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology, and will take
full into account that economic and social development ana poverty eradication are
the first and overriding priorities of the developing country parties'. (Article 2.7).
More specifically the Convention provides, the developing country
parties shall be provided the 'agreed full incremental costs' of implementing
measures under the Convention. The Convention thus clearly establishes that the
obligation of developing countries are restricted to measures which are
compensated by payment of agreed full incremental costs (Article 2.3). In the case
of certain other obligations (under Article 12.1), the 'full incremthital costs' are to
be provided.
2. In the case of developed country parties and countries with economies in
transition, that is industrialized East European countries, certain specific
commitments of standardization and reduction are laid down in Article 4.2.
However, a number of specific details need to be worked oUt in the first meeting
of the conference of parties. This specific obligations of the developed countries
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and industrialized East European countries flow logically from the responsibility
for inducing the phenomenon of climate change.
The developed countries, but not East European states are additionally required to
provide the new and additional financial resources required by developing
countries. The exemption of East European states from financial obligation can be
justified on the basis of differences in 'respective capability between them and
other developed countries'.
In keeping with the principles of differentiated responsibilities Article 12 requires
developing countries to provide general information on steps taken and envisaged
by them to implement the Convention, and any other information which they
consider relevant in this connection, including, the feasible material relevant for
calculation global emissions trends. The developed country parties as well as the
East European countries are additionally required to provide detailed descriptions
of policies and measures adopted to implement their specific commitments (under
Article 4.2) and the effects of these policies and measures on GHGs emission by
sources and absorption by sinks. Developed countries but not countries with
economies in transition are also required to furnish details of measures taken by
them to provide new and additional financial resources to developing countries,
assistance to developing countries to meet the cost of adaptation, measures taken
to promote, facilitate, and finance transfer of environmentally sound technologies.
I now come to the questions which the Conventions itself recognizes as requiring
further consideration. It is not my intention to give an exhaustive account of the tasks
which are to be taken up in the first session of the Conference of Parties. My intention
is only to focus on certain specific tasks, which the Convention itself recognizes as
unfinished.
These relate to Article 4.2 concerning the specific commitments of developed
country parties and industrialized East European countries.
The Convention provides the following:
Article 4.2(a) requires developed country parties and so called economies in
transition to adopt national policies to limit and reduce GHGs emissions and
protect and enhance their respective GHGs sinks, recognizing that the return by the
end of the present decade to earlier levels of emissions would contribute to
modified long term trends consistent with the objective of the Convention. It
allows such counthes to implement such policies and measures jointly with other
parties. However, the concept of joint implementation, has not been spelt out. It
could be interpreted as joint implementation between developed and developing
countries. This would be consistent with a tradeable rights approach. But on the
other, efforts may also be made to interpret it as joint implementation between
developed and other industrialized countries, thereby shifting international
cooperation from a North-South to an East-West axis. Since emissions in East
Europe have generally shown a declining trend since 1990 on account of
temporary contraction of economic activity, so called joint implementation may
project a picture which is deceptive in the long run. The concept therefore requires
clearer definition. Article 2.4 sub para (d) therefore specifically requires that the
Conference of Parties at its first session take decisions regarding criteria for joint
implementation.
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2. Article 4.2(d) requires developed countries and the East European economies in
transition to periodically provide details of policies and measures, as well as the
resulting impact on projected emissions from sources and removal by sinks of
GHGs, with the aim of 'returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels'.
Methodology of calculations of emissions and removal of GHGs remains to be
worked out. Article 4.2(c) therefore specifically requires that this be considered and
agreed upon in the first session of the Conference of the Parties. Finally, and most
importantly, the Convention specifically requires under Article 4.2(d), a review of the
adequacy of commitments undertaken by the developed and other industrialized
countires. In Article 4.2(a) the Convention provides, that these countries should 'return
by the end of the present decade to earlier level', of anthropogenic GHG emissions. In
this connection with the time frame however no specific earlier level is identified. In a
different sub-para 2(b) there is a specific mention of 1990 levels, but in this there is no
reference to the time limit. There is an obvious need to remove this ambigUity, together
with the ambiguity which still remains in the joint implementation proposals. Moreover
the question of further reduction of emissions of developed countries and economies in
transition beyond 1990 levels requires to be addressed. For all these reasons it is
extremely important that a through review be undertaken of sub-para 2(a) and (b) of
Article 4. The need for such a review in the first session itself of the Conference of
Parties is recognized and provided for in sub-para 2(b). The sub-pära furthermore
provides that 'based on the review the Conference of Parties shall take appropriate
action which may include the adoption of amendments to the commitments of sub-paras
(a) and (b)'.
To sum up, the Climate Change Convention itself indicates area when further
negotiations are required. These pertain to the core area of the Convention, namely, the
specific commitments of developed and other industrialized countries which are
responsible for the Climate Change phenomenon. Unless satisfactory solutions are
found to these unresolved questions, the Convention will fall short of being an effective
instrument of combatting Climate Change.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change:
some underlying economic issues
Neha Khanna and Anand Prakash
Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi India
one unifying characteristicof environmental resources is their regenerative
capacity, a capacity which can be destroyed if they are exploited unwittingly.'
(P. Dasgupta)
After two years of intense debate and negotiation, a number of countries have
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at Rio de Janeiro
in June, 1992, The Convention aims at stabilising the concentrations of all GHGs
(Greenhouse Gases) so as to reduce a major threat to sustainable development i.e.,
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the Earth's climate system.
Several important economic issues relating to the global environment have come
to fore in the Convention. This paper attempts to highlight and examine some of these
issues from a developing country perspective. First, we look at the economic rationale
for this Convention. This is followed by an analysis of technology transfer, macro-
economic implications and international trade in the light of the Convention. The
concluding section discusses some implications for future protocols to the Convention.
Externalities, free rides and market failure
Consider a firm that faces a perfectly elastic demand curve for' its output.1 Also assume
rising MPC (Marginal Private Costs).2 This implies that the total cost of producing an
additional unit of output increases more than proportionately with every unit produced,
as illustrated in figure 1.
At equilibrium, the firm maximises profits by producing output °B at which its
marginal cost of production equals the price. This, however, is a narro' treatment of
costs. Suppose CO2 is emitted during the production process as a by-product, Then, in
addition to the private costs, the external costs of these emissions (in an extreme case,
climate change) also need to be included in determining the MSC which is the true cost
to society. In other words,
Marginal Social Cost = Marginal Private Cost + Marginal External Cost.
The MSC (Marginal Social Cost) to produce a given level of output will always
exceed the corresponding MPC as long as the marginal external cost of production at
that level of output is greater than zero. Hence, the optimum (maximum net benefit)
level of output for society is less than that produced by the plant. In this case it is °A
where the MSC equals price. Consequently, the plant produces an excess output of
(O - OA).
A perfectly elastic demand curve implies that the plant faces infmite demand at the given market price.
In other words, the plant is too small to influence this price and can sell any amount of its output.
2 Private costs comprise the costs of land, labour, capital, materials etc.
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Figure 1
Another familiar example is that of deforestation in Brazil. The private cost of
deforestationatleast as far as the problem of GHG emissions is concerned, is less than
the associated global cost. Hence, while a policy of deforestation may make 'economic'
sense for Brazil, it is inefficient from the point of view of the rest of the world.
The phenomenon of MSC exceeding MPC is characteristic of exploitation of
'common resources', including the Earth's atmosphere. No country bears the full brunt
of its polluting activities or enjoys the full benefits of environmentally friendly
measures. Hence, there is a tendency to 'free ride'. This tendency is exacerbated by the
non-excludable nature of the atmosphere. Thus, in the presence of externalities and non-
excludability, the market mechanism fails to ensure an optimum allocation of resources.
The crux of the problem is that agents (firms, countries, etc.) do not face the social
costs of their actions. Free riding is their strategic response which leads to market
failure. It is here that governments have a role. Through environmental policies
gOvernments can ensure that polluters bear the cost they would shift onto the
consumers. Likewise, without a world government, no existing institution can compel
international polluters to pay [The Economist, May 30, 19921. In a situation where
unilateral action would be grossly inadequate, an international agreement is, ideally
speaking, a (peaceful) way to make countries participate in containing anthropogenic
climate change, without having some countries free ride on the efforts of others. The
recognition of the need (and advantages) of global action to contain the present rate of
GHG emissions was the starting point for the Rio Convention.
Technology transfer
OECD estimates suggest that by the middle of the next century, stabiisation of CO2
emissions by its member countries at current levels would reduce world output of CO2
by 11% from the level it would otherwise have reached This reduction could, however,
be largely negated if the developing countries, in their pursuit of development, spew
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more GHGs into the atmosphere. On some estimates, the CO2 output of China would
alone exceed that of the entire OECD,3
In recent years there has been a movement towards the development of environ-
mentally friendly technologies (especially in Japan and Germany). These are technol-
ogies that use the earth's resources and its capacity to absorb waste as frugally as
possible [The Economist, May 30, 1992]. However, due to the lack of purchasing
power of the developing countries, institutional and other constraints, the access' of
these technologies to the Jeveloping countries has been limited. This limited access to
benign technology can hinder global efforts to stabilize anthropogenic emissions of
GHG.
This is where the role of policy measures to facilitate technology transfer comes
in. Technology transfer is defined as the process by which technology, knowledge
and/or information developed in an organization, in a given area, or for a particular
purpose, is applied and utilised in a different setting or context.4 It may take the form
of a license for the use and revelation of a given technology for a specified term in
exchange for royalty, and subject to other conditions (e.g. restrictions on further
transfer, R & D (Research and Development), exports, etc).
If developing countries have access to environmentally sound technologies early
in their development process, the potential damage to the environment as a by-product
of development can be mitigated. Recognising this point the Convention makes the
following provision:
'The developed country Parties shall take all practicable steps to
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of environ-
mentally sound technologies and knowhow to other parties,
particularly developing country parties, to enable them to implement the
provisions of the convention.' [Article 4(5)]
We analyse technology transfer in three categories
A. Getting developed countries to share their technical know-how
Technology can be crucial in gaining international competitiveness. Also, strong IPR
regimes, (as portended by the draft Dunkel text5) yield significant economic rents to
their holders, mainly agents in developed countries, which may be captured through
exports of goods embodying the technology, no less than through royalty payments
involved in the transfer of the technology in question. It may not, therefore, be in their
interest to transfer state-of-the-art technology to others.6 Instead, the temptation would
be to transfer previous generation technology, which could, of course, be superior to
3The Economist, May 30, 1992.
4BelI, MartinContinuing Industrialisation, Climate Change And International Technology Transfer,
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, December, 1990.
5The draft Dunkel text is the draft presented at the Uruguay Round of the GA'Vl' negotiations by the
Secretary General, Arthur Dunkel.
61n fact, 99% of the 3.5 million patents are taken in developed countries and only 10% are worked in
developing countries [Sengupta, TamaliProtection of Intellectual Property Rights In India And South
Korea: Case Studies Of The Computer Software And Phar,naceutical Industries, 19911.
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that being used in the recipient country. This temptation will be further compounded by
the presence of asymmetric information in favour of the developed country parties.
Specifically, two factors could be at play:
Moral hazard. Moral hazard may be defined as actions of economic agents in
maximising their own utility to the detriment of others in situations where they do not
bear the full consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their
actions due to uncertainty and incomplete or resthcted contracts which prevent the
assignment of full damages (benefits) to the agent responsible.7 Developed country
agents have full information about the technology they are supplying, while those in the
developing countries cannot observe this costlessly, This enables the former to increase
their profits by supplying technology of a previous generation to the detriment of the
latter.
Adverse selection. Since developing country agents do not have complete
information, they form their expectations by observing the range of quality of
technology supplied in the market. They attach probabilities to getting different
qualities of technology. Using these probabilities they determine the expected value of
the technology being offered. The price they are willing to pay will lie between that of
the most and least advanced technology being offered. At this price the developed
country agents will not find it profitable to sell the advanced technology as the price
the developing country agents offer will be less than what they expect. The iteration of
the above phenomenon will result (in the extreme case) in only previous generation
technology being offered in the market.
The implication is that from both the supply and the demand side, the market
tends to move away from the state-of-the-art. While this may be relatively inefficient
from the point of view of minimising GHG emissions (since the potential of the
continuously changing state-of-the-art to contain such emissions may exceed that of the
second best), it may be optimal in the context of maximising global welfare. This is
because in some cases, the developing countries themselves might prefer a second best
technology to the state-of-the-art, since the former may be more appropriate for their
economies. (See next section for further details on this argument.)
Technology transfer is multi-dimensional. It can be categorized into three broad
areas:
actual level of know-how transferredthis spans the transfer of intellec-
tual capital (blue-prints), physical capital, and final products
the property rights over the technology transferred
the nature of compensation (licence fees, side commodity deals, etc.)
involved in the transfer
The Convention is silent about depth of technology transfer. This ambiguity
leaves considerable room for the developed country agents to manoeuvre the
interpretation to maximise their gain at the expense of the developing country agents.
The result could again be either the transfer of outdated technology or transfer in a very
narrow fr4mework. For example, such transfers may comprise only exports of the
commodity embodying the technology, rather than the blue-prints or the physical capital
needed to produce that commodity. This would leave the recipient country with no
feasible option other than a continuous import of the commodity in question.
7Eatwell, John, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (ed.)The New Paigrave: A Dictionary of
Economics, Macmillan Press Limitea, 1990.
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Obviously, this involves significant opportunity costs for the recipient due to the
continuous outflow of foreign exchange. Furthermore, the developed countries could
also step up pressure on developing countries to change their existing IPR regimes if
any transfer is to go through.
B. Suiting this know-how to the economic and social systems of the
developing countries
The advent of the debate on Global Warming has brought forward many persuasive
arguments for switching to 'clean' coal technologies such as the IGCC (Integnited Gas
Combined Cycle). India set up a couple of pilot plants by importing gasifiers from
Germany and USA. However, in field conditions in India it is found that the efficiency
of the gasifiers was much less than that achieved in Germany/USA. This is because the
gasifiers being used were developed for high quality coal whereas, Indian coal has a
very high percentage of ash, clay and other extraneous matter.
The above example shows that the characteristics of technology are determined
largely by the nature of economies for which they are designed. The most significant
determinants are:8
level of income in the economy
resource availability and relative factor costs
nature of the technology in use in the society
system of organization of production in the society for which the tech-
nology is designed
Therefore, the characteristics required of any (new) technology differ sharply
between developed and developing countries. Appropriate technology is that which
minimises economic costs given the resource base and other socio-economic conditions
prevailing in the country. Thus, the state-of-the-art technology from developed countries
may be inappropriate for developing countries and could lead to inefficiencies in these
economies. It could, for example, lead to relatively abundant resources like labour
being underutilized. It is precisely for this reason that developing countries may prefer
a previous generation technology to the state-of-the-art.
This aspect has not been explicitly dealt with in the Convention. Perhaps a
clearer elucidation of 'agreed full incremental costs' that provides for the costs of
adapting technologies to recipient economies is required to cover this aspect of
technology transfer.
Another possible way around is joint R & D. Since the developing countries
constitute a large part of the market for environmentally sound technology, leaders in
such technology could start flagship R & D projects on a large scale in these countries
catering specifically to their needs. The Convention says:
developed country parties shall support the development and
enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing
country parties'. [Article 4(5)]
However, joint R & D may not be in the interest of developed country agents as
it could jeopardize their present monopoly over such technology. Therefore, a mutually
satisfactory way to share IPRs will need to be devised, so as to provide sufficient
incentives for such undertakings.
8As identified by Stewart in Meier, 1989Appropriate Technology, in Leading Issues In Third World
Development, (4th ed.), Gerald M. Meier (ed.), Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1986.
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C. Overcoming resistance to technology change in developing countries
Resistance to technical change exists mainly for two reasons. Firstly, there are
infrastructural requirements associated with certain types of technologies. For example,
setting up electronic telephone exchanges requires that equipment be kept in air-
conditioned rooms. The absence of this facility in developing countries (due to erratic
or non-existent power supply) discourages the establishment of such exchanges in rural
areas. Secondly, a sizable portion of the population in most developing countries tread
the thin line between subsistence incomes and starvation. This makes them highly risk
averse and unwilling to use new techniques.
The significance of these factors lies in the fact that developing countries cannot
thrust acceptance of new technologies on their people without substantial political and
economic costs. In reality, using new, environmentally sound technologies could be
painful. Therefore, unless sufficient measures are taken to provide
insurance against the users lot being worse off than what it was before
using the new technology
education about the advantages of using the new technologies,
the proposed technology transfer could be ineffective. Once more, an appropriate
definition of 'agreed full incremental costs' which covers such implicit costs could be
used to provide the resources which may help overcome this resistance.
The Framework Convention and the macro economy
Since the Climate Change Convention is aimed at stabilising GHG emissions at a
'sustainable' level, benefits (in the form of adaptation costs foregone) will accrue to all
generations of humankind. However, achieving this inter-generational equity objective
could impose considerable costs on the present generations.
The Convention implicitly recognises the historical responsibility of developed
countries for the current levels of anthropogenic emissions of GHG. It envisages a
transfer of technology and financial resources from developed to developing countries,
either in the form of grants or loans on concessional terms. The need for global action
and the realization that the developing countries will not agree to take preventive
measures if they interfere with their development process, together imply that
mitigating climate change is a process of give and take.
Currently developed countries have a monopoly over environmentally friendly
technologies. By transferring these to the developing countries they are effectively
expanding the market for these technologies. A large part of the resources will flow
back to the donor country in the form of demand for the goods produced by its firms
and royalty earnings. The economic rent earned by any firm that enters a new market
for such a technology will provide the wherewithal for further risk-bearing and
innovation. Thus the firm will be able to gain a competitive advantage over the others
in the industry. In a nut shell then, the aim is to gain a head-start in the future,
Developed countries, therefore, stand to gain economic (and political) advantage in the
domestic and international economy.
On the other hand, developing countries are aware of the importance of green
lobbies in developed countries. They may thus see this as an opportunity to gain access
to state-of-the-art technology. It is generally believed that though developing countries
are labour abundant they are severely constrained by the availability of investable
capital. The Convention may therefore be seen as a means for mobilising external
resources to be used by the developing countries in their overall development effort.
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Thus it may be argued that the influx of capital under the aegis of the Convention will
supplement scarce domestic resources of the developing countries and therefore
push/pull them out of their current stagnation. While this may be theoretically correct,
in reality it is rather simplistic. One must examine the macro-economic effects of the
likely resource transfer given the socio-economic conditions prevailing in developing
countries.
Picture a typical developing economy. It is characterised by the presence of a
large agrarian sector, a high population pressure on resources, high levels of unemploy-
ment, high rates of inflation, declining productivity, sticky interest rates, apart from a
huge external debt and low levels of social indicators (such as per capita income,
literacy rates, etc.).
New technologies that enter the economy are typically designed in developed
countries. They are likely to have a long 'learning period' while they adapt to the
economic conditions prevailing in the recipient developing economy. During this period
the cost of production in the industries receiving these technologies will rise as shown
in figure 2;
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Figure 2
This figure shows the time profile of the average (social) cost curve of a firm
that receives a new technology. Initially, the average cost to produce a given level of
output will rise. However once the technology is endogenised the cost begins to fall
and finally levels off.
In so far as a large part of the environmentally friendly technologies are likely
to be concentrated in the energy and other industries with significant forward linkages,
this higher cost will be transmitted throughout the economy.
At the same time, in each subsequent period there is an additional demand for
capitalpartly to finance the continuing capital formation and partly to consolidate the
market (i.e., strengthen the demand) for the commodity embodying the new technology.
This is more so in the case of environmentally benign technologies in developing
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countries, where a market for them may not exist at all since the global environment is
not a major consideration in these countries. Therefore, for the resource transfer
envisaged under the Convention to be effective, it is required that costs incurred to
undertake such measures are also covered. The reason for this is that the developing
countries are unlikely/unwilling to raise these resources domestically, given their
generally stagnating economies and the political unacceptability of increased taxation.
However, there seems to be nothing in the Convention that ensures such a broad
resource flow. On the contrary, this has been left open to debate and negotiation. Given
the prevailing international power structure in the world today, it seems unlikely that
such a broad flow will emerge. The only option left open to the developing countries
will be to increase money supplyeither by printing more money or by obtaining
additional funds internationally from outside the Convention.
To the extent that the transfer of resources to the developing countries will be in
the form of aid (albeit on concessional terms), as against outright grants, there will be
additional costs incurred by the developing countries. This is because past experience
has shown that the bulk of aid is 'tied'. This tends to distort the pattern of investment
towards those projects that have a large import component rather than projects/
programmes which are primarily dependant on local resources, thus imposing
opportunity costs on the recipient country.9 Even if aid is not tied, there is scope for
cartelisation in the supply of benign technologies, leading to 'reverse' transfers of
economic profits from the developing to developed countries. But, perhaps the greatest
cost to the recipient country, in our case a developing country, accrues when it has to
furnish interest and amortization payments. Given the stagnation and low/declining
productivity in the developing countries, additional nominal flows need to be generated
to finance these payments. The result is a further impetus to the on-going inflation.
Moreover, to the extent that the developing countries may have to borrow in the
international loan market to make the above payments, they will be pushed further into
the aid-debt spiral.
There are also other indirect costs associated with increased environmental aid.
Firstly, since such aid is to be 'new and additional' i.e., in addition to the other
development aid that the developing countries receive, it implies worsening of the debt-
service ratios for the developing countries. The result will be a decline in their credit
worthiness in the international aid/loan market. The implications of this could be far
reaching as it might mean less and/or more stringent aid to the developing countries
thereby jeopardising their overall development programme. Secondly, all interest and
amortization payments have to be made in an internationally acceptable currency.
Consequently, this places a strain on the foreign exchange reserves and (in a regime of
flexible exchange rates), exchange rates of the debtor country. The resulting
deterioration in the terms of trade may lead to an increasingly adverse balance of trade.
This is because developing countries exports typically have low price elasticities and
the relative decline in the price of exports will not be offset by a more than
proportionate increase in the quantity exported. Quite apart from this, in so far as the
(positive) gap between the domestic inflation rate and the world average is increased,
9Since some of the resources under the Convention may be transferred through bilateral arrangements,
aid may be tied by source also. This too has obvious opportunity costs for the recipient country which might
be able to obtain similar techr'logy on much easier terms from another source.
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there is a loss of competitiveness in the international market for exports from
developing countries.
The Rio Declaration invokes the Polluter Pays Principle for meeting the costs
incurred in undertaking abatement measures. Since the Declaration contains the guiding
principles for all other documents emanating from the UNCED process, it is applicable
to the Climate Change Convention. To this extent, the resource transfers could be
interpreted as 'polluter dues'. This could imply that a significant portion of these
transfers could be made in the form of grants or at least on more concessional aid.
Furthermore, the 'tied' component of the aid could also be lessened. These changes
could appreciably alleviate some of the costs incurred by the developing countries (as
discussed above).
Thus, while it may be possible to establish an international Climate Fund it is
essential to disburse these funds in a manner that assists the developing countries in
limiting GHG emissions without exacerbating existing international and domestic
inequalities. What is important is the efficacy with which the resources transferred
under the Convention are integrated into the overall development effort of the
developing countries. The governments of these countries will have to mobilise their
own resources and implement complementary programs that enhance the productivity of
their economies so as to prevent environmental aid from being detrimental and to
realise the full potential of the incoming technology and financial resources.
In recent years many developing countries have embarked on programmes of structural
adjustment of their economies. It will be crucial how these countries can integrate these
environmental considerations into their policies or national strategies. The structural
adjustment can be complimented by these new technologies and resources making the
transition a smoother process.
Trade and environment: a case for protectionism?
There has been increased awareness in recent years about the need for a cleaner
environment, and a growing realisation that using products produced by environ-
mentally friendly production processes is an important way of achieving this. This has
created an international 'green market', in both products and technology. Trade can
help exploit this market. Countries such as Germany and Japan have come to realise
that an 'early first' comparative advantage can be gained in the not so distant future by
adopting more stringent environmental standards now, as they feel the world will
follow suit soon. Besides, there is political mileage to be gained by being world leaders
in environmental issues as there is reason to believe that other countries will not let the
green market/constituency go uncompeted for.
However, trade also creates disincentives for the protection of the environment
Most environmentally benign technologies have high capital costs (though they may
have positive net present values). Therefore, in the short run this results in a loss of
competitiveness for their users in an international scenario where not everyone is using
such technologies. In the same spirit, relatively lax environmental standards in a
country provide an 'ecological subsidy' to its industries making them more competitive
than those in countries with more stringent standards. This might result in the shift of
production to these 'dirty' countries to the detriment of the environment.
The protection of the environment has thus provided a rationale for tariff
barriers or imposing unilateral trade sanctions. By keeping out commodities that do not
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meet domestic environmental standards countries can provide protection to their own
industry against potential competition.
Conversely, when sanctions are imposed for other economic reasons, such as the
protection of inefficient domestic industries, these can work against the environment.
For example, a protected agricultural sector based on the intensive use of chemical
fertilisers prevents entry of like commodities from other countries with lower fertiliser
intensities. The by-product of this protection is a higher emission of GHG by the
protecting country, (and also an increase in other local pollution impacts).
Also, there may be differences in perception of the risk posed by a polluted
(global) environment. This divergence in perceptions, especially marked between
developed and developing countries, is reflected in a lower willingness to pay for its
cleaning up and therefore, in a lower social cost in the latter countries. Thus, even if
countries have similar environmental standards, these may be met at markedly different
costs. This difference in costs could be perceived as another ecological subsidy for
industries in the developing countries. This provides an incentive to the developed
countries to impose countervailing measures.
Recognising the potential for protectionism the Climate Change Convention has
made the following provision:
'The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open
international economic system........Measures taken to combat climate
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade.' [Article 3(5)] (Italics added)
It is interesting that the italicised phrase also appears in the GAIT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) under article XX.'° Thus, the inclusion of the phrase
could be an effort to harmonise/reconcile the Convention and GA'FT. In this, the
Convention is one of the few international agreements on the environment that prohibits
the use of trade barriers. There are, however, some problems that might persist.
Most of the cases relating to the abuse of the environment that have been struck
down by a GAIT panel have been related to either local resources lying within a
country's national jurisdiction and/or concern environmental resources not protected an
international agreement. In the case of global climate change we are faced with a
diametrically opposite situation. The issue at hand is one of transboundary pollution of
a protected global common Thus if a future protocol to the Framework Convention
were to allow the use of unilateral trade sanctions or other barriers as an explicit (rather
than a disguised/unjustifiable) enforcement mechanism against violations of obligations,
these might be upheld by GAIT, as an exception to the other GAIT requirements that
all members treat imports and domestically produced commodities in a like manner, as
'°Article XX relates to general exceptions. hi particular, it provides for the following:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries , or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measurer
(b) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant ljfe or health;
(g) Relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption; [Genaral Agreement on Tariffs And TradeThe Text Of The General
Agreement On Tariffs And Trade, GATI', Geneva, July 1986].
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also all trading partners. Failing this, a GATT waiver can be requested, especially if the
signatories to the proposed protocol are mostly GATT members.11 In fact, in the
context of climate change, the use of waivers would ensure that the trade measures are
focused on the issue at hand, are transparent and are multilaterally negotiated.12
This brings us to the question of whether the environment can be protected
without resorting to outright protectionism. Alteration of consumer preferences in
favour of environmentally friendly products, in other words, strengthening the green
market, is one possible way. Suppose country X has achieved such an alteration
through public awareness campaigns. Also, the domestic policy of this country is to
label all commodities, whether imported or produced domestically, that meet certain
minimum environmental standards. (This would not be GATT-illegal as imports from
any source and domestic production are treated identically). In this case, even though a
trading partner using environment ly less efficient production processes is allowed to
enter the domestic market of X, it likely to suffer a loss in market share in this country.
This is because, ceteris paribus, the demand for unfriendly products has reduced. Here,
the alteration of consumer preferences in favour of a differentiated product has created
market incentives for protecting the environment without being GATF illegal.
Implications for future protocols
For an agreement to be successfully implemented, it is important for it to be self
enforcing. The problems faced in the implementation of international agreements (such
as the Climate Change Convention) are typified by the Prisoners' Dilemma. If all
parties to the agreement abide by their commitments they maximise their joint payoffs.
However, individually, their interests are best served by a strategy of violation.
Therefore, the dominant strategy for each party to the Convention would be to continue
emissions of GHG above the agreed levels by not signing future protocols to the
Convention.
An ideal way (in a Game Theoretic framework) to implement any future
protocol to the Convention would be to alter the payoffs in the 'emissions game' so
that stabiising emissions at the agreed levels becomes the dominant strategy. This
alteration could, however, involve the use of harsh measures such as trade sanctions,
reduced financial assistance, etc, which may discourage many nations from signing on.
In international agreements, therefore, it sometimes pays to leave the protocols to such
Conventions somewhat vague so as to get more nations on board. On the other hand,
there might exist positive measures that change the pay-off matrix in a manner that
makes every one better off by signing the agreement. Tradeable permits may be one
such instrument. Countries that exceed their allotted levels could purchase the right to
emit from those that have a surplus of emission rights. This would provide an incentive
to both parties. The excess emitters could continue their emissions above the allowable
level while countries with lower emissions can generate resources through this
mechanism. At the same time, the increasing imbalance between the demand and
supply of these permits that is likely to occur as an growing number of (developing)
t1To obtain a waiver under GATF a two thirds majority of the votes cast is required, with the additional
requirement that these two thirds comprise more than half of the contracting parties.
'2Genaral Agreement on Tariffs And TradeInternational Trade 90-91 (Vol. 1), GATT, Geneva, 1992.
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countries increase their emissions in their pursuit of development will raise their price,
which would create incentives for increasing GHG efficiency.
That protocols to the Climate Change Convention will be incomplete contracts
should be kept in mind. The writing of a complete contract will be particularly difficult
in this case due to the following reasons:
protocols would involve complex transactions and long time periodsthis will
make writing detailed contingent contracts very costly.
there is a high degree of scientific uncertainty in the Climate Change
debatethis is largely due to the large number and complex nature of possible
eventualities. Hence, contracting for each possible outcome is a virtual imposs-
ibility.
The implementation of an incomplete contract might be hampered by the non-
existence of a strict enforcement mechanism. This absence does not necessarily imply
that the contract is doomed to failure. There exist forces outside the protocol (such as
public opinion, international political pressure, etc.) that can ensure its effective
implementation.
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UNEP greenhouse gas abatement costing studies
Gordon A Mackenzie and Kirsten Halsnaes
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Riso National Laboratory
Denmark
Introduction
Many approaches have been taken to estimating the cost of limiting GHG (Greenhouse
Gas) emissions. These have used a variety of different assumptions and/or
methodologies, and consequently the results of one are difficult to compare with the
results of another. The UNEP Greenhouse Gas Abatement Costing project is intended
to clarify the economic issues involved in assessing the costs of limiting greenhouse
gas emissions and to propose approaches for carrying out comparable costing studies.
The UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment at Riso National
Laboratory, Denmark co-ordinates the project, with assistance from the Tata Energy
Research Institute, India and Caminus Energy Ltd in Cambridge, UK, Dr Michael
Grubb of London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, a Special Adviser to the
Executive Director of UNEP on these issues and co-ordinator of the earlier workshops,
is the lead adviser and liaison to the Executive Director for the project.
The project is divided into two phases of which the first is now completed
(UNEP, 1992). The first phase consisted of detailed studies of the underlying issues in
estimating abatement costs, including analysis of modelling options and reviews of
existing cost estimates, and a small set of national reviews. These country reviews
aimed at establishing the status of analysis and data in the countries concerned, and
illustrate in depth the practical issues raised in embarking upon abatement cost studies
in widely diverse countries. Drawing on this experience, Phase One of the project forms
the basis for establishing a consistent and iterative approach to national abatement cost
studies.
The aim of Phase Two is to develop and test a methodological approach through
a set of national case studies. As far as possible, these studies should use common (or
compatible) assumptions for parameters like international fuel prices, discount rates,
emission factors, and general technological development within the energy sector. In
addition, the structure of the analysis (e.g. time horizons and degrees of abatement
considered) and the concepts of cost used are defined to allow maximum comparability.
An essential feature of the case studies will be the combination of the results of
bottom-up (engineering) models, used for detailed system modelling .of GHG abatement
scenarios, with short to medium-run macroeconomic models, in order to calculate the
total macroeconomic effects of such strategies. This will involve improvement and
utilization of the methodology of GHG-reduction cost curves.
Project participation
The project aims to cover a range of countries in different stages of development, in
different geographical regions and with different energy options. At the inception of the
project it was envisaged that funding of the central project team would be directly from
UNEP, while the country studies would be self financed in the case of developed
countries, or funded by donor agencies in the case of developing countries and
economies in. transition. In the latter cases a pairing arrangement was proposed whereby
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institutions in the donor and receptor countries could collaborate. In view of the
relatively rapid initiation of the project, only a small core of countries were able to
participate fully in the first phase, while a number of other countries were more loosely
associated. These countries, and others, will join the project at a later stage as funding
is secured.
The countries participating in Phase One were Denmark, India, the Netherlands
and Zimbabwe. Summaries of the country studies are presented in the Phase One
Report (UNEP, 1992) and the full country papers are available on request from the
UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment.
The four core countries exhibit quite different stages and approaches to the
treatment of GHG abatement costing. The two developed countries, Denmark and
Netherlands, in spite of similar size, geographic situation, industrial and residential
structure, etc., have chosen different approaches. The two developing countries, India
and Zimbabwe, constitute two very different examples, both in tenns of physical size
and energy systems and in the development of methods. Energy modelling and GHG
costing methodologies are well established in India, while the process is still in its
infancy in Zimbabwe.
Relation to the Climate Convention
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN, 1992) lays considerable emphasis
on issues of cost. The precautionary approach is accepted, subject to the caveat that
measures adopted should be 'cost effective'. This is not defined, but clearly questions
relating to the economic cost of limiting emissions (as well as the benefits of not doing
so) will be crucial to the future policy debate. Furthermore, the convention focuses
upon 'Incremental cost' in relation to the transfer of financial resources for GHG
abatement in the developing countries. 'Incremental cost' is not defined in detail in the
climate convention, but can be understood both in relation to project implementation
and to more general economics of total abatement strategies.
There are a number of potential definitions of 'cost' and 'incremental cost'.
Other studies under way are attempting to clarify appropriate definitions for use in
relation to the convention. There are also extensive debates about how to quantify the
benefits to be gained from limiting emissions.
The project does not seek to resolve the debates about appropriate definitions of
cost and incremental cost for use in the international context. Nor does it consider
quantitatively the climatic benefits of abatement, because of the immense uncertainties
and complexities surrounding this. Instead, the project seeks as the primary focus to
examine how the impact of varying degrees of abatement on key cost indicators can be
assessed, in ways which both command broad consensus as providing reasonable
indications of the costs involved in limiting emissions, and which can be practically
realised in relation to the available models, data and institutional capacities in the
countries involved.
Content and structure of the studies
To gain maximum benefit from abatement costing studies, they need to be structured in
a comprehensive and logically consistent manner. The principal aim of Phase Two of
the UNEP studies is to conduct a set of representative national studies within such an
approach. The proposed methodological structure is outlined below.
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The proposed GHG abatement costing analysis can be briefly summarized as
follows.
Establish a reference scenario on the basis of the best available national
macroeconomic forecast, technology and emission data. An energy system
model (and possibly other sector models) is required in this step.
Specify a set of relevant GHG abatement technologies and make a separate
direct cost and emission ranking of these compared with the reference scenario.
Supplement the 'pure' cost and GHG emission criteria with other relevant
social, political, and economic criteria.
3, Analyze a set of comprehensive GHG abatement scenarios using a total energy
system model and other relevant sector models, in which aU relevant linkages in
the production system can be treated.
Assess the macroeconomic impacts of the different GHG abatement scenarios
derived in the previous step. At this stage some additional scenarios may be
developed and analyzed using the sector models.
Comment on the desirability and social, political and economic consequences of
one or more alternative GHG abatement strategies.
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The approach is a compromise between different qualitative concerns and is
therefore naturally open to criticism, both from experts who may find it too simplistic,
and from others who might find it over complicated and demanding. This is an
inevitable risk for any activity of this type. It is important to stress that the project team
does not claim to have found the ultimate method, which in our view does not exist.
The effort merely represents a first attempt to move the international debate on these
issues towards' a broader and more common understanding.
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Future plans
As mentioned above a number of countries are expected to join the project for Phase
Two. These include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Senegal, Thailand and
Venezuela. Funding is already secured for some of these and the country studies are
under way. The inclusion of these countries, and possibly more, in the project, carrying
out comparable national studies of the cost of greenhouse gas limitation will provide
valuable information on the feasibility of a common approach. A possible third phase
would extend the approach to an even wider group of countries, concentrating on the
establishment and consolidation of local expertise in the assessment of such costs.
The second phase of the project is scheduled to be completed in June 1993. A
third project workshop for participating countries and the project team will take place
in New Delhi in February 1993. The completion of the project as a whole will be
marked by a major symposium 'National strategies for Limitation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions' with special emphasis on costing, tentatively scheduled to take place in
Denmark in October 1993.
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Abstract
After nearly 20 years of global energy studies emphasis has shifted from resource limits
and volatile prices to the increasing recognition of environmental issues as important
driving forces for present and future energy systems. In view of concerns about
energy-related sources of global change, as documented by the UNCED process and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change signed in Rio, the paper discusses
transitional strategies and policy measures that achieve economic and social
development goals while minimizing emissions of greenhouse gases such as CO2.
Environmentally more compatible energy strategies encompass a wide range of
techno-economic adjustments such as efficiency improvements and shifts to low and
carbon-free fuels on one hand, and institutional and social-behavioral responses on the
other. The paper illustrates ongoing research at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IJASA) to develop analytical tools for the assessment of policy
options that respond to the agenda set forward by UNCED and which is likely to
remain a planetary one for much of the 21st century.
Introduction
Traditional concerns about the physical and economic availability of adequate energy
resources have given way to increasing awareness of global and long-term
environmental impacts of energy production, conversion and end-use at all scales from
the local, regional, to the global level. Today, the predominant question is still whether
it would actually be possible to continue consuming fossil energy at current or even
higher rates in the future? What is new is that instead of available energy resources the
risks of adverse global change could constitute the ultimate limit of future development
in energy systems. Thus, the ultimate global resource could be the environment rather
than recoverable energy reserves and resources.
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, humanity has consumed fossil
energy amounting to some 200 Gt (l0 tons) carbon and current annual emissions from
fossil energy use amount to almost 6 Gt carbon (C). Compared to this, our remaining
'carbon wealth' accumulated over geological times is orders of magnitudes higher.
Currently identified, economically recoverable energy reserves amount to 540 Gt C
(Table 1). Additional 3026 Gt C are contained in resources (i.e., identified quantities,
whose economic recoverability is uncertain at present) and further 5200 Gt C are
contained in additional occurrences (quantities inferred by broad geological information
but with their economic and technical potentials remaining largely unexplored).
Remaining fossil energy resources thus range between 3500 to 8700 Gt carbon,
compared to a current atmospheric carbon loading of about 760 Gt. This clearly
illustrates that already currently known fossil energy resources could be sufficiently
large to increase atmospheric CO2 concentrations by several factors. This raises the
issue of how necessary further economic and social development could be achieved
without undue stresses on the global environment and how the burden of mitigation or
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adaptation measures is going to be shared considering historical and present disparities
in energy-related carbon emissions (Figure 1).
In order to assess possible and likely future trends in the energy sector, Stanford
University and IIASA have been jointly organizing since 1981 the International Energy
Workshop (IEW) (cf. Manne et al., 1991) with the aim to compare energy projections
made by different groups in the world and to analyze their differences. The median of
global CO2 emissions calculated from the JEW polls of global energy consumption or,
in our interpretation, the current 'consensus view' of the future, corresponds to an
annual growth rate of one percent per year, i.e., to an increase from about 6 Gt today to
some 9 Gt carbon by the year 2020, with a range between 8 to 10 Gt as shown in
Figure 2. By comparison, 'business-as-usual' scenarios such as elaborated within the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or by the US EPA (1990) project
emissions in the order of 10 Gt carbon by the same year, which indicates that these
scenarios might perhaps be better considered as 'high emission growth' scenarios.
Additional concern has been voiced (Parikh, 1992) in terms that the IPCC scenarios
may in appropriately project current inequalities of resource use and resulting
anthropogenic sources of global change far into the future.
Alternative baseline projections relying on a continuation of historical trends in
energy efficiency improvements and structural changes in energy supply towards
environmentally cleaner fuels indicate somewhat lower global emissions, but
nevertheless an increase, primarily the result from continuing economic development in
the South. Examples of the latter type of scenarios include the reference scenario
developed by the World Energy Council (\VEC, 1992) or scenarios developed at 11ASA
like the ECS '92 scenario (Nakicenovic et al., 1993) or the global reference scenario
aggregating national CO2 abatement costing studies performed within the CHALLENGE
network (G2100 scenario), as shown in Figure 2.
All prevailing trends depicted in these scenarios suggest thatin the absence of
appropriate countermeasuresglobal carbon emissions will rise, perhaps beyond
environmentally acceptable levels. If indeed limitations on carbon emissions (either of
absolute levels or at least of their rates of increase) will become integral part of future
national and international energy environmental policies, two questions will need to be
addressed by both the analytical and the policy communities, e.g. in possible
negotiations on protocols of the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
What could be possible criteria to share the burden of global mitigation efforts, and
what could be possible mechanisms to implement such burden sharing in an equitable
and cost-effective way?
By what technological and regulatory measures are emission reductions to be
achieved and what are appropriate policy instruments for their implementation both
nationally and internationally?
Figure 3 illustrates some of the salient features of limiting energy-related CO2
emissions globally in comparing OECD versus developing countries (DCs). 1990
emissions and a scenario for 2020 based on the ECS'92 base case scenario (cost
optimal solution without any emission constraints) provide the starting point for the
analysis. Note in particular the stabilization of emissions in the OECD region (primarily
result of continued improvements in energy efficiency and decarbonization of energy
supply) and a near tripling of emissions in DCs (primarily result of vigorous economic
growth and comparatively modest efficiency improvements). For an illustrative scenario
of stabilizing, global emissions by 2020 at 1990 levels, three alternative burden sharing
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models1 discussed in the literature and also raised during the negotiating process for
the Climate Convention are shown in Figure 3. In one case (grandfathering) the burden
of emission reduction is shared uniformly across all regions via a 35% flat rate
reduction. Alternatively, emission reductions are allocated according to differentiated
responsibility in CO2 concentration increase (cutbacks proportional to historical
contribution), whereas a third model does not allocate emission reductions, but rather
the access to the global commons in form of equal per capita emission entitlements by
2020. An illustrative carbon tax case (170 $ per ton carbon in OECD and half that rate
in DCs, cf. Messner and Strubegger, 1991) illustrates what level of reductions could be
expected by such a range of emission taxes (increasing energy prices by up to 100%).
This kind of analysis also indicates that conventional economic policy tools could
accommodate emission reductions based on status quo considerations, whereas
alternative formulations would require some new mechanisms (such as international
trading of emission allowances/permits) to allow for macro-economic (and global) cost
effectiveness.
Thus, perceptions about factors ultimately limiting future energy and resulting
emission growth have changed from resource to environmental scarcity while the
driving forces are still the same population and economic growth. Some of the
measures and strategies that seemed to be desirable in the past, however, are invariant
to this shift in perceptions. Efficiency improvements and conservation are instrumental
in reducing both fossil fuel requirements and emissions. In addition, structural changes
in the energy system towards environmentally compatible energy carriers, and low or
even zero emission technologies represent additional response options to
the risks of global change.
IIASA research on energyenvironment interactions
An IIASA study on Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) develops an
analytical framework to evaluate policy options and future global energy strategies
directed at delaying or mitigating global change. In particular, the objective is to assess
future potentials and rates of reducing energy and carbon intensities worldwide. Figure
4 shows historical improvements toward improving energy efficiency and
decarbonization in a number of selected countries. The aim is to analyze future
trajectories that would lead individual countries and the world as a whole further
toward the origin of Figure 4. Whilst the historical trends depicted in Figure 4 are
indeed encouraging, they nçvertheless have been insufficient: long-term improvements
in energy efficiency and decarbonization combined have been proceeding at rates of 1.3
percent per annum, whereas economic activity has grown with rates of about 3 percent
per year. Hence, global energy-related carbon emissions have risen at a rate of about
1.7 percent per year. All this implies that historical improvement rates in energy
efficiency and decarbonization have to be significantly accelerated to slow the rates of
emission increase.
IIASA's ECS Project is developing a comprehensive assessment of a broad
range of options (technologies, associated economic incentives and institutional
'For a discussion and comparison of burden sharmg models see Fujii, 1990; Grubler and FUJU, 1991; and
Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1992. A data base of historical emissions combined with a range of allocation
models in parañieiric form is being developed at HASA to allow quantification of the implications of using
different models or varying other salient parameters of importance in greenhouse gas accounting.
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frameworks for their implementation) that is needed for evaluating the global potential
for stabilizing, and ultimately reducing emissions, perhaps even removing carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. An important part of that
work involves the development of an inventory (a data base) of technologies for
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The inventory provides a framework for the
technology assessment of mitigation options, for their evaluation, and for comparison
and exchanging data at the international level. Finally the inventory also provides input
data into the energy models developed to achieve consistency in the comparisons across
a wide spectrum of mitigation options. The second objective of IIASA's research is to
identify constraints and boundary conditions of strategies for achieving environmentally
compatible paths of economic and social development. The development strategies
outline different paths of techno-economic, socio-behavioral and institutional
adjustments reflecting differing technological, economic and cultural conditions of
industrial market, transforming, and developing economies respectively.
Improving energy efficiency and decarbonizing the
energy system
From the mitigation options available, improving energy efficiency is a particularly
attractive one as serving simultaneously a number of objectives: improving the overall
productivity of economies (producing more with less inputs) while at the same time
reducing not only greenhouse gas emissions but also other environmental impacts.. A
long-term perspective shows that the frequently discussed 'decoupling' of energy
demand from economic growth is not necessarily confined to periods of high energy
prices. The primary energy input per (constant) unit of GDP generated for all OECD
countries taken together has fallen at an average rate of two percent per year since
1973. If we take 1960 as a base year, improvement in energy intensity amounts to an
average rate of one percent per year. A similar analysis performed for the USA
(including non-commercial energy consumption) since 1800 shows a comparable
long-term improvement rate (Nakicenovic et al., 1990). This raises the question to what
extent historical efficiency improvement rates can be maintained in the future.
A detailed energy/exergy efficiency assessment of the OECD countries indicates
that the conversion from primary energy to final energy forms required by the
consumer is about 70 percent. In contrast, the efficiency with which final energy forms
are applied to provide useful energy forms and services is much lower resulting in an
overall conversion efficiency of not much more than 10 percent. The efficiency of the
system is still lower if different 'quality' characteristics of various energy carriers and
delivered forms are taken into account. Figure 5 shows that the overall exergy (second
law) efficiency in the OECD countries is at most a few percent compared with the
theoretical maximum. This shows that there is large scope for more efficient energy use
and in particular for improvement of end-use technologies. The inventory of mitigation
measures and the technology data base being developed at IIASA are specifically
designed to integrate current and possible future individual conversion, transport,
distribution and end-use systems into energy (or exergy) chains giving whole bundles of
technologies that define a particular reduction strategy.
The overall energy efficiency of the OECD countries as well as in reforming
and developing economies would be doubled by application of the most efficient
technologies available today (Nakicenovic et al., 1993). The rates at which such
efficiency improvements can be achieved are in turn to a large extent dependent on the
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age distribution of the capital stock of our economies, rates of diffusion of new
technologies and technology transfer. The long-term improvement in energy intensity of
GDP was about one percent per year in the industrialized countries However, this is a
historical average over 200 years containing periods of more rapid improvement (2 to 3
percent per year), but also periods of stagnation and even reversals with increasing
energy intensity due to the build-up of energy intensive infrastructures, as is the case
today in a number of developing countries Efficiency improvements have been faster
in certain areas than in others. For example, over the past twenty years, aircraft
manufacturers have managed to improve energy efficiency of commercial jet transports
by 3 to 4 percent annually. In electricity generation, this improvement has been 2.5 to 3
percent per year over the period between 1930 and the early 1970s. These are about the
upper boundary values to be expected in efficiency improvements in the medium term.
With an improvement in the energy intensity of 3 percent per year, a dollar of GDP
could be produced fifty years from now with only 20 percent of current energy
requirements; this figure would be lower in terms of carbon emissions if energy
substitution is also taken into account.
While efficiency improvements are a fundamental measure for reducing carbon
emissions especially in the near to medium term, in the long run there is a clear need to
shift to energy sources with low carbon content such as natural gas, and ultimately to
those without carbon whatsoever, such as hydro, solar, and nuclear energy, and the
sustainable use of biomass. Increased reliance on natural gas is a particular interesting
transitional option (Ausubel et al., 1988), especially in combination with active CO2
recovery, e.g., from steam reforming (Marchetti, 1989). Thus, both technological and
economic structural change will be of fundamental importance for efficiency
improvement and for lowering carbon emissions in order to achieve environmentally
compatible pathways of socio-economic development.
Technology assessment
The multitude of options available for improving energy efficiency and for further
decarbonization of energy systems2 need a systematic evaluation with respect to their
ultimate potentials, costs involved, and possible diffusion horizon before conclusions on
their desirability and applicability in different economic and social contexts can be
drawn.
Such an evaluation constitutes the main part of an ongoing study within the
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) Project at IIASA. In order to
make the technology assessment transparent and open to critical evaluation, the activity
includes the development of an integrated database for a comprehensive inventory of
technological options for mitigating energy related CO2 emissions: the CO2DB. The
database covers the full range of technological and economic measures spanning
efficiency improvements, conservation, enhanced use of low-carbon fuels, carbon free
sources of energy and other options such as afforestation and enhancement of carbon
sinks.
The inventory of mitigation measures and the associated technology database are
specifically designed to provide a uniform framework for assessment of ultimate
impacts from the introduction of new technologies over different time frames and in
2For an overview see: (3rubb et al., 1991; IPCC, 1991; Kaya et al., 1993; Nakicenovic et al., 1993;
Schafer et al., 1992; US National Academy of Sciences, 1991.
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different regions. The database includes detailed descriptions of the technical,
economic, and environmental performance of technologies as well as data pertinent to
their innovation, commercialization, and diffusion characteristics and prospects.
Additional data files contain literature sources and assessments of data validity and
concurrent uncertainty ranges. It is an interactive software package designed to enter,
update, and retrieve information on energy technologies with emphasis on those
offering opportunities for CO2 reduction and removal. The database also enables the
assessment of CO2 reduction strategies by combining many individual technologies
together, i.e., to analyze measures throughout the energy chain from primary energy
extraction to improvements in energy end-use efficiencies often called full-fuel-cycle
analysis. Thus, the CO2DB enables analysis of options encompassing whole bundles of
technologies that define a particular energy or environmental strategy.
Figure 6 illustrates an analysis of the cost, CO2 emissions and energy
requirements of different energy chains that provide the same servicelighting. Each of
the seven bars depicts a different combination of technologies that can now or could in
the future provide lighting: conventional incandescent bulbs versus energy-efficient
compact fluorescent bulbs; power generated by a conventional power plant burning hard
coal versus a highly efficient combined-cycle natural-gas turbine, with or without CO2
scrubbing. The last bar in each graph compares one of the six US energy chains with
an identical chain in Austria: analyses using CO2DB show to what extent identical
technological systems can have different costs and consequences in different situations.
Figure 6 illustrates several other features of the CO2DB inventory. First, it depicts all
parts of an energy chain. Second, it gives a breakdown of the costs and emissions
attributable to each step in the chain: in these examples costs to deliver the same
service differ by about 30 percent, while CO2 emissions to provide that service differ
by more than 90 percent. Third, it allows analysis of trade-offs: for instance, the
potential to reduce CO2 emissions by concentrating on energy end-use--in this case, the
type of light bulbversus energy supply, and the approximate costs of changing any
part of the chain.
Environmentally compatible energy strategies
Four types of technological strategies can be distinguished for improving the
environmental compatibility of current and future energy systems. The first is an
incremental one, emphasizing energy efficiency improvements. In this case, devices or
operational practices are replaced by more efficient ones without major changes in the
technology of the device itself or technologies upstream of the energy chain. For
example, this could mean replacing a refrigerator or a gas-fired power plant by more
efficient vintages while using the same electricity and fuel supply chains. The other
three strategies are more radical. They include changes in the design and operational
practices of technologies with and without changes in the energy chains. We refer to
these as changes in technological 'trajectories' . In the simplest case, the end-use
technology is changed but keeps the same upstream energy chain, e.g., switching from
a gasoline to diesel car. Alternatively, the end-use and conversion technologies may
stay the same but the primary energy input changes, such as switching from a coal to a
gas-fired combined-cycle power plant. Finally, it is possible to change the 'trajectories'
of end-use, conversion and primary energy supply technologies, such as switching from
a gasoline car with oil as the primary energy source to an electric vehicle with
photovoltaic panels.
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There is a clear ranking of the four different techno1wiri1 tritepc with
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(forthcoming).
[16] Parikh, J., 1992, IPCC strategies unfair to the South, Nature Vol.360, 10
December 1992:507-508.
[171 Sch afer, A., Schrattenholzer, L., Messner, S., 1992, Inventory of
Greenhouse-Gas Mitigation Measures, Examples from the IJASA Technology
Data Base, WP-92-85, IJASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
US National Academy of Sciences, 1991, Policy Implications of Greenhouse
Warming: Report of the Mitigation Panel, 0-309-04545-2, National Academy
Press, Washington, 'D.C.
World Energy Council (WEC), 1992, WEC Commission Energy for Tomorrow's.
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Fossil Energy Consumption, Reserves
and Resources (Gt C)
Table 1. Accounting for historical, present and potential future car-
bon emissions from fossil fuel use in Gigatons carbon. Historical
(1860-1987) and present (1987) carbon emissions from fossil fuel use by
source and carbon content; identified, economically recoverable fossil
fuel reserves, resources (identified quantities with uncertain prospects
of economic recoverability), and additional occurrences (additional
quantities inferred from geological information but with speculative
technical and economic potential). Compared to historical fossil fuel
use, the remaining resources in the ground represent a (perhaps even
far too large) "carbon wealth" which is more than a factor 10 greater
than the total carbon pool in the atmosphere of around 760 Gt C(corresponding to a present CO2 concentration of about 350 ppm).
Source: Nakic5enovk et al., 1993.
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Coal Oil Gas Total
1860-1987 114.9 58.2 24.5 197.6
1987 2.5 2.4 1.0 5.9
Reserves 391.6 92.1 58.5 542.2
Resources 2289 622 >115 3026
Additional Occurrences >3500 >1000 >700 >5200
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Eastern Europe (6.4%)
Eastern Europe (5.5%)
Rest of Latin America (3.2%)
Brazil (0.6%)
Rest of Africa (1.6%)
N. Africa & Mid. East (2.2%)
Rest of Asia (1.5%)
India (1.6%)
Australia & N. Zealand (1.1%)
Japan (3.7%)
E*-USSR (19.2%)
Rest of
N. Africa &
StA8%)
India (30%)
China (10.8%)
Ex-USSR (14.1%)
China (5.5%)
Japan (4.8%)
I
Australia & N. Zealand (1.3%)
North America (33.2%)
Western Europe (26.1%)
ICs: 71.9%
OCs: 28.1%
,,,/WesternEurope (15.0%)
ICs: 83.7%
DCs: 16.3%
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Figure 1. Distribution of energy-related CO2 emissions by major
world regions/countries (in percent), 1988 (top), and contribution to
atmospheric concentration increase 1800-1988 (bottom), based on his-
torical emission estimates and a simple carbon cycle model. Emissions
include also other industrial CO2 sources (cement manufacture and
flaring of natural gas). Source: Grübler and Nakhenovi, 1992.
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Figure 2. Range of scenarios for future global energy-related CO2 em-
issions (in Gigatons carbon) as indicated by the International Energy
Workshop (Manne et al., 1991) poll-response median and range (± one
standard deviation), and a range of scenarios: IPCC (1992), WEC(1992), EPA's (1990) Rapidly Changing World Scenario. Two
scenarios developed at IIASA are also shown: ECS'92 (engineering-
type, "bottom-up" model) and global aggregation of national CO2 em-
ission reduction costing studies of the CHALLENGE network (with
Global 2100, a macroeconomic, "top-down" model).
I - - I
OECD 0 DCs 2020: stabilize total emissions
at 1990 levels
Figure 3. Energy-related CO2 emissions 1990, base case (cost optimal
solution without any emission constraints) by 2020 from the IIASA
ECS'92 scenario (Nakkenovi et al., 1993), and possible stabilization
scenarios, OECD versus developing countries (DCs), in Gt carbon. A
number of burden sharing criteria are illustrated for a scenario of sta-
bilizing global emissions by 2020 at 1990 levels. The resulting emission
distribution of the introduction of a differentiated carbon tax of 170
and 85 $/ton carbon in the OECD and in DCs respectively is also
shown.
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ENERGY RELATED CO2 OECD VS DCs
Equal per
capita
emissions
1990 -35%
flat rate
reduction
2020
Base Case
Carbon tax Cut backs
170$/t C OECD proportional
85$It C OCs to historical
contribution
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DECARBONJZATION
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CHINA
1988 - 2.77/0.93
DECARBONIZATION OF ENERGY
Figure 4. Historical trends in energy (kgoe per 1000 $ GDP) and car-
bon intensity (kg C per kgoe) of various countries. Improved energy
efficiency (lowering the energy intensity) and interfuel substitution
(lowering the carbon intensity of energy use) are two important options
for lowering overall carbon emissions. The graph shows the diverse poi-
icy mix and strategies followed in different countries over the time hor-
izon considered. France appears to follow a decarbonization strategy,
whereas Japan mostly an efficiency improvement strategy. All coun-
tries shown achieved improvements in both domains. Source: Grflbler,
1991.
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OECD EXERGY EFFICIENCY, 1986,
IN PERCENT OF PRIMARY EXERGY
-
Figure 5. Exergy balances for the OECD countries in 1986 (in percent
of primary exergy). A second-law analysis of the exergetic efficiency of
the exergy (and energy) system in the OECD countries, shows that
while the efficiency in the provision of final exergy is already quite high,
efficiencies at the end-use side, and in particular in the provision of ser-
vices are low. The overall exergetic efficiency of the OECD countries is
estimated to amount only to a few percent. Figures for the former
USSR and developing countries are even lower. This indicates a large
theoretical potential for efficiency improvements of between a factor 20
to 100. Realization of this potential depends on the implementation of
many technological options and organizational innovations. Their
different tradeoffs, the cost and timing involved need detailed study.
Source: Nakicenovi6 et al., 1990.
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Incandescent light bulb
Hard coal powerplant
Compact fluorescent bulb
Hard coal powerplant
Incandescent light bulb
Combined cycle natural gas
Compact fluorescent bulb
Combined cycle natural gas
Incandescent Ight bulb
Combined cycle natural gas
with carbon scrubbing
Compact fluorescent bulb
Combined cycle natural gas
with carbon scrubbing
COSTS(Per lumen-year)
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Figure 6. Primary energy, CO2 emissions, and costs (uS cents 1990)
for alternative energy chains providing lighting (all units per lumen-
year). Source: IIASA CO2DB.
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Figure 7. Evolution of factors contributing to carbon emissions from
passenger cars in the United States (percentage change from 1970).
Specific fuel consumption of cars improved by around 30 percent,
passenger-km increased slightly, whereas average car occupancy
deteriorated by some 20 percent. With less passengers per car, more
vehicle-km are required to deliver a given volume of passenger-km.
This change in the usage efficiency of private car utilization more than
compensated the technological efficiency improvements. As a result,
carbon emissions have increased by some 20 percent over 1970 levels.
Data: courtesy of A. Schafer, IIASA.
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China's actions for global environment and
development
Wei Zhihong
Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology,
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Environment and development now are the two major concerns facing the international
community. Since the irrational exploitation and utilization of natural resources in the
course of industrialization, it has resulted in global environmental pollution and
ecological degradation, as well as real threat to the survival and development of
mankind. It is, therefore, an urgent and formidable task for all countries in the world to
protect the environment and maintain a sustainable development.
Solutions to two global issues of environmental protection and economic
development need extensive and effective international cooperation. The UNCED offers
a chance to international community to be able to discuss ways for solving environment
and development problems. This will be a milestone in the world's history of
environmental protection and development. Two important documents, i.e. The Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21, were adopted and two Conventions, i.e. The Convention on
Climate Change and The Convention on Biodiversity, were signed in UNCED. All
actions of UNCED will lay a good foundation for enhancing international cooperation
in the fields of environment and development.
Some opinions with regard to environment and development have been put
forward by China.
Economic development should be pursued in parallel with environmental
protection.
Economic development provides a material guarantee for the protection and
improvement of the global environment apart from the survival and progress of
mankind. For most of developing countries, the first task is to develop the economy
and then eliminate poverty, hence their reasonable and urgent requirements should be
taken into consideration while the problem of global environment is tackled. At the
same time, no country can afford to develop its economy in disregard of the pressure
on environment. Therefore, it is imperative to work out a comprehensive development
strategy which will ensure a better ecological cycle to obtain a balance between
economic growth and environmental protection.
Environmental protection is a common target and task of mankind as a whole
In view of historical fact and current situation, consumption of natural resources
and discharge of pollutants, whether in terms of total volUme or per capita quantity, are
much bigger in developed countries than developing counthes, thus the former should
bear a greater responsibility. Moreover, developed nations possess strong economic
strength and more sophisticated technologies for environmental protection, it is natural
for them sharing a great obligation for its solution. As a result, developed countries
should provide developing countries with new and additional funds and transfer
technologies of environmental protection under concessional terms to help developing
countries to be able to improve their own environment and to participate in the
protection of global environment.
Both near-term interests of each countries and long-term interests of whole
world should be taken into consideration.
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At present time, more addresses should be given priority to other urgent
environmental problems facing developing countries, such as pollution, soil erosion,
desertification, diminished vegetation, droughts and floods etc., while paying attention
to the global environmental issues of climate change and biodiversity. It will be of
significance for not only removing a serious threat to the environment and development
of developing countries, but also contributing greatly to the protection of global
environment and economic growth.
China always considers that China's environmental problems are part of global
problems, and is keenly aware of its responsibility and role in the protection of the
earth's eco-system. So that China has attached importance to and taken active part in
the UN sponsored discussions concerning environment and development, and signed
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, and Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity
in UNCED.
China has been paying much attention to environmental protection in the course
of economic development and made environmental protection one of its basic state
policies which to be incorporated into the strategic target of national economy and
social development. Moreover, China has worked out, through practice, a series of
policies and measures which suit to China's own conditions. Of which, three major
principles are as follows:
Putting prevention first.
Holding those who cause pollution responsible for cleaning up.
Strengthening management for environmental protection.
Unremitting efforts and hard work has brought remarkable results, over the past decade
or more China has, in the course of reform and opening-up, maintained steady
economic growth while averting a corresponding degradation of the environment, with
even some local improvements. For example, atmospheric pollution in cities is mainly
caused by the smoke produced in coal combustion. In 1991, total emission of waste
gases (not including those from township and village enterprises) was 10,000 billion
m3, emission of soot (from stacks of coal-burning facilities) was 13 million tons,
remaining at the same level as in 1990, of which 3.6 million tons were from coal-fired
power plant.
After UNCED, China has proposed some responses, policies and measures,
which should be adopted and implemented in the fields of China's environment and
development, based on China's real practice.
Pursuing the strategy of sustainable development.
Controlling industrial pollution in terms of effective measures.
Carrying out comprehensive controls of urban environment.
Improving energy efficiency and shifting energy consumption composition.
Diffusing eco-agriculture and planting trees to protect biodiversity.
Enhancing environmental science and developing environment-related
industries.
Using economic means to protect environment.
Strengthening education and heightening the awareness of the environment of
the whole nation.
Perfecting the legal system for better environmental management.
Working out China's plan of action (Agenda 21 of China) in line with
guidelines laid down in UNCED.
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China's underlying belief is that effective environmental protection is not only
an obligation to China and its posterity, but also an important conthbution to the whole
world.
Synergetic effects on hydrogen production from surplus
hydroenergy for sustainable energy development in
Nepal
Khilendra N Rana
Executive Director
Institute for Sustainable Development, Nepal
Statement of the problem
Nepal has no proven deposits of fossil fuels such as coal, lignite, natural gas and oil.
However, the country is blessed with a vast hydropower potential which is, in fact, the
single most important energy resource of the country.' The present national energy
system of Nepal, however, relies almost entirely traditional biofuels which are
supplemented with a small quantity of imported fossil fuels.2 As energy demand is
mainly confined to heat application, the share of electricity remains negligible in overall
energy supply. The energy sector of Nepal thus exhibits a chronic structural imbalance
between demand and supply.
The present energy consumption pattern in Nepal is clearly not sustainable and
it has also threatened the ecological stability of the country. Nepal faces, on the one
hand, massive deforestation in the bills with tragic consequences to the Himalayan
ecosystem while, on the other hand, even limited reliance on imported fossil fuels has
choked the process of economic growth by creating a balance of payments problem.
Nepal thus experiences two types of energy 'crises' simultaneously. The 'firewood
crisis' in the non-formal sector is well known. The 'oil crisis' in the formal sector is
equally acute. This state of affairs demands a structural change in the energy
consumption pattern at the earliest possible time.
The required structural change in the pattern of energy consumption in Nepal
can be achieved only through a path of sustainable development. For this purpose,
hydroelectricity is the only prominent renewable energy resource available in Nepal that
can be harnessed on a large scale by mature technology. As such, it should assume a
central role for the desired transformation of the energy consumption pattern in the
country. In this context, the electricity sector in Nepal is at present characterised by
considerable inefficiencies, notably by the occurrence of sizable surplus energy during
the wet season. It is, therefore, proposed here to exploit this inherent problem of
hydroelectric sector to create synergism which will help in achieving a sustainable
change in the energy consumption pattern in Nepal.
'The theoretical potential based on average flow is 83,280 MW(l). About 42,133 MW is likely to be
economically feasible [2].
2Traditional energy contributed 94.7 percent and commercial energy 5.3 percent of total consumption in
1990/9 1 [3]. The major components of traditional or non-commercial energy are firewood (74.54%),
agricultural residues (11.64%) and animal dung (8.3%).
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Availability of surplus hydroenergy and potential for hydrogen
production
The Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) is the main power system in the country3.
It has at present about 280 MW installed capacity, out of which almost 83 percent is
provided by thermal (diesel) plants. Oil fired plants mostly serve as stand-by units and
are operated only during peak demand periods for economic reasons. Thus the INPS is
essentially a hydro system; at present there are altogether 14 hydro plants in this system
with only one storage capacity for regulation.
The hydroenergy generating capacity of the INPS is highly seasonal in character
due to the predominance of run-of-the-river schemes. The system produces more energy
during the wet season (July to October), when the system load is much lower than in
winter months. Hence surplus energy is bound to occur in a predominantly hydro
generating system like INPS which is not properly backed by hydroelectric plants
storage. The availability of surplus energy, however, varies greatly over time, In
general, the availability of surplus energy will decrease if new projects are not added to
the system. On the other hand, it will increase when a new project, particularly a run-if-
the-river type of scheme commissioned. The magnitude of available surplus
hydroenergy will thus vary from season to season and year to year. As a matter of fact,
it will be available also in years when the system experiences acute power shortage and
periodic load shedding has to be enforced.
There is at present no demand for surplus hydroenergy in residential,
commercial, industrial or transport applications due to the unassured nature of its
supply. It also has a restricted export market due to the same reason. Hence, a sizable
quantity of hydroenergy is simply wasted in the system for year to year.
The magnitude of surplus energy available in INPS in the future will be
considerably affected by the nature of future hydroelectric development projects. In this
context, the size of the internal power market cannot alone justify the construction of
large storage projects in Nepal. However several large-scale, multi-purpose storage
projects with installed capacities in the order of thousands of megawatts are also
proposed in Nepal, primarily for energy export to neighbouring countries. It is yet
uncertain when these projects will be realised. Growing environmental concerns at
national, regional and global levels are creating considerable opposition for the
construction of large storage projects. The geological and seismic features of the
Himalayan region have raised additional uncertainties in this respect.
The assessment of surplus hydroenergy available in INPS for the next 15 years
(1993-2007) based on the existing plan for power development in Nepal is presented in
Table 1. All hydroelectric projects proposed for development upto the year 2000/01 are
run-of-the-river projects; therefore, with the commissioning of each new plant the
seasonal surplus will be available for a longer duration of time reaching a year-round
surplus between 2000/01 to 2002/03. The availability of seasonal surplus energy will
continue to occur beyond 2006/07 even without the additon of any other new project in
the system.
3Besides the integrated grid, there are 30 isolated local systems each one served by a small hydro plant
in the remote regions. Further, hundreds of micro-hydei units are operated by private entrepreneurs in Nepal.
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The hydrogen production potential of surplus hydroenergy available in INPS is
calculated in Table 2 assuming two different electrolyzers efficiencies. The maximum
production potential (about 4 to 5 million GJ (gigajoules) occurs in the year 2000/01.
Needless to say, the hydrogen production potential also varies from year to year,
basically reflecting the pattern of surplus hydroenergy availability in INPS.
Table 2. Hydrogen production potential of surplus hydro energy available in INPS
Annual
Surplus
Energy (GWh)
Year
Source: Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology [4].
Advantages of the hydrogen storage option
The storage of surplus hydroenergy is conceived here in form of hydrogen through the
electrolysis of water. The electrolysis process is based on the electro-chemical
decomposition of water into its components hydrogen and oxygen in a ratio of 2 : 1
(106 Nm3/annum) (10 GJ/annum)
Min.' Max2 Min." Max.2
1992/93 199.61 47.37 60.89 492.63 633.30
1993/94 224.95 53.38 68.62 555.17 713.69
1994/95 148.35 35.20 45.26 366.12 470.67
1995/96 77.85 18.47 23.75 192.13 246.99
1996/97 22.86 5.42 6.97 56.42 72.53
1997/98 331.75 78.73 101.21 818.75 1052.53
1998/99 230.65 54.73 70.36 569.24 731.78
1999/2000 131.65 31.24 40.16 324.91 417.68
2000/0 1 1607.38 381.44 490.35 3966.96 5099.68
200 1/02 1388.78 329.56 423.67 3427.46 4406.14
2002/03 1111.23 263.70 339.00 2742.48 3525.56
2003/04 831.87 197.41 253.77 2053.03 2639.25
2004/05 1521.70 301.11 464.22 3755.50 4827.85
2005/06 1245.00 295.44 379.80 3072.62 3949.97
2006/07 974.92 231.35 297.41 2406.07 3093.10
Notes: 1-/ Minimum 70% efficiency
2_I Maximum 90% efficiency
3_I Lower heating value for hydrogen = 10.4 x io KJ/m3
Hydrogen Production Pote tial
Volume Energy 3J
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respectively, by passing direct current through a dilute aqueous solution of alkali due to
the low conductivity of water. The equation is as follows:
2H20+Energy-2H2+02
There are many advantages of converting surplus electricity into hydrogen in the
Nepalese context which are elaborated at some length below.
Electrolysis as a technology
Electrolysis has been used in commercial operations from the beginning of the century
and it is a time tested technology. It is conceptually simple and reliable and represents
a mature technology. It has long useful life and is easy to operate owing to the
simplicity of the process and hence can easily be adapted to Nepalese context.
Hydrogen as a fuel
Hydrogen has excellent properties as a fuel and can compete with conventional fossil
fuel such as petrol, diesel, natural gas, etc. It can be used a an automotive fuel and
also as a source of heat in industrial, residential as well as commercial applications.
Electrolysis as a source of hydrogen
Electrolysis of water yields pure hydrogen (99.9 + 0.1% by volume). In fact, it is the
only process which produces hydrogen of such purity. In other processes using
hydrocarbon feedstocks, the cost of hydrogen purification comprises the major part of
the operating cost. The pure hydrogen fuel obtained from electrolysis has high energy
content and can be used directly without further purification in all end-uses.
Hydrogren storage
Hydrogen has a long storage cycle and it can be stored over a long period of time.
Further, hydrogen can be stored in form of gas (Gil2), liquid (LH2) and metallic
hydrides (MH2). Each of these storage options has its own advantages and
disadvantages, but they still offer wide range of storage options.
Electrolyzers efficiency
Industrial electrolyzers operated earlier at efficiencies of 60 to 70 percent. But advanced
electrolyzers have achieved 90 percent efficiency. Further R & D is underway to
improve the efficiency of this process to 95 percent or more [5].
Electrolyzers capacity
Electrolysis plants do not have marked scale of economies i.e., the production of
hydrogen is not highly sensitive to the plant capacity of scale of operation as in other
chemical processes. Hence, electrolysis can abe operated at wide capacity ranges
without high diseconomies of scale. In fact, industrial electrolyzers range in size from
500 standard cubic feet of hydrogen production per day consuming 3 kW of electricity
to more than 40 million standard cubic feet of hydrogen per day consuming 240,000
kW [6]. The electrolysis plant achieves its rated capacity rather quickly after its start-
up. Hence, electrolyzers can be switched on or off according to the energy supply
situation in IWPS. Thus electrolyzers can be ideally dovetailed with the electrical
system.
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Increasing economic efficiency of hydrogen production
The electrolysis process produces two co-products, hydrogen and oxygen. The
production of oxygen is half the quality of hydrogen and it is 99.5 + 0.1 percent by
volume pure. As the two gases are produced simultaneously, it is reasonable to refer
the power consumption for both gases (H2 + 02). Generally, pure oxygen is vented to
the atmosphere due to the lack of captive demand for this product in large scale
installations. Thus the lack of oxygen credit in almost all cases increases the overall
generation cost of hydrogen. Hence the feasibility of electrolysis upon the utilization of
co-product oxygen. Heavy water or deuterium, which is used as a moderator in nuclear
reactors, can also be produced as a by product of electrolysis
The storage of surplus electricity in form of hydrogen thus appears an ideal
solution for a country like Nepal.
Synergetic effects
The production of hydrogen from the available surplus hydroelectricity in INPS offers a
unique opportunity for synergism which can produce wide ranging impacts on the
energy sector of Nepal. As stated earlier, the electricity sector in Nepal is characterized
by surplus or waste energy and hence it is not very efficient as a separate entity. On the
other hand, the production of hydrogen by the electrolysis process, if envisaged as a
separate activity, will certainly not be economic due to the prevailing high electricity
tariff in Nepal. But if the surplus energy available in INPS is utilized for hydrogen
production or if hydrogen is conceived as a co-product of electricity generation, this
combined and coordinated measure will produce entirely different and more preferable
result due to synergism.
Synergism has many effects which are summarized in figure 1. These can be
divided into two groups, i.e., effects on the energy sector and the non-energy sector.
We shall elaborate these effects at some length here. While some synergetic effects areS
minor ones, others can substantially tilt the decision in favour of hydrogen. First the
use of hydrogen as a co-product of electricity sector offers a wide range of flexibility in
the fixation of the factor cost of the most important input (electricity) as well as the
capital costs (depreciation) of electrolyzers. As a rule, hydrogen generated from
electricity will be more expensive than the electricity that produced it. But in this case
the production of hydrogen will utilise the surplus energy available in the system which
is otherwise wasted. The cost of the electricity input is, therefore, bound to be flexible
in this context. Similarly, the depreciation of the electrolysis plant is not solely
determined by the life span of the assets due to physical deterioration but more by
government regulations (incentive for quick recovery of fixed capital investment) as
well as company policies. Hence, the synergetic effect could enable hydrogen
production at a much lower cost than under normal circumstances and thereby make
economics of hydrogen much more attractive for fossil fuel substitution.
The economic viability of hydrogen generated from surplus electricity to
substitute conventional fuels depends upon a host of socio-economic and technical
factors which are not known at this stage. Nevertheless, some preliminary observations
are forwarded here basically to illustrate the synergetic effects of electricity-hydrogen
co-production on the cost of hydrogen.
The production cost of hydrogen is determined by three items : a) cost of
electricity; b) depreciation of electrolysis plant and c) other costs. In fact, the first two
items generally comprise as much as 90 percent or more in the total cost of hydrogen
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production. Both these cost items, which are generally considered exogenous variables
under the separate provisions for hydroelectric schemes and hydrogen plants, become
quite flexible when these two schemes are combined together as a single project as
proposed earlier. On the one hand, the tariff of surplus electricity is highly flexible
within two extreme limits; the upper one set by the existing tariff for industrial
application and the lower one being zero. On the other hand, the useful life of the
electrolysis plant is very much longer than the 10 to 12 years conventionally adopted
for calculating depreciation (many electrolysis plants are operating normally even after
25 to 30 years of service all over the wçrld). Therefore, a lower rate of depreciation
than adopted in conventional practice can be enforced. It may be possible to promulgate
special legislation, if required, for this purpose. Thus, these two items, namely the tariff
of surplus electricity and the rate of depreciation of the electrolysis plant when
combined together will offer wide leverage for determining the production cost of
hydrogen. Hence, in all probability hydrogen can be a real, economic alternative to
substitute conventional fuels in Nepal due to these synergetic effects.
We shall now briefly examine the synergetic effects of electricity and hydrogen
co-production on the electricity sector. Needless to say, the electricity sector will be the
first major beneficiary of the synergetic effects. The hydrogen co-production from the
available surplus energy in INPS will save waste energy; it is always cheaper to save
energy than to generate it. In fact, hydrogen co-production with electricity will not only
conserve waste energy but also increase the overall load factor and the economic
efficiency of the system. At the same time, it will generate additional revenue to the
electricity authority, even if the surplus energy is valued at less than the prevailing
price of electricity in Nepal. This additional revenue will help improve the financial
health and solvency of electricity undertakings. The synergetic effect could also make
small hydra development schemes economically more attractive by producing both
electricity and hydrogen for decentralized applications.
Above all, the issue of economic efficiency is of vital importance. Economic
growth is an essential condition for development and the hydroelectric systemthe
most important energy supply system in the country must be highly efficient in order to
support economic growth in the country. The present state of affairs, however, means
that the electricity sector is not capable even to support its own growth. This is the
paradox of Nepal's electricity sector. Needless to say, social costs of buttressing
economically inefficient technology are very high and cannot be sustained for ever.
While the imperative to develop hydroelectricitythe most important energy resource
in the country is essentially recognised in all quarters, the actual development of this
sector has been hampered by many factors, both internal and external, among which the
present economic performance of this sector is not of least importance. As such, there
is genuine apprehension that the electricity sector will remain inefficient as long as the
present trends in generation and consumption continue to persist. Hence, it is essential
to intervene with measures to modify this pattern of generation and consumption.
Hydrogen could serve as an ideal mechanism for this purpose.
The energy sector as a whole will also substantially benefit from these
synergetic effects. The co-production of hydrogen will supply another type of storable
fuel which can find much wider applications than electricity itself. In other words, the
synergetic effects will enable the production of a new type of storable energy source
(hydrogen) from the surplus or waste of another source (electricity) so that instead of a
single, traditional source we have at hand two types of energy sources and are highly
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complementary to each other. Hydrogen is a versatile energy source which can be used
in automotive, domestic, industrial and commercial applications. As a multi-purpose
fuel, hydrogen can serve as the key component for the required energy mix in Nepal
and can potentially substitute all other types of traditional and fossil fuels in use in
Nepal. Viewed from this perspective, hydrogen appears as a panacea for relieving both
kinds of energy 'crisis' in Nepal, namely, 'firewood crisis' in non-fonnal sector as well
as 'fossil fuel crisis' in the formal sector. The hydrogen-electricity energy mix can thus
substantially modify existing patterns of energy production, distribution and
consumption in Nepal and shift them towards the path of sustainable development.
Anotherf effect of synergism is its potential to substitute imported fossil fuels.
These are used mainly in a) transportation (high speed diesel, petrol, aviation turbo
fuel, etc.), b) households (kerosene for lighting and cooking), c) industry (light diesel
oil, furnace oil, coal, etc for steam generation) and d) agriculture (diesel for pumpsets
and tractors). The transport sector consumes the bulk of imported oil. Oil consumption
in Nepal is mainly represented by two middle distillateshigh speed diesel and
kerosene which can technically be substituted by hydrogen in all specified end-uses.
Hence, hydrogen has potential to substitute the bulk of imported fossil fuels in Nepal.
The scope of traditional biofuel substitution used for rural domestic cooking
purpose is another important aspect of synergism. Again, this substitution is technically
feasible as evidenced by the development of hydrogen cookers today (7, 8). In fact, the
catalytic cookers are the practical answer to this problem. Hence, hydrogen can
potentially replace biofuels even though there are serious social as well as techno-
economic barriers for this purpose.
A major issue for sustainable development is to reduce the absolute quantity of
energy required for development. In other words, the imperative at this stage of
development is to achieve the same level of welfare and comfort at a much lower rate
of energy consumption than today. This statement may appear paradwlical, but is true.
The present per capital energy consumption in Nepal (about 14 GJ or 326 Kgoe),
though extremely low by international standards, cannot be maintained at this level of
consumption let alone be increased proportionately with the population growth in the
country. The biofuels consumed today have extremely low utilization effeciencies
particularly in domestic cooking operations, which is apparent from the large volume of
biofuel consumption in Nepal. This is a avoidable wastage of resources.
Under the given circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the present pattern
of biofuel consumption can continue into the next century without an ecological
catastrophe. Nevertheless, the response to this dilemma has been lukewarm. Ecological
disintegration, however, can be averted only be averted by a shift in domestic energy
consumption towards sources which have higher energy densities as well as greater
end-use efficiencies. Hydrogen fulfils these criteria and can substitute most biofuels in
cooking operations using much less energy.
The experimental performance of hydrogen technologies have been quite
encouraging in many areas. For example, hydrogen as a transport fuel has reportedly
performed such better both in terms of brake thermal efficiency and kilomet.res
travelled per unit of fuel consumed than the conventional petrol engine (1, 5, 9, 10).
Hydrogen lighting as electricity, gas or by condoluminescence is expected to be far
superior and more efficient than kerosene lighting. Similarly, hydrogen consuming gas
stoves (catalytic cookers) could have an efficiency of 100 percent [5] as against about
50 percent for pressurised kerosene stoves and 10 percent for traditional domestic
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cooking stoves. Thus hydrogen is expected to fulfil the same task at a much lower level
of energy consumption than traditional biofuels. Hence, the synergetic effects of
electricity-hydrogen co-production will support sustainable development by reducing the
absolute quantity of energy required.
The synergetic effects will also contribute to the satisfaction of basic needs.
Energy consumption is not an end in itself. It is only a means to provide services to
various human economic activities. Since each human activity is directed towards the
satisfaction of a particular need, it is pertinent to ask who consumes the energy and for
what purpose. These questions are particularly important in the Nepalese context where
the present energy consumption pattern is highly skewed towards affluent sections of
society. On the other hand, the basic needs of poor households, which represent the
bulk of the population in the country, are largely ignored. The large scale deforestation
and the impending ecological crisis cannot however be checked until and unless the
energy problems of the poor, particularly relating to cooking fuel, are not properly
addressed and solved. The hydrogen alternative offers a solution by providing both
automotive and domestic fuel which are directly related to basic need activities.
We now turn to non-energy effects of synergism in terms of environmental
protection, the development of national scientific and technological (S & T) capability,
and national self-reliance in energy supply. All these issues are intricately related to
sustainable development.
In a nutshell, the rapid growth of population, mass poverty and low economic
growth are the main factors responsible for environmental degradation in Nepal. In
addition, the large-scale adoption of western technologies and lifestyles in Nepal have
further aggravated environment problems. Moreover, the political and economic system
has so far equated 'economic growth' with development. Growth however does not
imply development and the obsession with growth has led to further environmental
problems. In this context, the present patterns of production, distribution and
consumption of.energy are directly responsible for many 'external' impacts on the
environment. On the other hand, hydrogen is a clean energy. The production of
hydrogen via the electrolysis of water has no adverse environmental impacts. The
distribution of hydrogen in form of gas, liquid or hydrides also does not pollute the
environment. Hence, the synergetic effects of hydrogen co-production are
environmentally benign.
The hydrogen option has important implications on national S & T development.
Hydrogen is more hazardous than other conventional fuels. Hence the production,
storage, distribution and use of hydrogen requires relatively sophisticated technology.
The successful application of hydrogen in Nepal is possible only if the technologies
currently available can be transferred and assimilated in the country. As a matter of
fact, mere access to existing technologies may not be enough; it will be essential to
adapt these technologies to the local context.
Finally, self-reliance in energy supply is a vital issue of national importance
which cannot be expressed merely in monetary or economic terms. Nepal's
vulnerability to Nepal with regard to reliabile and secure oil supply was exposed by
the trade impasse between Nepal and India in 19B8189. The profound economic,
political and psychological effects and hardship experienced by Nepal due to the
dependence on oil supply need no elaboration here. The oil import burden is increasing
the foreign exchange crunch and the chronic adverse balance of payments situation of
the country. The increasing volume of foreign debt has not only made debt servicing
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difficult but has also enabled external institutions to intervene in Nepal's internal policy
matters. Under these circumstances, the synergetic effects of electricity and hydrogen
co-production could considerably reduce this vulnerability by offering a solution,
however partial, to attain national self-reliance in energy supply.
In conclusion, the synergetic effects of electricity hydrogen co-production offers
Nepal a unique option for an entirely different soft development path towards greater
self-reliance and sustainable development.
Applying hydrogen technology in Nepal
The application of hydrogen as an energy alternative for day to day use is still
considered rather exotic despite significant use in industry. Besides cost safety
considerations in storage and handling seem to be the other main restriction for using
hydrogen as a fuel for automotive and domestic purposes. Storage and handling
problems of hydrogen have been satisfactorily solved for industrial application.
However, it appears difficult to enforce the same rigid specifications in design and
safety regulations in operation and maintenance of machinery and appliances earmarked
for individual consumers or households. Nevertheless, the technologies required for safe
storage and handling of hydrogen on a small-scale have already been developed and
marketed, even though they are still very expensive for common use [11].
The application of hydrogen in Nepal would require a judiciously identification
Of the areas in which the application of hydrogen can be economically competitive with
other conventional fuels under the given conditions of demand and supply and then
supply appropriate technologies for these applications. These issues will be governed by
three important considerations. First, hydrogen as an energy alternative has to provide a
viable solution for the core energy problems of Nepal. Second, the appropriateness of
hydrogen as an energy source in various end-uses will depend upon its properties as a
fuel, including ease in storage. Finally, the selection of hydrogen end-uses in Nepal will
be considerably influenced by the current trends in international R & ID in hydrogen
related technologies.
In this context, Nepal's specific problems may necessitate the fashioning of new
technologies by an original combination of existing components for specified uses. A
certain degree of technological capability within the country is essential for this
purpose. While all these issues are important for the successful application of hydrogen
as an energy alternative in Nepal, the present limitations in Nepal's S & T capability
presents considerable problems for appropriate technology supply. The implication is
that technology supply will depend considerably upon the goodwill and co-operation of
industrialised countries as well as international agencies.
Under these circumstances, a major concern is the likely evolution of hydrogen
end-uses which could either help meet the basic needs of the masses or encourage the
consumption of imported luxury goods by local elites. This issue is very sensitive
because the use of hydrogen is advocated in the Nepalese context to solve the crises of
dual society which is marked by glaring inequities. As Mentioned earlier, on the one
hand, hydrogen has been offered as a potential solution for the 'firewood crisis' where
it would provide cooking energy (together with lighting) to rural areas. But in reality,
hydrogen as a commercial fuel is likely to encounter many socio-economic problems in
cooking applications. On the other hand, hydrogen is expected to alleviate the 'oil
crisis' by substituting oil in the modern sector. However, this solution will vary,
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depending upon whether hydrogen would replace oil in transportation vehicles (buses
and trucks) or in passenger cars.
While the techno-economic feasibility of hydrogen technology can be
established in some judiciously selected areas of application, its social acceptance
remains an enigma. Hence, hydrogen should not be simply viewed as a technocratic
solution; a holistic approach should be taken for its promotion. The technological
intervention with hydrogen as a new energy alternative into existing production
systems, both urban and rural, will necessarily have many social engineering
consequences which need to be properly studied and analysed.
While the government and outside agencies can create awareness and the
opportunity for social change through a technological intervention, the success of that
particular social change will depend upon the attitudes and motivations of that
community towards it. By and large, these attitudes and motivations are governed by
their own 'felt needs' and perceptions of social goals. In this respect, the application of
hydrogen technologies is likely to have very much different social implications in
different end-uses. While the automotive use of hydrogen in mass transport vehicles not
likely to encounter any serious social resistance, cooking with hydrogen can be an
entirely different proposition. Cooking is deeply rooted in the cultural tradition of a
society nad different ethnic and cultural groups in the country have considerable
diversity in food habits. Further, the capacity of the cooker as well as cooking pots
have to be adopted according to the family size. As the hydrogen cooker is essentially a
gas cooker, it is expected to overcome these problems with appropriate modifications in
technical design. Nevertheless, some social objections may arise due to the change in
the flavour of cooked food (e.g., in comparison to traditional cooking over open fire) or
due to the invisibility of hydrogen flame in the case of catalytic cookers.
Comparative costs: a case study
The comparative cost analysis of hydrogen with fossil fuels for automotive use involves
three different issues. First, the competitiveness of hydrogen as a fuel with respect to
petrol and diesel in Nepal will depend relative economic costs. Second, the use of fossil
fuels causes environmental damage as against the clean, renewable hydrogen energy.
The damage due to fossil fuel use should be incorporated into the comparative cost
analysis. Finally, hydrogen as a fuel can be used in existing internal combustion OC
engines with minor modifications. However, the relative efficiencies of petrol, diesel
and hydrogen are different for operation in these engines and should also be taken into
account for the comparative cost analysis. Hence, a recently developed conceptual
framework will be adopted here which defines a societal or effective cost to cover
production cost, environmental cost and utilisation efficiency [5]. The societal or
effective cost is the total cost that the society has to pay for use of a particular fuel and
it is given by the following equation:
P fl
P fl3
where
societal cost of synthetic fuel
production cost of synthetic fuel
Synergetic effects of hydrogen production in Nepal 135
environmental cost of synthetic fuel
Pf pollution factor of fossil fuel
pollution factor of synthetic fuel
flf utilisation efficiency of fossil fuel
n utilisation efficiency of synthetic fuel
Production/economic costs
The comparative economic costs of GH2, LH2, petrol and diesel are presented in Figure
2. The economic costs of imported petrol (US $7.1 1/GJ) and diesel (US $6.751GJ) in
landlocked Nepal are much higher than in the international market due to additional
handling, storage and transportation costs. Even though the economic costs of imported
petrol and diesel are in the same range, there is a big difference in their retail prices in
the Katmandu market; petrol is sold at US $21. 14/GJ as a luxury item, while the price
of diesel is fixed at US $7. l4/GJ as an essential commodity for mass consumption. On
the other hand, it is rather difficult to generalise the production cost of electrolytic
hydrogen due to many factors4. For the sake of illustration, the production cost
estimates of hydrogen based on the Commission of European Communities research
programme [12, 131 have been adopted here in Figure 3. The production cost of Gil2
varies between US $4.99 to 23.34/GJ in the lowest and highest alternatives respectively.
The cost for LH2 is about 25 percent higher than in case of GH2 owing to the additional
cost of liquefaction.
At first glance, both GH2 and LH2 options do not appear economically
competitive with conventional petrol and diesel fuels. However, the availability of
surplus hydroelectricity in the grid (which has zero economic cost) tilts the balance
towards hydrogen. The production cost of off-peak GH2 (without electricity cost) is
quite competitive with economic costs of imported petrol and diesel alternatives in
Nepal.
Further reduction in the production cost of GH2 indicated above appears possible
by decreasing capital costs. A recent study conducted on the production of electrolytic
hydrogen from off-peak power indicates that medium-efficiency, low-cost electrolyzers
may be better suited for this purpose than high-efficiency, high-cost electrolyzers [14].
In addition, an appropriate depreciation policy as noted earlier above could further help
reduce the capital cost. Hence, GH2 can be realistically considered economically
competitive with imported petrol and diesel in Nepal.
Environmental costs
The major environmental problems directly associated with the consumption of fossil
fuels are air pollution, acid rain and the greenhouse effect with its consequent impacts.
hese adverse impacts of fossil fuel consumption have been known for some time, but
attempts have been made to value them only recently as a result of growing
environmental concern throughout the world. Detailed estimates of the damage caused
4The major factors which determine the production cost are:
scale of operation (large/medium/small scale);
nature of operation (continuous/off-peak);
types of electrolyzers used (conventionalladvanced alkaline/solid polymer/high temperature);
cost of electricity for hydrogen production (industrialloff-peak tariff);
type of hydro plant (old/new); etc.
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by fossil fuels on various elements of biosphere are now available and the total cost
adds to US $10.62/GJ (5).
The estimated environmental damage at US $10.62/GJ is indeed much higher
than the economic costs of imported petrol (US $7.1 1/GJ) and diesel (US $6.75/GJ) in
Nepal. This is the price society has to pay in addition to the economic cost for the use
of fossil fuels. If we assume that current taxes on fossil fuels are environmental taxes,
then petrol is taxed (US $14.03/GJ) more than justified by the environmental damage
it causes whereas diesel remains virtually untaxed (US $O.391GJ) without proper
compensation for the damage caused by its use. This discriminatory practice of taxing
petrol and diesel at different rates, however, is not compatible from the environmental
viewpoint even though social considerations may dictate otherwise.
Utilisation efficiencies
The relative end-use efficiencies of hydrogen, petrol and diesel in automotive use is the
next import issue here. The end-use efficiency of hydrogen in road transport vehicles,
however, differ according to its form (OH2, LH2 and M2) as well as its mode of
operation (IC engines or fuel cells). In general, the relative utilisation efficiency of
hydrogen is superior to fossil fuels in conventional IC engines. The performance of
experimental hydrogen vehicles and engines have demonstrated much higher efficiency
in compared to petrol engines [91. On average, a value of 22 percent better overall
efficiency has been suggested [15]. While the average efficiency of the conventional IC
engine is considered about 25 percent for petrol, 30 percent for GH2 and 33 percent for
LH2, it increased dramatically to 70 percent for GH2 with fuel cells [5].
Societal costs
The societal costs of petrol, diesel and hydrogen (OH2 and LH2) are presented in Figure
4. For application in IC engines, OH2 has the lowest societal cost followed by LH2,
diesel and petrol. But among all alternatives under consideration, GH2 with fuel cells
has the least societal cost. It is cheaper than IC engines in all cases. In fact, OH2 in IC
engine or four times cheaper than petrol.
The present Government petroleum pricing policy has significant implications
for substituting petrol and diesel with hydrogen in Nepal. As the retail price of petrol is
artificially boosted through taxes, hydrogen is competitive with petrol and its
production from surplus hydroelectricity would yield substantial revenue to the
electricity authority even if the surplus energy is valued much below the prevailing
industrial tariff. On the other hand, the substitution of diesel with hydrogenthe
preferred alternative is only possible in an IC engine if the surplus energy is made
available free of cost. The simultaneous substitution of both diesel and petrol with
hydrogen appears to offer scope for cross subsidising the former with the latter.
However, since diesel consumption is six times larger than petrol in Nepal in 1990/91,
this measure has only a limited validity. Hence, a revision of government policy on
diesel appears to be essential for its substitution with hydrogen in Nepal. The practical
development of fuel cells would enable the substitution of diesel with hydrogen even
under the existing retail price structure.
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Climate Change: the challenge facing the ESI of LDCs
Prof. Ad//son de Oliveira
COPPE/UFRJ, Brazil
Background
The year 1992 has been strongly marked by the UNCED Conference. After more than
two years of preparation, high level representatives from 153 countries (many of them
chief of State) met in Rio to sign two treaties (Climate Change and Biodiversity) and to
agree on a set of green guidelines for global action (Agenda 21). Some consider these
results a substantial achievement (von Weizsacker, 1992) while others are far less
enthusiastic (Khor, 1992). The main divide between these two opinions is the practical
result of the conference, since there is a general agreement that the conference was a
success as far as improving public awareness of the environmental challenges facing
industrial societies.
Roth the refusal by the Americans to sign the biodiversity treaty and their
unwillingness to accept a specific timetable for the stabilisation of greenhouse gases are
pointed out as clear indications that global environmental problems would not be easily
solved. The United States is the largest consumer of world natural resources and it
concentrates the financial resources and the technological capabilities that are
indispensable to deal with either local or global environmental problems. It is hardly
imaginable that environmental policies can possibly have any substantial global effect if
the United States remains untouched by these policies. The scepticism that emerged
among developing and industrial countries about the actual outcome of the Rio
Conference is therefore perfectly understandable. President Bush's statement that the
'American life style was not up for negotiation' (Khor, 1992) has done nothing but
confirmed this scepticism.
Among developing countries policymakers, this scepticism was to some extent
reinforced by studies on global warming carried out in industrialised countries. The
strong emphasis put on the contribution of developing cointries, anthropogenic
activities (particularly forestry, rice fields, feedstock and their likely future energy
consumption) to greenhouse gas emissions has been perceived as designed to minimise
the role of industrial countries' CO2 emissions, resulting from their fossil fuel
consumption, on climate change (Aganval/Narain, 1991). It is worth remarking that
despite this scepticism, developing countries supported the convention on climate
change. The agenda for both developing and industrial countries was settled and now
one must start thinking about its implementation.
The Convention clearly focuses on the sources for action in industrial countries
(Energy Economist, 1992). However, developing countries should not remain passive.
Indeed, poverty is the world main source of environmental damage. Developing
countries must speed up their economic development in order to minimise the negative
impacts on the environment of their economic growth. The energy sector will play a
crucial role in their economic development but it is fundamental to establish an energy
strategy that will not aggravate environmental problems. It is worth remarking that
industrial countries agreed in the convention to provide developing countries with the
necessary support to face this challenge. The Climate Change Convention offers a
unique opportunity to enhance economic development without damaging the
environment. It is our responsibility to make the Convention work.
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Although there is no scientific agreement about the causes and consequences of
the greenhouse effect, a minimum regrets strategy is most often suggested as an
insurance policy against this potential threat to industrial society (Ortoli, 1992). In order
to adjust their energy sector towards a minimum regret strategy, several European
countries decided to stabilise their energy sector's CO2 emissions by the year 2000.
There is a strong hope among Europeans that their CO2 target will soon be followed by
both industrialised and developing countries. However, there are hints that this is
perhaps an optimistic perspective. Indeed, the Americans still perceive that the cost of
such, a target is too much high (The Economist, 1992). Obviously, most developing
countries are strongly concerned about this row among industrialised countries, since
their ability to stabilise their CO2 emissions in the foreseeable future is quite limited.
Moreover, their actions in this field will be largely dominated by what the industrial
countries will do.
As far as the energy sector is concerned, ESI (Electricity Supply Industry) is
usually targeted as a focal point for environmental policy. The ES! is the single largest
producer of CO2. one of the main anthropogenic greenhouse gases, in industrialised
countries and in many developing countries as well. Moreover, the ES! is the main
sector in the economy in which there are large opportunities to diminish greenhouse
gases emissions. Indeed, there are several studies which point out that technologies do
exist to improve the enduse performance of electric appliances and to increase supply
using renewable sources of electricity as well (as for instance Goldemberg et al., 1987).
These are opportunities to increase the supply of electricity services to consumers with
no additional emissions of greenhouse gases. It is our perception that performance
improvement policies are the principal mechanism to gather these opportunities.
Recent trends in performance of the ESI of LDCs
In most LDCs, the ESI developed quite rapidly since the end of World War II. The
assumption that electricity supply was a principal input for economic development led
both governments and international aid organisations to significantly increase the supply
of electricity in LDCs. Moreover, social tariffs have largely been used to foster
electricity consumption among the poor strata of the population, specially in rural areas.
This policy has had a dramatic effect on access to electricity supply of LDCs
populations (de Oliveira, 1991). Except in Africa, urban areas of the developing world
are almost universally supplied with electricity and large rural areas have had access to
electricity supply as well. Despite these improvements in social performance, there are
areas still with no electricity supply and electricity consumption per capita in LDCs is
still extremely low as compared to industrial countries.
Electricity consumption made possible, substantial improvements in productivity
and it produced a revolution in the social life of LDCs. Not surprisingly, strong
political pressures remain to expand electricity supply in the developing world and most
LDCs still have plans to rapidly expand electricity supply. Conversely, electricity
consumption in industrial countries is expected to increase slowly. Consequently, the
developing world shall be responsible for the largest share of the growth in world
electricity consumption. Obviously, this trend engenders large concerns among
industrial countries about the environmental impacts of the ESI in LDCs. Indeed, the
last World Energy Conference, in Madrid, concluded that LDCs, growth in energy
consumption is likely to be a substantial source of world environmental problems.
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Compared to industrial countries, the environmental performance of the ES! of
LDCs is still poor. Indeed, environmental issue is a relatively new which is quite often
confronted with poverty, a more pressing issue from a LDC perspective. Despite this
constraint, there are signs of growing concern with the environmental impacts of the
ES! among LDCs. Policies oriented to reduce mainly the local (and in some cases the
regional as well) environmental damages of electricity generation were recently
introduced in Asia and Latin America (de Oliveira, 1992). The diversity of power
generating technological mix in use among LDCs induces quite distinct policies
however.
In India and China, where poor quality coal is commonly used, large amounts of
SO2, NO and fly ash are damaging air quality; large investments are needed to adjust
existing power plants to environmental standards and regulations which are not fully
enforced as yet. In Mexico and Thailand, thennal power plants are important sources of
both SO2 and NO gases; improvements in fuels quality is enabling a reduction in the
environmental impacts of the ESI but more strong action will be needed if CO2
emissions will have to be stabilised. In South America, hydropower dominates
electricity supply and emissions of greenhouse gases by the ES! is low; however, there
is strong concern with both the displacement of riparian population and the impact on
wildlife provoked by large dams. In West Africa, there is still very little concern with
the environmental impacts of the ES! since the power sector is relatively small.
The technical performance of the ES! and LDCs has had a mixed trend in the
recent past. It improved in certain aspects but deteriorated in others. The thermal
efficiency, for instance, is improving although it remains relatively low as compared to
industrial countries. However, transmission and distribution losses increased as result of
the rapid extension of lines to low density consuming areas as well as due to theft and
pilferage. Reserve margins have reduced since investments in generating capacity were
drastically cut back, despite growing demand for electricity. Interconnection, both
domestically and internationally, was not entirely exploited in order to improve the
reliability and quality of service. Moreover, although there are signs of improvement in
end-user efficiency, no comprehensive electricity conservation policy has been
established as yet in most LDCs. It is worth remarking that cogeneration, which is a
substantial source of energy efficiency improvement, still faces strong institutional
barriers in LDCs.
Economic and financial performance is a key factor since it governs the flow of
indispensable financial resources for sustained development of the ESI. It is important
to distinguish between those elements that are under utility control and those that are
not. As far as the first set of indicators is concerned, there was a trend towards
deterioration in performance, despite increases in electricity sales by employee. The
capital cost of utilities increased substantially as result of construction delays and
growing equipment and materials costs; operational costs increased since maintenance
of power plants and investments in transmission and distribution lines were both
neglected; revenues from electricity sales diminished as result of theft, pilferage and
long lead times between billing and actual payment of electricity bills.
There was a substantial deterioration in economic and financial performance as
result of policies decided outside utilities as well. Governments of LDCs reacted to the
oil crisis, and subsequently to the debt crisis, with stabilisation policies that limited
tariffs increase, despite substantial rise of both fuel and capital. Lenders reacted to the
deterioration in financial performance reducing their flows of capital to the ES! of
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LDCs in a period where investments were essential to put the ES! in a new
technological trajectory. Obviously, these policies were not quite helpful, further
aggravating the already difficult situation of the ES! of LDCs.
Getting out of the vicious circle
In the 1980s, the ESI of LDCs was plunged in a vicious circle of performance
deterioration that is hindering its sustained development and aggravating its
environmental impacts. Increase in fuel costs and capital costs, diminished growth in
consumption and the internalisation of environmental costs are compelling governments
in introduce institutional changes and utilities to move in a new technological
trajectory.
Lenders have their view (mainly founded in the experience of industrial
countries) on the sort of changes that are needed. Their main concern is with the re-
establishment of sound financial flows to the ESI. They suggest that substantial increase
in tariffs and privatisation of utilities are necessary policy guidelines. From their point
of view, these policies will allow, the ES! of LDCs to recover financial soundness and
will induce improvements in economic performance (that will eventually lead to
environmental, social and technological performance improvements) as well.
These policy guidelines are most often resisted by LDCs governments whose
perception of the performance of the ESI is most often connected to their macro-
economic, social and environmental impacts. Governments find it some what unrealistic
to promote large increase of actual electricity tariffs in the context of high inflation.
Moreover, there is a strong belief that the development role of the ESI is much too
important to let the private sector govern the industry as yet. Indeed, there are strong
political pressures for electrification that have to be accommodated and there are large
externalities, particularly environmental impacts, that must be administered as well.
Utilities have a mixed reaction to lenders, policy guidelines. From their point of
view, the performance of the ESI should be rated by its ability to rapidly extend
electricity supply. Utilities are enthusiastic about any increase in electricity tariffs which
will substantially improve their cash flow and eventually will support a rapid growth of
the ES!. Nevertheless, they fear that privatisation will eventually increase their costs as
a result of coordination between generations, transmission and distribution. In this case,
lack of improvements in financial performance produced by higher electricity tariffs
would eventually be impoverished by increase in costs induced by lack of coordination.
The conflict between, these three perspectives is leading to further .deteriorate in
the performance of the ES! of LDCs. These three perspectives must be reconciled.
Lenders must not discount the very substantial cost of macroeconomic stabilisation
policies fort.he ES!. Government can not keep passing on to utilities costs that have to
be paid by consumers and, where appropriate, by the Treasury. Utilities can no lOnger
plan for rapid increase in their electricity supply, in a context which severely constrains
their cash flow. The ES! of LDCs is passing through a transition period in which the
costs of changing its technological trajectory have to be shared by lenders,
governments, utilities andconsuiiiers.
From the institutional point of view, the ES! has to be reorganised in a
framework that induces performance improvements. Utilities have eventually to bear the
cost of their management mistakes; governments must pay the subsides for the costs
induced by their political interference in the ES!; lenders must recognise that their loans
cannot be protected from the costs of stabilisation policies. Such framework has to open
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space for new actors (cogenerators, independent power producers, large industrial
consumers) that will play a more active role in the ESI in the future. Government
interference in utilities, daily life shall be limited by a regulator that must keep strong
pressures for social, environmental, technical, financial and economic performance
improvements.
Financially, tariffs have to increase but consumers must not be penalised by
utility inefficiency, specially whenever there is overinvestment. Obviously, pilferage
and theft must be strongly reduced and bills must be collected in time. A much wider
range of tariffs must be created in order to offer to consumers the quality of service
that would match their real needs.
Technologically, interconnection should receive top priority since it can produce
substantial economic impact in the very short term. A comprehensive conservation
policy will slowdown the pace of growth of electricity consumption and a policy that
increases competition among both fuel and equipment suppliers which will reduce
costs. The acquisitions of technological capability must be object of specific policy,
specially as far as environmental technologies are concerned (MeierStamer, 1992).
Promoting environmental performance
The most effective way to improve environmental performance in LDCs is to foster
their economic development. The EST has a crucial role to play in this process but the
vicious circle in which the industry is plunged is limiting its role. Indeed, there is little
scope for investment if the trend of deterioration in performance is not reversed since
investments are essential to put the ESI of LDCs in the new technological trajectory
demanded by environmental concerns.
The ESI of LDCs is likely to increase their greenhouse gas emissions quite
substantially if no action is taken soon. The scope for action is large. The
hydropotential remains, to a large extent, untapped as yet both in Africa and in Latin-
America and is substantial in Asia as well. Cogeneration is marginally used but has an
enormous potential that can be rapidly exploited if sound policies are put in place.
Thermal efficiency can be substantially improved if the quality of fuels used by power
plants is adjusted. These opportunities for improvement in environmental performance
are fully in line with improvements in social, economic and environmental
performance.
Nevertheless, the current policies are not moving the ESI in the right direction.
Indeed, lenders, governments and utilities are deciding their policies based on
conflicting perspectives that can only keep the ESI on its vicious circle of deteriorating
performance. For instance, lenders are inducing utilities to use high discount rates in
their project evaluation. This policy will induce technological choice towards low
capital intensive technologies. Under these circumstances, renewable energy sources
such as hydropower will be penalised while fossil fuel power plants will be
economically benefitted. uch a trend will increase the environmental costs of the ES!
substantially.
A reconciliation of lenders, utilities and government policies is a fundamental
step forward in effective environmental performance improvements in the ES! of LDCs.
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Perspectives on the Biodiversity Convention
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Introduction
The Convention on Biological Diversity, finalised at Nairobi in May 1992 after seven
rounds of negotiations over the preceding two years, has evoked exceptional interest
across the world. This interest has been aroused partly by the intrinsic appeal of the
subject. Concern for flora and fauna, partly as a result of its being opened for signature.
Coinciding with the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992; and partly because of the controversial North-South issues it
deals withencompassing, inter alia, sovereignty over natural resources, transfer of
technology and additional financial resources. Attention has also focussed on it because
of the refusal by the United States of America to sign the Convention at Rio. While
different aspects of the Convention have been touched upon and analysed, its overall
implications have remained somewhat hazy in most minds, not only because it is a
complex document on an abstruse yet vast subject, but also because not many have
been able to follow the dynamics of the negotiations. This paper seeks to present the
basic structure of the Convention, while highlighting its main areas of coverage and
interpreting their implications.
Expressed in simple terms, biodiversity is the total array of all living organisms
whether plants, animals or micro-organisms, and includes diversity within species,
between species, and among eco-systems. Human activities like habitat destruction,
over-exploitation of natural resources, pollution of various kinds, and numerous other
direct or indirect processes are now accelerating the depletion or extinction of species
and changing the conditions for their evolution. While all species deserve respect
regardless of their use to humanity or their intrinsic ethicaL/aesthetic value, the
protection of bio-diversity becomes particularly important since in it may be locked the
key to progress in medicine, agriculture and other fields.
By far the largest extent of biodiversity is to be found in the developing
countries, who have bome and continue to bear the costs of maintaining this diversity.
However, as a result of their superior research and technological capabilities, it is the
developed countries who largely enjoy the economic benefits from its utilization. An
understanding of this dual aspect of biodiversity should serve to clear up some
misconceptions about the major concerns addressed by the Convention. It is not merely
an agreement on conservation, nor simply a means to obtain biotechnology or
additional funds. The Convention on Biological Diversity, in fact, is all of these and
more.
Objectives
The objectives of the Convention were the outcome of intense negotiations and reflect a
carefully balanced consensus. The objectives have been identified as '...the conservation
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising Out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant
technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies,
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and by appropriate funding.' The three concerns being addressed are thus: (a)
conservation, (b) sustainable use, and (c) the sharing of benefits. It is the third element
which makes this Convention unique. For the first time, we have a multilateral legal
instrument which establishes a truly global partnership aimed at the protection and
utilization of natural resources. For the first time, the true value of biological resources,
per Se, is recognised, leading to the further acceptance that the benefits from the
utilization of these resources must be shared equitably with those (i.e., the South) who
have conserved those resources at considerable opportunity cost.
It is particularly noteworthy that the partnership so established also fully
recognises and reaffirms the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, as is
clearly stated in the Preamble, the single Principle contained in the Convention and in
other substantive clauses (e.g., Article 15 Para 1). The inclusion of that Principle,
incidentally, marks the first time that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment(1972) has been incorporated in toto into a legally binding
international instrument.
Conservation and sustainable use
The Article on Geneal Measures for Conservation and Sustainable Use requires each
country, in accordance with its conditions and capabilities, to develop national
strategies, plans or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and to integrate 'as far as possible and as appropriate', the conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity into relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes
or policies. To the extent possible and in the manner appropriate to it, each country is
also required to identify and monitor components of biological diversity important for
conservation and sustainable use. Such an identification and monitoring is also to cover
processes and categories of activities which could have significant adverse impacts on
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.
The qualification 'as far as possible and as appropriate' contained in Articles
(7-11 & 14) relating to conservation and sustainable use of biological resources does
not imply a weak commitment to conservation but merely reflects the reality that not
everything can be identified, monitored or conserved immediately. Furthermore, it
provides the required flexibility enabling each country to undertake the necessary
measures in a manner most suitable to it.
Article 8 of the Convention is devoted to in situ conservation and requires,
interalia, the establishment of a system of protected areas requiring special measures for
biodiversity conservation and the development of guidelines for the selection,
establishment and management of such areas. A large number of other measures which
would promote in situ conservation have also been identified in the same Article. The
noteworthy development arising out of this Convention is that now special funding and
other support would be made available, particularly to developing countries for such in
situ conservation. For a country like India, which already has a comprehensive
conservation programme and a well-defined network of protected areas, the additional
resources will certainly be welcome as they would benefit our conservation effort.
Special measures for ex situ conservation have also been identified (Article 9).
Ex situ conservation has been viewed as being 'predominantly' but not exclusively for
the purpose of complementing in situ measures. Thus the possibility of undertaking ex
situ conservation measures delinked from in situ measures has also been catered for. It
is also of interest to developing countries such as India that measures for ex situ
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conservation of components of biological diversity are required to be adopted,
preferably in the country of origin of such components. Ex situ conservation would also
receive financial and other support and the Convention specifically recognizes that such
support should extend to the establishment and maintenance of ex situ conservation
facilities in developing countries. This too would undoubtedly assist the greater
involvement of India and other developing countries in promoting ex situ conservation.
A separate Article of the Convention addresses the issue of sustainable use of
the components of biological diversity. Supportive measures to promote conservation
and sustainable use have also been identified and these cover areas such as incentives,
research and training, public education and awareness, technical and scientific
cooperation, impact assessment.
Impact assessment and the minimising of adverse impacts have been covered in
Article 14 of the Convention. As the chapter of Article 14 (1) makes clear, the
provisions contained in its five subparas are to be carried out 'as far as possible and as
appropriate' by each Contracting Party. The first subpara addresses the issue of EIA
(Environmental Impact Assessment) and, where appropriate, allows for public
participation in EIA procedures. The second subpara requires the introduction of
appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of a State's
programmes and policies that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on
biological diversity are 'duly taken into account'. The following subpara addresses the
issue of activities within the jurisdiction or control of a State which are likely to
'significantly affect adversely' the biological diversity of other States or areas beyond
the limit of national jurisdiction. The fourth subpara requires that in the event of
'imminent or grave danger or damage' originating under its jurisdiction or control to
the biodiversity of another State or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a
State would immediately notify the potentially affected States and initiate action to
prevent or minimize such danger or damage. The notification procedu're has, however,
consciously not been drawn Out. The final subpara requires the promotion of 'national'
arrangements for emergency responses to activities/events which present a grave or
imminent danger to biological diversity. The role of international cooperation would be
to 'supplement' such national efforts. Joint contingency plans would be established
'where appropriate and agreed to' by the concerned States.
During the negotiations a number of developing countries stressed the need to
recognise the value of traditional knowledge and the contribution of the innovations and
practices of farmers/local communities. This concept finds recognition in the
Convention, which will seek to promote their application and an equitable sharing of
the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.
It is also noteworthy that the Convention deliberately avoids all references,
either explicit or indirect, to 'global lists', whether of biogeographic areas of special
significance or of species threatened with extinction.
Sharing of benefits
This feature of the. Convention is contained in two carefully phrased Articles which will
probably undergo much analysis in coming months. The logic of these Articles is built
around the fundamental acceptance of a State's sovereignty over its natural resources
including, of course, its genetic resources. While each country would 'endeavour to
create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources and not to impose
restrictions...', it is unequivocally stated that 'the authority to determine access to
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genetic resources vests with the national governments and is sUbject to national
legislation'. It must be remembered, however, that the basic purpose of the Convention
is not to debar access to genetic resources but to promote it within the framework
provided for in the Convention.
Since each country has sovereign rights over its natural resources, it is up to it
to grant access to a particular resource or not. It now has the further right, before
taking a decision, to invoke 'prior informed consent' procedures, which are well
understood in international law. In this particular context, such procedures would
require the Party seeking access to provide full information, inter-alia, about what is
being sought, how and where it will be sought, by what method it will be extracted and
in what quantity, what use it is expected to be of, etc.
Based on such information, and provided that a country does decide to grant
access, such access would be on 'mutually agreed terms'. By itself, this does not
amount to much, since a Convention is not required for States to enter into contracts on
'mutually agreed terms'. What the Convention lays down, however, are some
parameters or elements which such agreements must address or, ideally, contain. In
contract Acts at the national level (e.g., our Contract Act of 1872) certain minimum
conditions are laid down for a contract to be valid, and the Convention attempts to do
the same for contracts which involve genetic resources.
What are these parameters or elements? First, that research must be carried out
in the country providing the genetic resource, as far as possible, but in any case with
the full participation of that country. An obvious spin-off of this would be the
development of research capabilities in the South. Second, the products resulting from
the R & D on genetic resources should be shared in a fair and equitable manner with
the country providing those resources. A clear example of such sharing would be in
pharmaceuticals. Third, there should be a similar sharing of the profits (by whatever
name) occuring from the commercial utilization of genetic resources. And fourth, the
technology, including biotechnology, which is based on these resources must be
transferred to the country providing them. It is in this fourth element that the question
of IPRs (Intellectual property rights) has arisen, because the Convention provides that
the technology to be so transferred includes 'technology protected by patents and other
intellectual property rights'.
To understand the issue of TPR' s as it occurs in this Convention, it may be
useful to first consider the strcuture of Article 16. The first paragraph of this Article is
a general one exhorting each Contracting Party to share technology (including
biotechnology) with other countries both for the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity and for makthg use of genetic resources in an environmentally sound way.
Paragraph 2 deals with the terms on which such technology transfer should occur, i.e.,
on fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms
where mutually agreed. If such technology is protected by patents or other IPRs, such
IPRs should be adequately and effectively protected in the process of technology
transfer. It should be kept in mind that paragraph 2 still refers to a general commitment
towards technology transfer to developing countries on favourable terms, and not as a
specific contractual or legal obligation under the Convention.
The specific legal obligation for technology transfer which this Convention
creates is under paragraph 3 of Article 16 which states that where a country,
particularly a developing country, has provided genetic resources which are then
subjected to biotechnology, such technology must be transferred to that developing
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country regardless of patents and other IPRs. The implication of this paragraph is that
when entering into a contract for providing access to its genetic resources, a developing
country can insist that it should receive the resultant technology even if protected by
IPRs.
The intention behind paragraph 3 of Article 16 is further clarified by paragraph
4 which seeks to impose the same conditions on the private sector as each Contracting
Party would have to follow under paragraph 3. Further, paragraph 5 makes a clear
statement that patents and other IPRs should not impede the transfer of technology
envisaged under Article 16 but should be supportive of the objectives of the
Convention. In essence, paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, read together provide a new thrust in
the IPRs debate because they establish a right on a particular IPR not only for the
person (i.e., legal person) who has developed the process or product, but also for the
person who has provided the unique material without which that process or product
would not have been possible.
An important feature of these paragraphs is the reference to the financial
mechanism to be established under the Convention. Unlike other environmental
Conventions or Protocols the Biological Diversity Convention envisages the use of a
financial mechanism to ensure that developing countries receive their fair share of
benefitsa sort of insurance against unfair trade/business practices. Interventions by the
financial mechanism can also help to top up, so to speak, the returns on investments in
R & D that a company would normally expect but which may now be lower because of
profit-sharing under the terms of the ConventiOn.
In the ultimate analysis, contracts would still be on 'mutually agreed terms' and
each country would carefully see where the balance of its interests lies. For example, a
country may choose not to insist on the technology or access to products but accept a
financial package instead. Another may prefer a lump-sum settlement rather than
recurring royalties. Decisions would normally be on a case by case basis, and it will be
interesting to see how the format of agreements in this regard evolves.
It has been argued that such contracts or terms could in any case have been
insisted upon by a cOuntry allowing access to its genetic resources, even without a
Convention. That is correct. But what the Convention does is to require the Parties
receiving the resources to ensure that such arrangements are entered into. In other
words, the developed world would have to require its creatures, whether individual or
coporate, to see that the conditions stipulated by the Convention are fulfilled. The onus
of ensuring benefit sharing will not be on the providers of genetic resources alone, but
also on the recipients To emphasize this point, the Convention specifies that for
technology transfer in particular, the private sector shall also abide by the obligations
on States Parties contained in the Convention.
Finally, a comment on which genetic resources are being referred to. Through
definitions (e.g., of 'country providing genetic resources', 'country of origin of genetic
resources' and 'in situ conditions') and a substantive clause (Article 15 paragraph 3),
resources collected in the past and housed in genebanlis have been excluded and will
not occasion the reverse access to benefits which some have expressed fears about.
Secondly, only those resources which have been legally provided under the Convention
would attract the sharing of benefits, not those which may have been acquired
accidentally or by theft.
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Financial clauses
There would be a financial mechanism under the Convention, tO assist developing
countries to carry out the objectives of the Convention and to benefit from its
provisions. The funding would be through 'new and additional' financial resources to
be provided by developed countries. The funding mechanism would operate under the
authority and guidance of the Parties, in a 'democratic and transparent' manner, and
would be accountable to them. In brief, the mechanism would work entirely as a
subsidiary organ of the Conference of the Parties, and not with a will of its own. The
finer details would be decided upon by the Parties at their first meeting after the
Convention has come into force. In the interim period (from the coming into force of
the Convention till the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties) GEF (Global
Environment Facility) would function as the financial mechanism, but only if it has first
been restructured fully to meet the requirements of the relevant provisions of the
Convention.
The financial mechanism envisaged closely resembles the mechanism established
under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, by the
London amendments of June 1990. The agreement ultimately reached, after bitter
wrangling, leaves the ii nal decision to the Parties once the Convention has come into
force, and the GEF is not ruled out as the required mechanism, provided it has been
restructured in accordance with Article 21. A mechanism administered by the Parties
does not necessarily im ply that a new bureaucracy or institution has to be established.
The mechanism can be operated by an existing institution but the method of operation
would need to be fully guided and governed by the Parties.
Other provisions
It is noteworthy that the Convention establishes a 'subsidiary' body on scientific,
technical and technological advice. This body, which would be multidisciplinary, is to
function under the authority of, and in accordance with guidelines laid down by the
Conference of the Parties, and wotld provide inputs upon the latter's request.
Rreporting obligations under the Convention have deliberately been couched in
general terms and not spelt out in great detail. Contracting Parties are to present to the
Conference of Parties reports on measures taken for the implementation of the
provisions of the Convention and the effectiveness of such measures in meeting its
objectives. The latter phrase is of particular relevance in view of the multiple objectives
of the Biodiversity Convention.
A separate Article of the Convention makes clear that its provisions shall not
affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing
international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.
The Convention provisions on settlement of disputes are phrased on traditional
lines and largely parallel similar provisions contained in the Vienna Convention on
Protection of the Ozone Layer(l985).
The Convention comes into effect ninety days after 30 States have become Party
to it. No reservations may be made to the Convention. A Party may withdraw from the
Convention two years after it has entercd into force for it, and the withdrawal becomes
effective a year later.
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A useful beginning
The conclusion of the Convention on Biological Diversity, covering a vast and complex
area which many at first considered was unlikely to lend itself to an international
consensus, marks an important stage in efforts to protect the genetic resources of our
world. Based upon the concept of global partnership, rejecting the 'common heritage'
approach, and acknowledging for the first time the true value of biological wealth, it
constitutes a significant development in international environmental law. The
Convention is of particular interest to developing countries, where the greatest
biodiversity is to be found, since it provides a framework by which they could benefit
from the exploitation of their own biological resources. While the Convention would
now need to be made operational, agreement on it is a move in the right direction, and
reflects a delicate balance taking into account to the extent possible the interests and
concerns of all negotiating parties.
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Introduction
This paper attempts to analyze the implications of the BDC (Biodiversity Convention),
mainly from a developing country viewpoint. The Convention has addressed the
problem of dwindling species diversity, sustainable use of genetic resources and set up
a contractive framework for their utilization.
The Convention has laid emphasis on the sovereign rights of States over their
genetic resources, simultaneously referring to biodiversity as the 'common concern of
humankind'. From this follow the implications for national legislation to safeguard
national interests as well as to facilitate the objectives of the Convention, stated as, the
conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources,
including appropriate access to genetic resources and appropriate transfer of technol-
ogies.
The Convention has addressed complex issues such as technology transfer,
intellectual property protection, and biotechnology transfer in a manner which could be
acceptable to developed ICs (or industrialized) countries which are technology rich and
gene poor, as well as DCs (Developing Countries) which are gene rich and technology
poor. This has left some issues unresolved, which may be subjects for future prctocols.
Some of these issues have been identified in this paper.
The paper also briefly discusses the role of indigenous communities in the
conservation of resources and examines the implications of providing incentives to
them, so that they may continue to play this vital role.
Biodiversity defined
Biodiversity is the totality of genes, species and ecosystems in a region. For the
purpose of protection and conservation, biodiversity can be divided into three
hierarchical categories: genes',species2 and ecosystems3.
'Genetic diversity refers to the variation of genes within species. Alternatively it is the sum of genetic
informatitin contained in the genes of individuals of plants, animals and microorganisms. This covers distinct
populations of the same species or genetic variations within a population.
2Species diversity refers to the variety of species within a region. Globally, this has been estimated to
be between 5 and 50 million although only 1.4 million have been described so far.
3Ecosystem diversity relates to the variety of habitats, biotic communities and ecological processes in the
biosphere. This is harder to measure than species or genetic diversity due to the "boundaries" of communities
and ecosystems being elusive.
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While in principle, human cultural diversity (i.e., attributes of human society
such as cropping patterns land management practices, diversity in language, etc.) could
count as biodiversity, the BDC does not deal with human culture as such, and
accordingly we do not discuss this aspect further.
Distribution of biodiversity
The patterns of distribution of biodiversity have influenced the structure of the BDC.
This is because of an overwhelming concentration of in situ biodiversity in DCs,
constituting a valuable resource sought by ICs (Industrialized Countries). In ex situ
conservation, on the other hand, ICs have an advantage.
In situ distribution
Globally the countries with the most species of vascular4 plants are in the neotropics5
(Central and South America) and in Southeast Asia, where most of the world's
rainforests are located. Northern countries such as Canada, Scandinavia, and the former
USSR, and southern temperate countries such as Chile and Argentina, have compara-
tively fewer species. Tropical forests, in particular closed tropical forests, contain at
least 50% and perhaps 90% of the world's species. Mediterranean climate regions have
very rich floras with high levels of endemism6. For instance the Cape region of South
Africa has about 8,600 species of plants, of which 68% are endemic. Wetlands,
although not known for their high species diversity or local endemism, are complex
ecosystems.
Marine ecosystems, in particular coral reefs, are comparable in diversity to
tropical forests having a high diversity at the higher taxonomic7 levels than even
terrestrial ecosystems. Islands are known for having some very endemic flora with very
few of their species being found elsewhere. They also have the unfortunate distinction
of having the highest number of recorded extinctions.
It is this unevenness of the distribution as well as extinction of genetic resources
which has led to the setting up of ex situ conservation sites.
Ex situ distribution
Ex situ distribution is another means of conserving biodiversity. This is done both in
international germplasm and private collections. This method of conservation is
encouraged only to a limited extent in the BDC. While the issue is yet unresolved, till
now free access to international collections is allowed. Private (and national) collections
do not, in general, allow free access.
4Those plants having vessels which convey fluids.
5Refers to the New World Tropics
6mose.organisms occuning permanently in an area
7During the classification of living organisms they are placed in different categories known as taxa
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Declining biodiversity
Tropical deforestation is the principal example of endangered biodiversity. Although the
extent of forest cover in the northern temperate and boreal regions has not changed
significantly in recent years, there has been a replacement of older forests by second
growth forests and plantations, leading to species loss. In Mediterranean climate sites,
such as California, South Africa, Southwest Australia, and Central Chile, at least 10%
of all species are in danger. The largest number of recent extinctions has been on
oceanic islands, 60% of plant species endemic to the Galapagos islands, 42% of the
Azores, and 75% of the species on Canary Islands are endangered (WRI 1992-93).
About 10% of the vascular plant species endemic to Hawaii are extinct and 40% are
threatened. Freshwater ecosystems are threatened by pollution and introduction of alien
species.
The loss of biodiversity could be attributed to direct and indirect causes8 i.e.,
habitat loss and fragmentation, introduction of exotic species, overexploitation of
species, pollution, and climate change.9
8Report on Global Biodiversity Strategy; Guidelines for action to save, study and Use Earth's Biotic
Wealth Sustainably and Equitably. WRI, The World Conservation Union (IUCN), United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) in consultation with FAO, United Nations Education, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 1992.
°a) Habitat loss and fragmentation
M FAOIUNEP estimate(1982) is that globally 11.1 million ha are eliminated outright each year,
and at least a further 10 million ha are grossly disrupted annually [WRI/WV,TFI. The major loss
could be attributed to the expansion of marginal agriculture, and due to commercial timber
harvesting, between 1961 and 1985.
Introduced species (exotic)
This is particularly frequent in the case of islands, where an alien species could endanger those
species which have not co-evolved together. In Hawaii the 86 introduced plant species constitute a
threat to the endemic biodiversity; one such introduced tree species having already displaced more
than 30,000 acres of native forest.
Overexploltatlon of plant and animal species
Increased pressure on natural resources have been another cause endangering biodiversity. The
population and catch of the Peruvian anchovy has dropped radically due to overexploitation between
1958 and 1970. Apart from having a major function of serving as food, occasionally a resource may
serve as a collector's item causing its extinction as in the case of the Sumatran and Jawa rhinos.
Pollution of soil, water and the atmosphere
Pollutants stress ecosystems reducing or eliminating those species sensitive to the altere4
conditions. Acid rain has been instrumental in causing the death of a significant amount of fish life
in the Scandinavian and North American lakes, apart from the destruction of extensive forest cover.
Marine pollution has affected the Mediterranean sea and even estuaries entering other seas.
Global climate change
Climate change in the form of increased temperature 1-3°C is likely to alter the limits of
tolerance of land species approximately 125km towards the poles, or 150m on the mountains. It is
anticipated that the rapidity of the change would not allow for adaptation or redistribution of some
species. Sea level rise could also affect low lying areas and may cause the submergence of some
flora and fauna.
1) Industrial agriculture and forestry
Modern agriculture have been characterised by plant breeding programs aimed at increasing
levels of productivity. These limited varieties of crops have wide adaptation and are responsive to
high levels of inputs. Their limited diversity is in itself the cause of danger. Similarly, in the
forestry sector, natural forests are increasingly being replaced by monocultural plantations.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the broad
structure of BDC. Section 3 deals with some general issues and how they have been
dealt with in the BDC. Section 4 discusses aspects of conservation, while Section 5
examines national and multilateral commitments. The contractive framework is
analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 looks at intellectual property right concerns related to
life-forms, and their resolution in the BDC. Section 8 discusses the treatment of special
country groups, and Section 9 examines the treatment of indigenous communities. The
last section attempts to both assess and identify subjects which may be included in
future protocols.
Broad description of the BDC structure
The text of the BDC is broadly structured as follows: Commencing with a Preamble
which lists the guiding principles to be followed in the Convention, it is followed by 42
operative Articles and two Annexes. Article 1 deals with objectives of the Convention,
and Article 2 defines some of the terminology used in the document. Article 3 states
the overarching principle of sovereignty of States with respect to biological resources in
their jurisdiction, subject to the qualification that their activities do not cause
environmental damage outside their jurisdiction. The remaining articles deal with
identification and monitoring of components of biodiversity, conservation (in situ and
ex situ), access to genetic resources and technology, handling of biotechnology,
financial resources, financial mechanism, and relationship with existing agreements.
Annex 1 lists important components of biodiversity, and Annex 2 furnishes the
provisions for arbitration.
General issues and their treatment in the BDC
Objectives
Genetic materials are a principal input in biotechnology research, which in the last
decade has assumed major economic importance. In the process, the winners have been
developed countries with R & D capabilities in biotechnology, and IPRs rights over
them. The losers have (typically) been DCs, which have been the source of genetic
materials. Waehle'° cites the example of the Rosy Periwinide (Vinca rosea) from
Madagascar, a plant which now forms the basis of a US $ 100i 60 million drugs
industry, while the local people in Madagascar have received virtually no economic
benefits from the same.
At the same time, there has also been marked loss of species diversity,
particularly in the last several decades. This is attributable largely to human (economic)
activities, as detailed above.
The objectives accordingly are to both conserve genetic wealth, as well as
assure access to the resulting biotechnology, besides regulating access to the genetic
materials themselves.
rowards a Green World: Should Global Environmental Management be built on Legal Conventions or
Human Rights? CSE Publication.
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Sovereignty
Common heritage of mankind vs national property
The question of sovereignty as it relates to genetic resources is whether they are to be
treated as 'open access' global common property (as implied by the term: 'common
heritage of mankind') or as it belonging to the concerned State in which they are
located (national property).
The principal argument for open access global common property is that genetic
material is a non-excludable, non-rival good. In other words, since researchers need
only small amounts of genetic material (a few seeds), the use of the resource by an
individual agent does not reduce the quantity of resource available to others, making it
a non-rival good. It is also non-excludable simply because in practice it is impossible to
prevent physical access to genetic material under in situ conditions. Treating genetic
materials as global common property will, however, pose two difficult questions. First,
the question of apportioning responsibility for costs involved in their conservation, and
second, in sharing the economic benefits from their utilization.
The argument for treating these resources (i.e., those located within national
jurisdictions) as national property is as follows: First, DCs clearly have some leverage
over ICs due to their greater endowments of biodiversity. Treating the resources as
national property may enable DCs to reap economic benefits from their use by ICs,
without trying to resolve the difficult question of equity in sharing global common
property resources. Second, that regulation must be initiated for conservation of
resources because of the alarming extent of species loss. Such regulation must depend
on national authorities, whose responsibilities can be better focused for national, rather
than global common property resources.
Most nations had earlier supported free access to 'unimproved germplasm' in
wild species or traditional varieties of crops or livestock. At the 22nd FAO Conference
in 1983, two resolutions 8/83 and 9/83 were passed. Resolution 8/83 put forth the
'International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources' which was an attempt to bring
the current network of gene banks under the control of the FAO. The objective of this
agreement was to ensure that plant genetic resources of economic and social interest,
particularly for agriculture, would be explored, preserved, evaluated, and made available
for plant breeding and scientific purposes. The articulated basis of the document was
the principle that 'genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should
be available without restriction'.
Status of sovereignty according to BDC
The Convention (Article 3) clearly affirms that States have sovereign rights 'to exploit
their own resources', which may be interpreted to include biological resources in
national jurisdictions. This strong affirmation is qualified by the requirement that they
have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause extra-jurisdictional environmental damage. They are also responsible for both
conservation and sustainable use of these resources. They thus have the authority to
determine access to such resources. Where access is granted it would be on 'mutually
agreed terms' and subject to the 'prior informed consent' of the contracting party
supplying the material (Article I 5). Clearly, countries of origin have no rights over
genetic material already in ex situ collections, outside the country.
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Genetic resources in international and private germplasm collections11, have
not been adequately dealt with in the BDC. From the statement on relationship with
other agreements (Article 22) it would seem that the matter is unresolved because there
is no prior multilateral agreement on the subject.
The BDC acknowledges that the conservation of biological diversity is the
'common concern of mankind'. While this expression justifies international cooperation
for conservation, the eschewing of the term 'common heritage of mankind' rules out
any possible interpretation of genetic resources as global common property.
'Precautionary principle'
The precautionary principle calls for action in meeting the BDC's objectives even in
the absence of complete scientific certainty, wherever there is a threat of significant
reduction or loss of biodiversity, so that the threat is avoided or minimized. The
alternative is to 'wait and see' whether further research resolves uncertainties
sufficiently that the costs and benefits of actions can be unambiguously determined.
The pros and cons of observing the principle are as follows:
The argument in support of the principle is that loss of genetic wealth exposes
humanity to risk and possible but uncertainly large economic losses. It would justify
some expenditure even in the absence of scientific certainty, in order that the risks are
significantly reduced and major losses averted.
On the other hand, the diversion of resources towards conservation at the cost of
other developmental requirements, could be a reason for awaiting more information,
prior to taking action.
The BDC opts for the precautionary principle, rather than the 'wait and see'
alternative. It is sited in the Preamble, rather than in specific operative Articles. This
may enable, when alternative interpretations of commitments or other operative
provisions are possible, to favour an interpretation involving the precautionary
principle, rather than the alternative.
Conservation (sustainability) concerns
The BDC seeks the conservation of biodiversity in order that it may be utilized for
human welfare (Preamble, Articles 1, 2 and reading also the Rio declaration: 'human
beings are at the centre of sustainable development concerns'). The Convention is, thus,
categorically anthropocentric in perspective, and does not acknowledge (legal) rights of
any other (living and non-living) entities.
'Sustainable use' has been defined (Article 2), as the use of components of
biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long term decline of
biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations
of present and future generations. incentives to promote the sustainable use of
biodiversity, are to be provided by the adoption of 'economically and socially sound
measures'.
"In this instance information is not as easily available as in the case of the public sector gene banks.
Such information may constitute trade secrets.
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Identification and monitoring
The purpose of identification and monitoring is two fold. First, to locate components of
biological diversity significant from the point of conservation and sustainable use, as
well as focus on those components requiring urgent conservation, and having the
maximum potential for sustainable use (i.e., economic benefit) (Article 7). Second, to
monitor processes and activities which have a deleterious impact on conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity (Article 7). Contracting states are required to undertake
such identification and monitoring activities. This data is to be tabulated and organized,
facilitating utilization. This commitment may be fulfilled, in the case of DCs, only if
and to the extent, financial resources for meeting the 'agreed full incremental costs' are
made available by ICs (Article 20).
The functioning of the INBio (National Biodiversity Institute), at Costa Rica [1]
could serve as a role model. The concerned organisation could establish a national
inventory of the country's biotic wealth and conduct periodic assessments of current
status. This would influence decisions regarding granting accessibility to a particular
resource, at a particular point of time. Apart from this, the expertise of such a a
professional organisation would help ensure that the potential value of the resource is
correctly assessed.
In situ and Ex situ conservation
Apart from the establishment of protected areas for the protection of biological
diversity the Convention refers to the regulation, management and development of such
resources both within and outside such areas, for in situ conservation (Article 8). For
such conservation, international cooperation is envisaged, including financial support to
DCs, to the extent of 'agreed full incremental costs' (Articles 8 and 20).
Ex situ conservation measures are meant to complement in situ measures,
preferably in the country of origin. Two reasons for preferring the country of origin for
locating the ex situ effort are: First, this may aid in the recovery and rehabilitation of
threatened species and their reintroduction into natural habitats. Second, the property
rights of the country of origin over the resource would not be diluted because it would
not leave national jurisdiction. This would act as an incentive to conservation.
The BDC stresses the regulation and management of collection from natural
habitats, so that existing ecosystems and in situ populations of species are not
threatened.
DCs are also encouraged to have such ex situ collections, by the provision of
financial and other support.
Equity concerns
While acknowledging that DCs require access to and transfer of technology and
financial resources (as a prerequisite to meeting their commitments under the
Convention), the question is whether the BDC has adequately answered equity
concerns. Equity issues are raised in the questions of, first, access to genetic resources
(in situ and ex situ), second, access to R & D and its commercial benefits, third, equity
across generations in the sense of resource sharing, and finally, equity concerns relating
to rights of indigenous communities. Some of these aspects are dealt with elsewhere in
this paper.
The question of access to genetic resources is linked to the assignment of
property rights over the resource. When the Convention comes into force, the country
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of origin gains the right to regulate access to in situ resources and the same is true for
the country of location except in the case of private and international germplasm
collections. In effect, the country of origin loses all claims to ex situ resources not
located in its jurisdiction, This reflects the earlier general practice of treating these
resources as 'open access', rather than national property. Given that the process of ex
situ conservation did not violate the then existing property rights, it can be argued that
procedural equity considerations (rights) should prevail over intuitive notions of
substantive equity, which might allow countries of origin to retain property rights over
ex situ resources. However, this argument may have important implications for equity
in other global environmental issues, e.g., climate change, since it might tend to support
status-quo or 'grandfathering' rights over global resources.
The question of equity in access to R & D and commercial benefits resulting
from utilization of genetic resources from another country is sought to be determined
by setting up a contractive framework in the Convention. This framework enables
contracts for technology transfer and commercial benefits of R & D on the one hand,
and access to the enabling genetic resources on the other, to be negotiated. Equity
might be considered to be attained if such contracts are negotiated under fair
procedures. Whether the playing field set up is level from the perspective of DCs, is
discussed below in Section 6.
Inter-generational equity concerns are sought to be realized by adopting a
conservation and sustainable use strategy, by means of which long-term decline of
biodiversity may be arrested, If these resources can be maintained in perpetuity, it may
be argued that the inter-generational concern is substantially taken care of.
The equity issue of rights of indigenous communities over resources which they
have husbanded for generations and on which they are dependent is discussed below, in
Section 9.
Multilateral and national commitments
The BDC stipulates commitments for developed and DCs separately, although as
discussed below, the basis for classification is yet to be delermined. The more
important among the commitments are as follows:
Multi/a teral commitments
Under the BDC, developed countries shall provide and! or facilitate under 'fair and
most favourable terms', access to and transfer of technologies relevant to conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity to DCs. For technologies under IPRs protection,
access and transfer would be on terms which 'recognize and are consistent with their
adequate and effective protection'. In other words, such technologies do not enter the
public domain solely on account of the Convention, requiring their transfer to DCs.
Clearly, therefore, sidepayments would be required to persuade the IPRs owners to part
with these technologies.
Accordingly, the Convention provides for 'new and additional financial
resources' (Article 20) to enable developing country parties to meet the 'agreed full
incremental costs' of meeting (all) their commitments. The questions of financial
commitments and the possible interpretations of 'full incremental costs' are discussed in
greater detail in below.
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The list of developed countries (including countries in transition to a market
economy) would be finalised after the first meeting of the Conference of Parties. The
criteria for burden sharing amongst the developed countries remains undetermined
National commitments
According to the BDC responsibilities at the state level would include, first,
development of national strategies for conservation and sustainable use, second,
integration of conservation concerns in policy making, third, establishment of protected
areas and the like to conserve biodiversity, fourth, necessary domestic legislation for
conservation, and finally, promoting public awareness of biodiversity conservation.
Implementation of these commitments by the DCs is contingent on the
developed countries meeting their own commitments relating to transfer of technology
and financial resources. Unlike in the Climate Change Convention, in the provision
regarding finances for meeting incremental costs, there is no diluting caveat like 'as far
as possible or as appropriate'.
Financial mechanism
The BDC requires developed countries to provide 'new and additional financial
resources', reasonably interpreted as funds exceeding current patterns of development
assistance, for meeting the 'agreed full incremental costs' incurred by DCs in meeting
their respective commitments. Agreement on such incremental costs is to be reached
between a financial mechanism set up under Article 21, and the concerned developing
country. Norms for computing incremental costs would need to be worked out by the
Conference of Parties.
The institutional structure for the financial mechanism is to be decide& upon by
the Conference of the Parties at its first meeting. Till that time a restructured GEF may
function as the financial mechanism.
The major, essentially political, issue regarding the institutional structure of
financial mechanisms in global environmental regulation, is the question of
'democratization'. DCs, in general, perceive a bias in the Bretton Woods institutions in
favour of donors' interests, and are insistent on 'democratization', one interpretation of
which is change in voting rules away from the IMFIWorld Bank scheme of weighted
voting to the General Assembly norm of 'one country one vote'.
Since DCs are numerically dominant in the UN system, this norm would
potentially confer greater weight to points of view on which they can reach consensus.
On the other hand, DCs are more heterogenous and have more divergent interests than
developed countries, and the prospects of them reaching strong consensus on almost
any issue are weaker than for developed countries. Accordingly, while democratization
is important for legitimizing the international standing of the financial mechanism, it
may have less impact on the nature of outcomes than might at first sight be supposed.
Interpreting 'agreed full incremental costs'
An obvious subject for future protocols is the adoption of norms for '(Agreed) Full
Incremental Costs' of measures by DCs in fulfilling their commitments under the BDC.
Economists would generally agree that a minimum notion of such incremental
costs would first, define net benefits as 'opportunity costs', i.e., the costs foregone from
not placing a given resource (e.g., an ecosystem) employed for, say, conservation
purposes as a fulfilment of a commitment under the BDC, rather than in the best
An analysis of the Biodiversity Convention 161
alternative use (e.g., 'farming'). Opportunity costs may thus be contrasted with direct
financial costs. Second, that such costs must be broadly defined, including goods which
may be priced in markets, as well as those for which no (explicit) markets exist. Third,
that all valuations of costs must be specific to the economy, and not based on
(imported) norms. Fourth, that social discount rates at which streams in time of costs
(benefits) may be collapsed to present values, are parameters of (explicit or implicit)
choice for the concerned country, and cannot be prescribed by outside agencies.
Differences may arise on the question of whether the value of associated
tangible but non-marketed benefits, for example improvement in local environmental
quality, or benefits whose (future) market value is highly uncertain, (for example
conserved genetic diversity), are to be netted out of computations of costs.
Further, DCs may face various constraints in adopting even clearly established
'no regrets' measures, i.e., measures which yield increase in economic efficiency over
the conventional practice. These may include the fact that the up-front capital costs of
some measures may exceed that of the current practice, and may not be adopted by
DCs due to capital availability constraints. Non-concessional financial flows to deal
with such constraints may increase the risk of future BOP (Balance of Payment)
difficulties through debt servicing. Alternatively, additional investments in
infrastructure, human capital, and rehabilitation, may be necessary before (say)
conservation measures may be adopted. Unless these are adequately captured in norms
of incremental costs, DCs may be unwilling to undertake such measures.
An additional aspect of defining incremental costs relates to the depth and other
conditions of technology transfer for meeting commitments. The respective IPRs
holders may prefer to capture the rents through export of capital equipment embodying
the technology, rather than transfer of knowledge. The reasons for such a preference
may be several. On the other hand, several DCs may be confident of being able to
absorb technological knowledge to the extent of R & D capability in the same, and
prefer, again for various reasons, in-depth transfer of technological knowledge to (say)
import of capital equipment. Because of the preference of IPRs holders for transfer of
machinery rather than knowledge, the element of rent involved in transfer of knowledge
may be higher. Norms for defining incremental costs would have to reckon with this
aspect also.
The contractive framework
At the heart of the BDC, distinguishing it from other global environmental agreements,
for example the Montreal Protocol, or the Climate Change Convention, is a framework
for trading access to national genetic property with the resulting technology and/or
commercial benefits. This contractive framework is set up in Article 16.
The BDC appropriates genetic resources located in national jurisdictions (except
international and private ex situ collections) to national authorities. However, the
principal problem in setting up a contractive framework is that access cannot be
physically prevented (since biotechnology requires only very small quantities of
material, a few seeds), or alternatively, that IPRs categories (for example trade secrets
protection) exist under which disclosure of use of specific genetic resources is not
necessary.
One interpretation [of Article 16 (3)] is that the BDC disallows the use of IPRs
instruments which do not insist on disclosure sufficient to enable replication of the
covered (process or product) by other researchers. However, the provision is rather
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opaque, and may lend itself to alternative interpretations. Even if this is not the case, in
our view, it will be difficult for DCs to realize transfer of resulting technology in depth,
or a significant part of the commercial benefits (rents) from use of the genetic
resources. This conclusion is explained below:
Access to genetic resources and transfer of technology is to be on 'mutually
agreed terms', meaning that the sidepayments that may be involved, as well as terms of
transfer of (resulting) technology, are to be negotiated between the concerned States.
Further, the sidepayments may be made (at least partly) by the financial mechanism,
rather than directly or solely by the gene users.
One may note that there will be a clear asymmetry of information between the
gene supplier and the agent developing the biotechnology, notwithstanding the fact that
supply of genetic resources is to be with 'prior informed consent' of the supplier. The
latter would, at the time of negotiations, have already completed a significant amount
of research, know fairly well what it was looking for, and benefitting from the
provisions of the BDC facilitating mapping and organization of genetic infonnation, a
reasonably good idea of the chances of finding it. The developing country negotiators
in such contracts would have lesser information, since much of it would be proprietry
to the potential user, and would hardly be equals in the negotiations, since they would
have little idea of the true value of the resource.
Second, is the question of whether the requirement of (compulsory) transfer of
technology enhances the bargaining strength of DCs. Technology transfer may occur in
several varying depths and modes. Thus, transfer may occur through direct investment
to a captive unit, or through sale of capital goods embodying the technology, or it may
involve designs and specifications permitting their manufacture. Alternatively, it may
include R & D skills. Some of the other negotiable dimensions of technology transfer
are duration, geographical limits, and volume of production of the licensed technology.
The Convention is silent on these aspects.
Suppose that disclosure of use of genetic resource is, in fact, effectively
mandated. In that case, biotechnology innovators must negotiate with the gene supplier
regarding sidepayments and depth of technology transfer, in return for access to the
gene pool. The gene supplier may be prepared to trade-off reduced depth for increased
sidepayments, but would start with the disadvantage of not knowing the gene pooi' s
worth. It would, therefore, very likely make trade-offs along an indifference contour
which at every point is below that which would be the case if it had full information.
The latter, on the other hand, having revealed less than the gene pool's true worth,
would also prefer to trade-off reduced depth for increased sidepayments within the
disclosed valuation of the resource, since at least part of the negotiated sidepayments
may be paid by the multilateral fund. If the administrators of the fund do not intervene,
the likely result is only nominal depth of technology transfer and low level of
sidepayments.
However, the administrators of the fund may seek to eliminate such free rides
on its finances by the gene users. Accordingly, they may attempt to negotiate norms
both for sidepayments, as well as depth of transfer (which, as pointed out above, may
also be an issue in defining incremental costs). In this, developed countries would
collectively reveal less than their true valuations for access to genetic resources, and
may also attempt to protect gene users' rights by proposing restrictive norms for depth
of technology transfer. Since DCs would not know the true valuation of the resource,
An analysis of the Biodiversity Convention 163
and collectively have little taste for increasing depth at the expense of sidepayments on
offer, the process of evolving norms may only tend to freeze the earlier outcomes.
Further, even if such norms do not emerge and all sidepayments are directly
paid by gene users, since rents from IPRs can be captured equally by sale of goods
involving the technology, or by licensing it, the negotiated sidepayments would have
the element of royalty built into it, reducing the amount. One further consideration is
the potential for violating the terms of technology transfer, for example by exports to
third countries (which may have been disallowed in the technology transfer contract). If
technology suppliers believe that such risk is significant, they will attempt to cover it
by a premium, reducing the sidepayments still further.
Intellectual property rights concerns about rights over life-forms
There are two distinct areas under IPRs protection which are of concern i.e., those over
a genetic resource (biological resource property), and those over the intellectual
contribution to the development of resultant technology (intellectual property).
We first consider IPRs protection for genetic information. Can the discovery of
a new species of butterfly, for example, qualify for IPRs protection? Would such IPRs
help conservation? An answer to the first must consider that such discoveries do not
answer the criteria of an inventive step, or that of repeatability and description of the
IPR subject (which may alter sufficiently from one generation to the next that specific
descriptions would not be valid). Also, they do not have industrial application, at the
point in time of discovery. There are also ethical problems with the grant of such IPRs
on natural life forms, about which there is no prospect of general agreement.
Notwithstanding the above, several national IPRs regimes recognize as
approbriable, some types of biotechnological discoveries and inventions. These include:
naturally occurring and altered microrganisms, plants, animals and other biological
material; biological processes for the production or modification of various products;
and commercial use of such products. The legal forms of protection are in the form of
plant breeders' rights, plant patents for asexually reproducing plant varieties, and
'utility patents' relating to use of the species or variety (including products).
One of the criteria of patentability is that of sufficient disclosure (i.e., enough
information should be conveyed to allow a skilled person to either perform the process
or make the product for which the patent is granted), which is often difficult to meet in
the case of biotechnology. This may be due to the impossibility of fully describing the
living material, and of providing access to it by means of the written word alone. This
problem has been overcome to some extent by the use of culture collections as patent
depositories for microrganisms and other incompletely describable biological materials.
However DCs may lack the capacity to verify the source of such material in these
depositories.
For reasons discussed above, granting IPRs protection to life-forms is not yet
generally allowed. Many national laws exclude plant and animal varieties, and
biological processes for the production of plants and animals, from the scope of IPRs
protection.
Treatment/resolution of such issues in the BDC
The BDC does not explicitly address the issue of patenting of live organisms. At
several places, however, it affirms that IPRs protection over biotechnology (which
164 A N Achanta and P Ghosh
under the BDC may include technology using living organisms) remain untouched
[Article 16 (2)]. Such IPRs may apparently be prospective, and not only existing.
The BDC affirms that it does not affect the rights (obligations) of the Parties
conferred under existing international agreements (Article 22), except where such
exercise of rights (obligations) would seriously damage or threaten biodiversity. Since
the Uruguay round on GATT is yet inconclusive, there is a clear need to harmonize its
provisions relating to IPRs over life-forms and biotechnology with those of the BDC.
One important existing international agreement relating to life-forms is the
UPOV (International Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties) Convention
(1961). This Convention allows for a 'breeder's exemption' i.e., the right of other
breeders to experiment with the protected variety. It also confers a 'farmer's exemption'
i.e., recognizes farmers' contribution to the selection and conservation of genetic
diversity of crops by allowing them to store and resow seeds taken from the initially
protected crops. These constitute important limitations on exercise of IPRs rights over a
major commercially significant life-form, and the BDC clearly does not disturb such
restriction.
Country groups
Country groups identified in the BDC include developed and developing countries.
C1TS (Countries in Transition) are not a subset of developed countries, although they
may opt to assume commitments identical to theirs. LDCs ('Least Developed
Countries') and SIS ('Small Island States') are subsets of DCs. The former would
presumably be distinguished on the basis of social and economic criteria, and the latter
by geography. A separate category for SIS may be justified by the fact of their higher
vulnerability to biodiversity loss.
Developed and DCs
Developed country parties would provide the financial resources to enable developing
country parties to meet the 'agreed full incremental costs' of implementing measures, in
fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention. The extent of implementation by
DCs is dependent on the former honouring the commitments of financial support and
transfer of technology, subject to the rider that their overriding priority is development
and poverty eradication. A list of developed countries (and others willing to undertake
the obligations of developed country parties) would only be finalised at the first
meeting of the Conference of Parties. As noted earlier the basis of burden sharing
among developed countries is yet unresolved. This too represents an interesting aspect
of equity in global environmental issues. Further, since criteria would have to be
evolved for classifying countries, the evolution of the yardsticks at future negotiations
is also a matter of significance. Interesting questions remain as to whether the lists
would be static or dynamic, whether there would be provisions for review of criteria,
whether single attributes (per-capita income or GDP) or multiple attribute (incomes,
literacy, economic structure, life expectancy etc.) would be employed, and so on.
Least developed countries, a category in the class of DCs which remain to be
identified, are allowed 'special consideration' in the matter of funding and transfer of
technology. What exactly constitutes such special consideration? The matter would have
to be resolved in several fora in the future.
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Small island states
Small island states have been awarded special treatment within the category of DCs due
to their unique situation characterized by highly endemic flora and fauna, and high
species diversity (due to their geographic isolation), leading to their special
vulnerability to biodiversity loss due to climate change and other causes.
It has already been noted that the largest number of recent extinctions have been
on oceanic islands.
Indigenous communities
Approximately 200 million indigenous peoples live in and have special claims to
territories, that in many cases have exceptionally high levels of biodiversity. Their
claims are based on their long occupation of the territory, their apparent ability to
manage the available resources sustainably, including conserving genetic resources over
millenia, and their traditional knowledge of use of plants and other biological
species.'2
The Convention recognises their dependence on biodiversity, and the desirability
of sharing equitably the benefits from use of traditional knowledge { Preamble }. It
recommends that States should (subject to national legislation) respect and maintain the
knowledge and practices of such peoples, promote their dissemination, and encourage
the equitable sharing of the benefits of such knowledge (Article 8j). Clearly, these
provisions fall well short of conferring anything like internationally acknowledged
property rights over either biodiversity resources conserved by such communities, or
their traditional knowledge of the uses of such resources. Of course, since the
biological resources are the national property of the concerned States, by domestic
legislation, individual States may confer such rights on their indigenous peoples.
Further, States may also develop innovative IPRs regimes to give rights to thse
communities over their traditional knowledge.
Why is it that despite much clamour from several quarters that IPRs rights
should be conferred on indigenous communities, this has not been done in the BDC?
Apparently, on considerations of substantive equity, such communities should be
entitled to a share of the commercial benefits from use of their knowledge, and one
way of ensuring this is by conferring suitable rights.
While the equity argument is unexceptionable, one needs to note that as far as
biological resources are concerned, international conferment of property rights to them
would dilute notions of State sovereignty over biological resources in their jurisdiction.
Further, outside parties seeking access to such resources would, in negotiating terms of
such access, usually face an even less equal party in terms of information regarding the
potential value of the resource, than would be the case if they negotiated with State
authorities. If States can be believed to be honest trustees of the welfare of their
12 (a) According to the WRI,(1992-93) residents of one forest village in Thailand eat 295 different
local plants and use another 119 for medicine. The World Health Organization has estimated that
approximately 3,000 plant species are used for birth control by tribal people around the world.
(b) An index of the enormous potential knowledge amongst such communities is the fact that the
National Institute of Health, U.S. has sent experts to all parts of the third world to interview tradi-
tional medical practitioners and gather herbs having an anti-tumour activity. Since the last five years
the US National Cancer Institute has' gathered more than 1,500 medicinal plants from tropical forests
and peoples at about $418 a plant.
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indigenous peoples, equity would be better served by requiring access to be negotiated
with State authorities. One key issue in this context is the question of empowerment of
indigenous communities within the domestic political structures.
Regarding rights over traditional knowledge, two issUes are important. First, it is
very likely impossible to devise an effective system of monitoring the use of traditional
knowledge in the development of new products or processes by outsiders. Second, if
IPRs rights are to be conferred on traditional knowledge, the way is open for claims of
IPRs protection over other categories of knowledge which are now not recognized as
approbriable. These would include, for example, basic scientific knowledge, including
that discovered long ago. Clearly such unlimited proliferation of the domain of IPRs
would be severely detrimental to the interests of DCs.
One other argument supporting the conferment of rights to indigenous
communities arises from the need to ensure their continuing participation in conserving
biodiversity, Such rights would serve as an incentive to local communities, facilitating
innovation as well as conservation. In these communities the key to successful
conservation is making sure that they share the benefits fairly and do not shoulder a
disproportionate share of the costs [11].
Conclusion
Our analysis of the Convention draws attention to the imperative need for clarification
of IPRs disclosure requirements under the contractive framework.
Some of the other concerns which would require to be the subject of future
protocols are, first, that codes of conduct should be developed for collection of
germplasm, and release of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). Second, regarding
ownership of existing germplasm located in international collections more clearly
defined. Third, regarding norms for depth of technology transfer must incorporate DC
concerns. Finally, definitions for and norms of incremental costs of measures in
fulfilment of commitments.
Attention has been drawn to the need for a centralised national agency on the
lines of INBio for sreening national genetic material and regulation of collection. Such
a national agency would facilitate the compilation genetic material, aiding the
government in identifying and assessing the value of such resources, and in regulating
collection. In this way collection could be channelised through a single institution and
there would be accountability to the concerned government owning the resource.
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Incremental costs of GHGs abatement programs:
a first cut at a definition
Prodipto Ghosh and Neha Khanna
Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi, India
Introduction
In June 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed at Rio de
Janeiro. The Convention includes provisions for transfers of technology and financial
resources from ICs (Industrialised Countries) to DCs (Developing Countries) to enable
the latter to fulfil their (differentiated) responsibilities under the Convention. Transfers
of finances are for meeting the 'agreed full incremental costs' of measures which may
lead to reductions in future rates of GHG emissions.
This paper addresses the question of defining such incremental costs. It develops
definitions and a LP (Linear Progmmming) model to arrive at a concept of 'minimal
incremental costs', i.e., a notion of economic costs involved in meeting global warming
responsibilities which policy makers could agree upon as the least that would be
involved in such programs The model assumes two alternative formulationS of global
warming responsibilities under future national strategies envisaged by the Framework
Convention. The first specifies a time path of GHGs emissions in the economy as a
whole. The second, supposes that such a strategy would specify a time path of GHG
intensity in the economy (which may be a vector disaggregated by sector).
The costs considered in this paper are economic, not financial. The principal
difference between such costs occurs at three levels. First, financial costs, as typically
determined by an accountant, involve only actual financial expenses (on capital, labour,
materials, taxes, depreciation). Economic costs, on the other hand, are 'opportunity
costs', i.e., the benefits foregone by not utilizing a given resource in the best alternative
use. Consider for example, an owner who manages her own retail store and pays herself
no salary. Since no monetary transaction occurs, an accountant would not recognise any
costs. On the other hand, for the economist there exists an opportunity cost equalling
the highest salary that the owner could have earned by working elsewhere.
Further, economic costs exclude transfer payments such taxes and subsidies,
since these do not represent any direct claims on the resources of the economy. They
merely represent a transfer of control over the resources from one agent to another
within the economy. For example, when a firm pays taxes to the government these do
not form a part of the economic costs since all that occurs is a transfer of purchasing
power from the firm to the government. However, if the government were to use the
funds so obtained to, say, construct a dam, then these expenditures would constitute
economic costs.
Economic costs also correct for market failures - for e.g., by including
externality costs, which are costs passed onto third parties not involved as producers or
consumers of the good/service in question. In the case of environmental externalities
experienced by the society in question, it is assumed that these externality costs refer to
local, not global impacts. In other words, it is assumed that the national strategy either
ensures that the global emissions profile is such that no global warming impacts are
perceptible, or that all costs of adaptation or damage would be met under other
regulatory arrangements or provisions.
It should be noted that the notion of economic costs includes costs on account
of retraining of personnel, hiring of skilled labour (specialists), royalty payments,
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administrative expenditures, etc., that might have to be undertaken as the result of a
new technology that is brought into place. Additionally, a number of measures -
information dissemination, infrastructure development, etc., - all of which enable and
assist firms to adopt the technology in question, may also be required. For example, in
order to switch from using incandescents to compact fluorescents, the entire power
generation, transmission and distribution system will need to be upgraded so as to
ensure the supply of electricity at a constant voltage. All such costs that represent the
use of resources to facilitate the adoption of the new technology are a part of economic
costs.
Techniques for computation of the elements of economic costs (and benefits) are
detailed in several standard texts on cost-benefit analysis, and will not be repeated in
this paper. What we attempt in this paper, assuming that individual elements of costs
and benefits (including those of local environmental impacts) can be computed, is the
following:
First, we furnish a definition of 'minimal incremental costs' of an abatement
alternative which policy makers would generally agree on as representing the least
economic costs involved. Second, we develop the specifications of a general LP (Linear
Programming) model to compute the cost thus defined, over a national abatement
program for a specified time-period under alternative regulatory assumptions.
Possible formulations of a national strategy to limit GHG
emissions
A national strategy to limit GHG emissions may, in our judgement, take one of two
forms. One, it may specify for each country (or category of countries) a path of future
aggregate GHG emissions over time. Alternatively, it may specify (perhaps for each
defined sector, say steel making, in given categories of countries or each country) a
time path of GHG intensities of output (i.9., tonnes of GHGs emitted per tonne of steel
produced). These are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
The shapes of the time paths depicted in each case may be explained as follows.
in the case of DCs, it is unlikely that any national strategy in the foreseeable future
would provide for actual reductions in GHG emissions. However, the adoption of
benign technologies would, over time, tend to reduce the growth rates of GHG
emissions, and at some time in the future, the aggregate GHG emissions may stabilize.
On the other hand, in the absence of such a strategy, GHG emissions growth rates may
be unchanged, or increase, as the economy grows and undergoes structural change
biased towards energy intensive sectors. Figure 1 is thus explained.
Further, increasing use of benign technologies in the economy generally, and
particularly in energy intensive sectors, would reduce the GHG intensity over time.
Even in the absence of a national strategy, GHG intensity may also be expected to fall
with time because of autonomous technological change, which may induce energy
efficiency. These considerations help explain Figure 2.
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Figure 1. Timepath of GHGs emissions in an economy
Figure 2. Time path of GHGs intensity in an economy
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Costs and benefits of a given project
In this section we briefly review how net economic benefits of a given project are
computed.
Figure 3 depicts a typical project profile of costs and benefits. Each project is
associated with a stream of benefits and costs over time. However, these values are not
strictly comparable since agents (individual, firm, society) typically have a positive time
preference, i.e., they prefer to reap benefits earlier and pay costs later. Discounting
reduces these values to a common denominator i.e., the present value of a stream of
benefits (costs) over time. The discount rate used is the social (rather than the private)
discount rate since we are considering the problem from the viewpoint of the policy
analyst)1. The perspective is detenninistic, i.e., no uncertainty attaches to any element
of costs or benefits associated with the known (set of) technologies. Net economic
benefits or net present value (NPV)2 is computed as the sum of each year's benefits
less costs, discounted by the discount factor. Mathematically.
T B-CNPV=E t
:o (1+S)t
where:
B: Benefits at time t
C : Costs at time t
S : Social discount rate.
'I"
ususfiss SI SsSSsI.sflIss pl.IsSsd
(1)
Cps,SI & aádsbsu,,.
Figure 3. Profile of costs and benflts of a
typical project
'Note that the social discount rate represents a societal choice, i.e., the respective weights attached to
identical benefits (costs) occurring at different times. Techniques for computing social discount rates are also
elaborated in the cost-benefit literature. They are some what contiversial, but we do not go into these
aspects in the present paper.
2The NPV is the criteria of ranking alternative projects on the basis of the respective gains in economic
efficiency that they yield.
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Costs and benefits of an 'interrupted' project
An abatement program may involve the interruption of an existing plant before its
'normal'3 economic life is over, and its replacement by another plant embodying a
(more) GHG benign technique. We explain below how the net benefits over the
remaining normal economic life of the existing project are to be computed. Figure 4
graphically depicts the costs and benefits of project interruption.
B.nflt (S)
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Figure 4. Computing foregone costs and benefits of project
interruption
The project commenced at t = 0, and its lifetime (without interruption) would be
till t = T. However, it is interrupted at t = t' and decommissioned, over the period t
to t"
All 'past' benefits and costs of the project (i.e., in the period t = 0 to t') are
considered 'sunk', and the foregone costs and benefits are reckoned over the period t'
to T. The 'net foregone benefits' (NFB) at t' is accordingly the discounted value of all
costs and benefits foregone by the interruption, less the net costs of the
decommissioning operation, where all streams are discounted to the point of
decommissioning. Mathematically:
tT DNFBt1=E
-E (2)
tt' (1 +S)(t_t t=t' (1 +s)(t_C
where D is the net costs of decommissioning (i.e., inclusive of any scrap value).
'Normal' in the sense tf in the absence of a GHG abatement program.
time
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Definition of 'minimal incremental cost of
an abatement option'
We now employ the concepts developed above to define MIC (Minimal Incremental
Costs) of an abatement option involving the interruption of an existing plant and its
replacement by another (GHG benign) technique. The situation is depicted in Figure 5
(where the phasing of costs and benefits of the replacement plant are illustrated, not
those of the existing plant).
The existing plant is termed A; and the replacement plant B. Both plants are
assumed in this definition to yield the same level of service (e.g., MW of electricity).
The NFB of the existing project A, which is interrupted at t = t' when the
replacement project B goes on stream so that there is no interruption of service, is
NFBA computed as explained in the previous section. Discounting this value to t, the
point of time when investments in the replacement project B commence, we arrive at
the NFB of project A at time t as:
NFBAtNFBt -.
'A (3)
The NPV of project B at t t may be computed as described above (by using
equation (1)). We now define the 'minimal incremental cost of switching from A to B
at time as the difference between the net foregone benefits of the existing project A
and the net present value of the replacement project B, both reckoned at the time when
investment in the replacement project commences. That is:
MICj = [NFBJ - NPV] (4)
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Figure 5. Costs and benefits of a replacement
project
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From project level to program minimal incremental costs
An abatement program under a national strategy to limit GHG emissions will, in the
case of a diversified economy, involve a large number of options. While one may work
out the MICs of particular abatement options, an important policy question is how to
choose a least cost set of abatement options over a planning period, given two types of
constraints. First, the economy should adhere, in each period, to the GHG (emissions or
intensities) path specified under the national strategy. Second, that capacity in each
sector of the economy at the following period is known or determined exogenously in
the current period.
A detailed LP (Linear Programming) model is set out in the Appendix to both
define and determine the minimal incremental costs of such a program. The main
features of the model are briefly explained below.
The policy objective is assumed to be the minimization of the total economic
costs of adhering to the abatement path at each planning period4. This is in keeping
with the provisions of the Convention that any abatement measures undertaken by the
DCs are contingent upon the transfer of finances (and technology) from the ICs.
The planning horizon is one period, since it is assumed that future capacities in
each sector are known only up to one period in advance. Additionally, the set of
available techniques is fixed only for one period in the future. The economy adheres to
the specification of GHG emissions (or intensities) at the beginning and end of the
period. There is a (large) discrete set of techniques, which may be embodied in current
and future plans. An abatement option consists of a switch from an existing plant to
another employing a (more) GHG benign technique. However, the set of pairs of such
technique switches are restricted to those in the same sector. For example, an electric
thermal power plant may be replaced by another electric power plant employing a more
GHG benign technique, but not by say, an aluminium smelter.
Apart from switches in technique involving the same levels of service, the
economy may make fresh investments (retirements) in each technique, in keeping with
its growth/economic structure objectives, detailed in the set of sectoral capacities at the
next period.
Minimal incremental costs are involved in each abatement technique, and there
are net benefits (net foregone benefits) in each case of fresh investment (retirement).
Expressed as costs (i.e. net benefits are negative costs), these are aggregated into the
total costs of the abatement program.5 A LP model is then specified, minimizing these
total costs, subject to the sectoral capacities and the GHG emissions (intensities)
stipulated in the national strategy in the next period in each case.
A numerical solution of this LP model may be obtained by standard algorithms
(e.g., the Simplex or Karmarkar methods). The solution will furnish the 'optimal' levels
of switches of pairs of techniques, as well as the set of fresh investments (retirement) in
One may suppose as an alternative, that the policy objective could be to minimize the sum of the
minimal incremental costs of individual options. As a planning objective for DCs this is implausible because
it would not ensure that the total costs of remaining on the specified abatement path, given the society'.s
growth objectives, are also minimized.
Where negative costs (net benefits) are involved in a particular abatement option these are excluded
from reckoning of total costs on the assumption that these options may be adopted anyway, i.e., even in the
absence of a national strategy.
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each technique for each period. These elements of the solution may be employed to
determine the 'minimal'6 incremental cost of the abatement program in each period.
Concluding comment
The present exercise is a very limited one. The definitions of 'minimal incremental
costs' at both the project and program levels are rather restrictive, and are aimed at
locating a datum of incremental costs which, perhaps, all analysts may agree upon as
representing the minimum direct economic costs involved.
Any actual abatement option or program will doubtless involve other direct and
indirect costs. For example, society at large bears economic costs in the form of
welfare changes such as those due to relative price changes, changes in income
distribution, resource allocation, etc. Our definition of incremental costs does not
include these and other costs, such as those due to inflation, changes in the balance of
payments situation, that arise out of the macro-economic ramifications of a strategy to
limit GHG emissions. Such macroeconomic effects may be difficult to apportion
between the abatement and growth/structural change components of the overall
program. A major research challenge for the near future is to develop appropriate
notions of incremental costs which take account of these elements.
6 'Minimal' i the sense that these are the incremental costs associated with the minimum of the total
costs as determined by the LP. Moreover, they are determined on the basis of the MIC associated with each
switch from technique ito j.
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Appendix
In this appendix we give the detailed mathematical structure of the LP model for
computing the minimal incremental costs of an abatement program which ensures that the
economy remains on the strategy mandated emissions path and at the same time does not
jeopardise its growth objective.
The elements of the LP model are
A discrete set of techniques
{i} = {l,2, ,N}
A discrete set of time periods
{t} = {l,2,t, ,T}
GHG intensity of each technique (GHGs emitted per unit of capacity, however
defined e.g., MW of electricity) g1, and without loss of generality g1 > g11 for all
i ; i.e., the more benign techniques are numbered higher in the series and go;
i.e. techniques may be sources, sinks, or zero net emitters of GHGs.
Capacity installed in each technique at time t:
Q, for all i
Specific cost of a given change in technique at time t:
M1C (Al)
where MIC1t is the minimal incremental cost of a change in technique from i to j
at time t (see main text).
The specific costs may be illustrated as shown in Figure 6.
/1
n(n-1)
-2
Figure 6
LG
_JI.1.
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where:
(g1-g1)Q: (A2)
i.e., the abatement potential of the change in technique i to j at time t, and
= i4; (i} = {ixf\l} (A3)
without loss of generality,
IL; <
An allowable set of technique changes:
{hxk}c(ixj} (A4)
h > k, i > j
The definition of an allowable set may be such as to allow only changes in
technique within given sectors. Additionally, the allOwable set may exclude
abatement options which are repugnant to other policy considerations.
Time paths formulated under the national strategy, which may be, either
Target GHG intensity of the economy:
(45)
or
Target aggregate emissions
=1g1Q (A6)
Model
The starting model assumption is that the strategy mandated path is adhered to at the
current period t. The LP model calculates the minimal costs of a program to ensure that
the economy remains on the mandated path at time t + 1, given the economy's growth
objectives. These are specified as capacity levels in each sector at time t + 1. The planning
objective (by assumption) is that the policy maker minimizes the net costs (maximizes net
benefits) of the transition along the mandated path for each period.
Suppose the economy at t moves to t + 1, along the mandated path. Then the
change in capacity of each technique j, is given by:
(A7)
K) kJ
where: q' is the aggregate of switches to j from less benign techniques;
X is the aggregate of switches from j to more benign techniques; and
is the new capacity (retirement) in j at t
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The incremental program cost is then given by
IPC
= E a4q
KJ
(A8)
kJ
where a, etc., is a logic driven parameter, such that
a1t = 1 if > o,
= o otherwise
This definition of IPCt includes the net costs of only those switches which
have positive net cost.
Now, let C' be the specific net cost (positive net benefit) of new capacity
in j, and the specific net cost (positive net benefit) of retirement of j, at tin each
case. The total cost of the program is then given by
TCt
= + aqj) +
J KJ k>J
fcjkjt + h,rk,] (A9)
where t, h, are logic driven parameters
ft = 1 if k>
= o otherwise
kt=ojfkt>o
= 1 otherwise.
(The total program cost nets out the net costs of technique switches having positive
net benefits)
The growth constraints may be written as
E[Q,'AQ]1 (AlO)
JES
The right hand side is an exogenous specification of capacity in sector s, {s = 1,
2,--, n }, where s represents different sectors of the economy.
The policy problem is then written as
Minimize TCt
qt, qt, kt
subject to
E
J63
Either
'-.' 1+1 -
-
£
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(aggregate GHG constraint by national strategy),
or -T t+1
-
(economy's GHG intensity constraint by national strategy).
(3) {hxk} ç {ixj}
(only allowable set of technique changes may be considered).
The LP solution will yield the following sets: (qt}, {q}, { k I. The first two will
enable the computation of the least cost IPCt, using equation (A8) given above.
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Technology transfer in the context of global
environmental issues
Amrita N Achanta and Prodipto Ghosh
Tata Energy Research Institute, New Dethi, India
'The following discussion borrows from Besen and Raskind (1991).
Introduction
Multilateral regulation of the global environment sought to be accomplished through
Conventions and Protocols (for example, the Conventions on Climate Change and
Biodiversity adopted at Rio in June 1992, and the earlier Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1990), involves two broad classes of
technology transfer issues for DCs (Developing Countries). First, technology transfers
are essential in order that DCs may meet their differentiated responsibilities (not
necessarily mandatory) in abating environmental damage. For example, a less GHGs
(Greenhouse Gases) intensive growth path in the case of India and China may involve
switches from Conventional Pulverized Coal Thermal Power technologies to more
energy efficient or 'advanced' Coal Power technologies. Research and Development in
respect of the latter have, for the most part, been carried out in ICs (Industrialized
Countries), whose firms accordingly own the relevant IPRs (Intellectual Property
Rights). Technology transfer from the owners to the relevant agents in DCs will be
necessary, and the important questions here relate to the terms, depth of, who pays for,
and how much, for such transfers. Second, most clearly in the case of biodiversity
conservation, environmental protection (and perhaps traditional knowledge) will furnish
important positive externalities to the process of technology generation (e.g.
phannaceutical products, agricultural crops) and the question is how to enable DCs to
realize payments for these external benefits to technology producers. This issue is
distinct from the question of paying the opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation.
Each of these broad issues is spiked at the core with considerations of equity between
nations, and across generations. However, this paper is not primarily an exploration of
such equity issues.
In the next section we look briefly at the theoretical under-pinnings of IPRs,
including a brief restatement of DCs perspectives.
Theoretical basis of IPRs'
The standard justification for grant of property rights over intellectual property is that
such rights furnish incentives for creative work. Further, such rights are sought to be
fine-tuned so that the incentives maximize the difference between the value of the
resulting intellectual property and the social cost of its creation, including administra-
tion and transactions costs. In other words, the specifics of IPRs regimes are designed
to realize economic efficiency. Some further questions are involved:
First, IPRs regimes are premised on the belief that prospective financial returns
in fact drive private creators of intellectual property. In other words, that such private
creators will have sufficient incentives only if they have the ability to capture at least
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some of the value that users place on such property: If they are unable to do so, the
amount of innovative activity may be inefficient.
Second, there is the issue of whether innovative activity takes place at least
social cost. This may depend upon the extent to which creators may borrow ideas or
concepts from earlier work. For example, rights to 'derivative work' are typically
vested in the authors under copyright law, resulting in increased costs to subsequent
authors.
Third, somewhat related to the second issue, is whether the IPRs regime
maintains a proper balance between creating and disseminating intellectual property. A
particular incentive structure may result in resources being assigned to the creation of
many new works. If however, these innovations are not widely used, the net societal
benefits may be less than in the case where fewer resources are employed in creativity,
but the intellectual property created is more widely disseminated. This issue focuses
attention on two important questions on the appropriate scope of protection. One, what
is the optimal duration of IPRs protection, for example in case of patents. Two, what is
the optimal trade-off between the duration and breadth of IPRs protection.
Another way of looking at this issue is in terms of trade-offs between static and
dynamic efficiency. The former would require that innovations resulting from resources
invested by private agents be made widely available to all who are willing to pay the
(low) marginal cost of dissemination. Accordingly, public policy should facilitate the
widespread use of these assets, implying minimal property rights in them. Dynamic
efficiency considerations, on the other hand would suggest that with minimal property
rights, the creators may not recover their initial investment, let alone attain sufficient
returns to motivate them to undertake such chancy activities in the first place.
Accordingly, property rights should be stronger ('exclusive') than would be implied
under static efficiency.
Formally, IPRs are domestic policy instruments, granted by national authorities.
However, since innovations embodied in products (or by themselves) cross borders, the
question of IPRs protection in international transfer is important. On the other hand
countries have differing perspectives on the socially optimal trade-offs between duration
and breadth, and indeed, on what categories of knowledge may be conferred IPRs
protection. The question of harmonization of IPRs laws across countries and transboun-
dary protection are important current issues of international political economy. A brief
account of perspectives of DCs in this debate is furnished below:
Developing country perspectives2
We take as a model of an IPRs regime incorporating typical DCs concerns, the current
Indian IPRs system. This regime diverges from typical ICs, IPRs regimes in three
major aspects:
First, several categories of products and processes are excluded from IPRs
protection. These include horticulture, agriculture, and food processes, and medicinal
and drugs products. The reasons are that a major part of the population depends on
agriculture and horticulture for its livelihood; that the purchasing power of the poor for
food is limited; and because basic health care is scarce.
2 This subsection relies on Nayyar (1992).
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Second, while the system rewards innovators, it is not intended to confer
monopoly rights in manufacture or imports. Accordingly, the regime permits
compulsory licensing for working patents in India.
Third, the regime seeks to promote diffusion of existing technologies and
innovation of technologies which create economic opportunities for a late industrializ-
ing economy. Accordingly, in several sectors (e.g., pharmaceuticals) processes may be
protected while product patents are disallowed, facilitating the wider use of the products
as well as local R & D in alternative manufacturing processes.
These features of the Indian IPRs regime, are at bottom, expressions of equity
and (technological) development concerns. Equity within the society is sought to be
realized by focusing on the need to enhance entitlements to basic needs by the poor,
particularly in respect of livelihood, food and medicine. This is attempted to be
accomplished through the IPRs regime itself, quite apart from any separate overall
policy framework for social welfare. Accordingly, in pursuit of equity, property rights
(in respect of both duration and breadth) for creators is weakened.
The second policy imperative, that of facilitating technology development,
derives from the fact that comparative advantage across countries based on knowledge
requires a policy framework which accelerates knowledge (and skill) acquisition.
Accordingly, this policy objective justifies narrower IPRs protection, besides
exclusions from patentability.
These considerations are sought by DCs to justify differentiated IPRs regimes in
ICs and DCs. DCs scholars have argued that the draft agreement on IPRs at GAIT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) (the 'Dunkel Draft') neglects these concerns,
focusing instead on the interests of ICs. Thus the proposal 'seeks to expand the scope
of the IPRs system, increase the life of privileges granted or rights conferred, extend
the geographical spread where the privileges or rights can be exercised, reduce the
restrictions on the use of rights conferred and, above all, create an enforcement
mechanism with retaliation across sectors '(Nayyar, 1992). More specifically,
exclusions from patentability under the Dunkel draft would be restricted to life-forms,
implying that exclusions on product patents would be disallowed. Further, the burden of
proof in suits for violation would be reversed with the onus on the alleged infringer. In
addition, compulsory licensing would be severely restricted, and imports deemed as
working the IPRs. The period of protection would be extended (from 14 years currently
in India) to 20 years. These are important deviations from, for example, current Indian
patent law. Serious consequences are prognosticated: Essential technologies may
become unaffordable; the emergence of domestic technological capacity may be
stymied; transfers of technology may be retarded; and restrictive business practices by
TNCs (Transnational Corporations) may increase. These impacts would accentuate
inequalities between ICs and DCs.
Some other scholars (Sengupta, 1991), on the other band, have argued that
strengthening IPRs protection in DCs (albeit not on the lines of the Dunkel draft) would
ensure continued FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). This is because of a perception in
the international business community that investing in countries with weak IPRs
protection is risky. Empirically however it has been noted that the laws governing
foreign investment and technology transfer, as well as the general industrial
environment, play a greater role in determining investment and technology flows than
IPRs protection levels (Sengupta, 1991). Accordingly strengthening JPRs protection
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may neither adversely affect developmental concerns, nor necessarily attract foreign
investment and technology flows.
In the next two sections, we present descriptive accounts of some key IPRs
instruments, as well as modes of technology transfer.
Principal types of IPRs
The two principal types of intellectual property, relevant for technology transfer in the
global environmental policy context are 'patents' and 'trade secrets'.
Patents
A patent may be granted by designated public authorities in a country on 'any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, improvement and plant as
well as to new, original and incremental design for an article of manufacture' (Chisum,
1989). In India, patents are granted under the Indian Patent Act 1970, which was based
on the report of the Tek Chandllyengar Commission. There are important departures in
the Indian statute from typical patent laws in ICs, relating largely to duration, and
patentability, i.e., exactly what kinds of innovations may be patented. These differences
are discussed above.
What exactly are the property rights conferred on a patent holder? In exchange
for disclosure of the subject matter of the innovation to the public (which would
include actual and potential rivals), the patent holder (patentee) is enabled to exclude all
others from making, selling, or using the subject matter of the patent for a specified
period. During this term, any use of the subject matter of the patent requires permission
of the patentee, usually by means of a license involving royalty payments. The patentee
can even prevent an independent subsequent inventor of the same subject matter from
making, using or selling it. At the end of the period of protection, the subject matter
enters the public domain, i.e., all property rights cease.
Many questions about patents are still widely debated. There is little agreement.
among economists on the impact of patent protection on the growth of technology
(Kitch, 1986), or on the optimal (dynamically efficient) duration of patents (McFetridge
and Rafiquzzaman, 1986). Further, the evidence on whether patents have helped
cartelization is inconclusive (Hall, 1986).
Patents are frequently the subject of court proceedings, often by suits by
patentees alleging infringethent. Courts may interpret the patent claim literally, or
infringement may be found if there is a 'substantial, functional identify between the
patent claims and the contested item' (Besen and Raskind, 1991) i.e., the 'doctrine of
equivalents'. In fact, one important legal issue is whether a patent effectively covers
more than the literal disclosure in the patent application, or also includes the
prospective technology that follows.
Four principal lines of defence are open to alleged infringers. The grant of the
patent may itself be challenged as, first lacking the requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness. Second, fraudulence by the patentee may be alleged by misrepresenting
the prior art in the patent application. Third, a patent is invalid if it was patented
elsewhere or described in a printed publication. Finally, the 'doctrine of misuse' relates
to the use of a patent beyond its statutory scope. For example, if the license involves a
tying arrangement, i.e., the licensee must purchase another product from the patentee.
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Trade secrets
Trade secrets are specific commercial information. One definition (U S Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 1979) is 'information including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy'.
Trade secrets are thus, by definition and unlike patents, not disclosed. Trade
secret law only protects such information from 'improper' disclosure, but not against
independent discovery or by reverse engineering (e.g., determining the chemical
formula of a pharmaceutical product through chemical analysis). The incentive to create
intellectual property protectible as trade secrets derives from their potential value. Trade
secrets also differ from patents in respect of subject matter and duration of protection.
'While innovation or novelty is required of the subject matter for patent protection,
commercial value is the sole criterion for protection as a trade secret. Moreover, the
duration of trade secret protection is indefinite, limited only by the accident of
independent discovery (or improper disclosure).
'Improper' disclosure requires a breach of duty by an employee (with access to
the trade secret) to maintain secrecy. In addition, the improper act includes theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, commercial espionage; in fact anything that would count as
wrongful conduct even outside trade secret law. Relief against improper disclosure
includes injunctions and damages.
Clearly, many categories of inventions may be eligible for protection under
either patents or trade secrets law (but obviously not both). Although trade secrets law
offers lesser protection, because filing a patent application involves heavy transactions
costs, while the costs of preventing disclosure of a trade secret may be less, a trade
secret is often the preferred course. In addition, the disclosure required of patent
applications may convey sufficient useful information to potential rivals engaged in a
race for related or for the next generation of innovations, and this may lead innovators
to prefer trade secrets protection.
Modes of technology transfer
Technology transfer may be involved both in respect of abatement or conservation
activities by DCs, as well as in realizing the rewards of granting access to
environmental (e.g., genetic) resources. Technology transfer is defined as the process by
which technology, knowledge and/or information developed in an organization, in a
given area, or for a particular purpose, is applied and utilised in a different setting or
context
Bell (1990) distinguishes categories of transferrable technology and has
identified them as three flows:
Flow A: Capital goods, services and design specifications
Technology here refers to hardware or machinery and equipment, which
is acquired and brought into operational use during investment projects. Other
technological and managerial services included in investment projects cover
execution of planning and feasibility studies, types of design engineering,
project management services, etc.
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The flow of capital goods and services add to the transferee's production
capacity, or in the case of equipment designs, provide domestic capital goods
producers with specifications for setting up similar facilities.
Flow B. Skills and know-how for production
Included in most technology transfer agreements is the flow of know-how
required to operate and maintain new or improved production facilities. There
are two main components in this flow:
'Paper embodied technology': in the form of manuals, schedules, flow
charts, including operating procedures, maintenance and repair
procedures, routine quality control, and possibly procedures for
marketing outputs and purchasing inputs.
'People embodied technology': refers to knowledge and expertise
required to carry out procedures, which in turn includes training of
individuals in requisite skills, or in dealing with situations not covered
in manuals and routines. This flow (which includes know-how and
expertise) also adds to the production capabilities of the transferee.
Although Flow A and Flow B add to the production capacity of the
transferee, they do not contribute substantially to his 'technological capacity'.
Neither do the transfer of capital goods or of know-how (which aid in
production) add to the expertise and experience required to change, adapt and
develop the product or process in the future. The prospects of subsequent
improvements are neglected in Flow A or Flow B.
Flow C: Knowledge and expertise for generating and managing
technical change (Know-why)
Like Flow B, it also consists mainly of information and people
embodied knowledge and expertise. It differs from Flow B, in that it is
concerned with changing technical systems. There is obviously some overlap
between Flow B and Flow C.
The depth of knowledge and information about the technology in Flow C
would be greater than that required for routine operation and maintenance. The
other (and crucial) component is the expertise required to undertake various
engineering design studies, or the evaluation of alternative plans and designs, or
the incorporation of technology in improved production systems. Through this
flow, continuous technical change could be realized in existing production
facilities.
The transfer of technology can occur from a supplier to a recipient by
various mechanisms. The modes of technology transfer may be classified as
commercial or non-commercial. Commercial transfers are contracted primarily
through markets, and non commercial transfers occur primarily through non-
market institutions.
The principal commercial methods of transfer are:
Direct foreign investment in a host country subsidiary or a joint venture
Licensing of intellectual property rights, usually on royalty payments
Technical assistance
Sale, importation, installation, and servicing of machinery and other
capital goods; and
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Franchising of consumer goods and services
Some of the non-commercial methods of technology transfer are:
Advisory groups
Personnel exchanges
Information dissemination
Education
It must be noted though that successful transfers are usually a
combination of severail(all) of these mechanisms. The effectiveness of transfer
is a function of the stage of technological development, characteristics of end
users, its potential for absorption within the recipient country, besides other
factors. Two principal commercial modes of technology transfer are discussed
below in more detail.
Foreign Direct Investment
Technology transfer is often a component of foreign direct investment (FDI), although
each may also stand alone. The flow of technology to DCs has frequently constituted a
part of foreign direct investment, typically by large TNCs (Transnational Corporations).
Technology transfers between affiliates constitute a significant share of such
transactions. Transfers involving the parent firm and their branches, or wholly (or
majority) owned subsidiaries are usually done informally, and do not include formal
agreement(s). In contrast, when the foreign investment is a joint venture where the
local partner is a majority owner, then a formal agreement/license is typically
negotiated between the technology supplier and the recipient.
The mechanism of transfer through foreign direct investment may appeal to the
supplier because he retains control and earns dividends rather than royalties. Control of
the local enterprise is often comprehensive: management, operation and marketing,
quality control of products. This facilitates control of the technology itself as a trade
secret rather than submitting to the disclosure required by patents.
From the viewpoint of the recipient, foreign investment brings in capital in the
form of foreign exchange, and the security of the foreign partner's long-term
commitment. However, local innovative improvement of the imported technology may
be thwarted by the supplier quite deliberately.
Licensing of intellectual property rights
Technology transfer can occur independently of foreign direct investment by means
such as intellectual property licenses.
A patent license transfers to the licensee several of the exclusive rights of the
patent. The license is usually obtained by the payment of lump-sum fees or royalty,
although other commercial arrangements are also possible.
Such an agreement enables a foreign licenser, unwilling to risk his capital in a
developing country, or uncertain of a project's profitability, or unable to invest in
unfamiliar conditions, to benefit from his intellectual property holding. In countries
where foreign investment is regulated and local entrepreneurship is strong, technology
licensing is increasingly used. Similarly where host country foreign investment laws
are restrictive, either in the form of prohibition of foreign equity participation in
certain sectors of the economy, or legislation requiring a phased 'fade-out' of foreign
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ownership in local subsidiaries/joint ventures, it encourages TNCs interested in
penetrating these markets to opt for licensing agreements in place of foreign
investment. This has been the typical experience in India till recently.
Licensing is also convenient in that it is for a finite duration. From the
recipient's point of view, licensing leaves him free of control and interference. The
recipient may also benefit from interaction with his own government in ensuring that
the agreement is equitable. However, government interference may also result in
restrictive licensing arrangements, which may not be perceived by the licensee as in his
interest.
Role of Government in technology transfer
The role of the government in facilitating transfers of technology should not be
underestimated. It is responsible for the economic framework of the recipient country, a
factor which would influence investment decisions of TNCs. The signals government
gives to industry may discourage or encourage R & D as well as influence modes and
depth of technology transfer. Governments are also heavily involved in funding or
organizing R & D. In India 80% of scientific R & D is in the public sector, a situation
similar to that in France. In the US, Government funding accounts for 50% of the total
R & D investments. Further, governments are heavily involved in setting up the IPRs
framework, as well as in negotiating the international IPRs regimes.
India had earlier followed a development path of import substitution, and in an
effort to substitute imported technologies, indigenous technological capacity was
encouraged by a restrictive regime of technology imports. No significant relationship
between protection and degree of innovation has however been observed (Sengupta
1991). Recent policy changes have significantly liberalized technology imports.
IPRs regimes may impact the BOP (Balance of Payment) situations of countries
in several ways. First, a strengthening of IPRs may mean that transferees would have to
pay increased royalties in foreign exchange. On the other hand a loss of IPRs earnings
due to weak IPRs protection in transferees' countries could worsen a trade deficit. For
example, it is claimed that the US loses 60 billion dollars a year due to IPRs
'violations' in other countries.
Government policy also affects technology transfer through regulation of
foreign direct investment, in terms of restriction on import of capital goods, and control
of technology licensing. For example, India had earlier insisted on a majority
domestic equity share of at least 51%. If however, the transferred technology was
closely held, or if the industry was a designated priority industry, or if the industry
had a dominant export commitment, the foreign share could go upto 74%.
Appropriate technology
The technologies under consideration for transfer should be 'appropriate' from the
viewpoint of the recipient country. Some of the considerations determining whether a
technology is appropriate are first, that it conforms to the development goals of the
recipient country, second that it harmonizes with its resource endowments, and third
that the conditions under which the transfer occurs relate to its circumstances.
Developmental goals may relate to promotion of self reliance, removal of
inequalities in income, increasing employment opportunities, etc. Resource endowments
relate to availability of natural resources, manpower, managerial skills, etc. The
prevailing conditions include the existing infrastructure, markets, and other institutional
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structures. Appropriate technologies in this context may include those that are labour
intensive, use local materials, are not capital intensive and may be operated on small
scales.
Context of global environmental Agreements
In this section, we discuss technology transfer issues with particular reference to the
Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity Conservation.
The Climate Change Convention commits DCs to three specific actions:
(a) To formulate and implement publicly notified plans for abatement and
adaptation.
(c) Take action to minimize any adverse effects of abatement or adaptation
measures on the economy, public health and the environment.
(c) Additionally, DCs may submit specific abatement (reduction of GHGs), projects
for funding.
In these the DCs are entitled to financial resources, outside of normal
developmental assistance, including for transfer of technology. The quantum of
assistance is described as the 'agreed full incremental costs'. If such assistance is not
forthcoming, DCs have no commitments.
Technology transfer is thus visualized in respect of both abatement and
adaptation measures, and to ensure that any harmful impacts of the measures
themselves are minimized. No concessional or non-commercial terms of technology
transfer are envisaged; only that the financial component (in the terminology
employed) shall qualify as grant. Further, no attenuation of IPRs protection of the
technologies are contemplated.
Similarly, the Biodiversity Convention requires all countries, including DCs, to
formulate national strategies for conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources,
integration of conservation concerns in policy making; establishment of protected areas
etc., to conserve biodiversity; domestic legislation for conservation, and finally,
promoting public awareness of biodiversity conservation. The implementation of these
commitments by DCs is, again, contingent on the developed countries meeting their
own (further) commitments relating to transfer of technology and 'new and additional'
financial resources for meeting the 'agreed full incremental costs' of such measures.
The question of what exactly would count as full incremental costs in the context of
technology transfer is obviously important.
'Technology transfer and full incremental costs'
We have noted above that commercial technology transfers may occur in a dense set of
modes and their combinations, from foreign direct investment protected by trade
secrets, to transfer olin-depth R & D capability ('Flow C') under patent licenses on the
other. One issue in defining 'full incremental costs' is what is the 'depth' (in multiple
attributes) whose licensee fees would be covered by multilateral transfers to DCs
through the concerned FMS (Financial Mechanisms). ICs may be expected to support
transfers through 'Flow A' regimes and/or by FDI, while simultaneously pressing for
liberalized FDI regimes in GA1' (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade), as well as
bilaterally. DCs views may be more varied, with countries like China and India perhaps
perceiving advantage in 'Flow C' types of transfers, and the use of FDI being a choice
variable for national authorities, rather than the IPRs holders. Rents for IPRs licenses
will depend on the precise attributes of the license, i.e., depth of technology transfer.
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Clearly, what types of technologies, and what depths of technology transfer
would qualify for concessional funding, are important areas of future negotiations.
Some of the strategic bargaining aspects of these negotiations are as follows:
In negotiating technology transfer norms, ICs may argue (and calculate) that
since 'no regret' measures are in themselves of net advantage to DCs, they should
(may) adopt them anyway, without any external concessional funding for in-depth
transfer of such technologies under the provisions of the Conventions.
One argument that DCs may advance involves the concept of an 'investment
hurdle' or 'capital-gap'. Several no-regrets strategies are typically not adopted on a
wider scale because their up-front capital costs are higher than competing technologies,
even though the no-regrets strategies are more (economically) efficient. The classic
example in this respect is hydro-versus-thermal power; capital shortage typically leads
to relative under-investment by DCs in the former, even though it is more efficient.
DCs may urge that the 'capital gap' involved in such no-regret strategies be met by
grant funding, because the major decision criterion for investments in their case is
initial capital costs rather than (relative) economic efficiencies of alternatives.
Where technology transfer is involved, funding this capital gap may involve
royalty payments for in-depth technology transfer, instead of, or in addition to, purchase
of capital equipment. This would, however, require the adoption of non-restrictive
norms for technology transfers.
Accordingly, another possible stratagem for DCs is to delink questions of depth
of technology transfer from whether the options are 'no-regret', or involve positive
(economic) costs, i.e., the norms should apply to both categories identically. What
would be the advantage to DCs? Many of the important abatement measures (i.e., in
terms of scope for GHGs reductions or conservation measures for biodiversity) may, in
fact, be in the latter category (e.g., switch to natural gas based power generation from
coal based power generation from coal based generation). If ICs perceive that it is in
their interest to persuade DCs to adopt these, they would need to concede grant funding
at sufficient levels that the DCs are at least indifferent between these and the
Conventional options. If DCs further insist that norms for depth of technology transfer
are not restrictive, (including restricted to positive cost options), enabling them to
utilize such funding for technology transfer in depth, they may still be on strong
negotiating ground. The application of such non-restrictive norms to no-regrets
strategies may enable DCs to employ capital gap funding for in-depth technology
transfers in such cases also.
The problem of strategic bargaining to realize these and other advantages is
complex. DCs are as a group, more heterogenous, including in their economic interests,
than ICs. Further, they are susceptible in different degrees to bilateral inducements and
pressures from powerful ICs. On the other hand, a few key DCs have the potential to
collectively alter global emissions patterns significantly in a few decades, giving their
possible coalition considerable synergy. Strategic bargaining aspects of these, questions,
thus need to be addressed carefully.
One possible response to the question of norms for technology transfer is for the
FM (Financial Mechanism) to purchase the IPRs for a set of abatement (conservation)
technologies outright, and place these in the public domain. In that case, any country
wishing to employ these technologies may do so at any depth; without it (or the FM)
paying any further licensee fees.
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Would such alternative arrangements be preferable for DCs? To answer this
point, one may note that the universe of possible benign technologies is extremely
large. Any selection must be of a far smaller set, because of limited financial resources
with the FM. Since the technologies must be voluntarily placed on offer, and the
potential recipients also involved in making the choice, the question arises as to
whether or not one may expect outcomes in which the most efficient (or 'state of the
art') technologies would enter the public domain. The vendors would have complete
information about their own technologies, while the recipients would be unable to
acquire such information, till the technologies are actually disseminated. A variant of
the 'market for lemons' phenomenon, well known in the economics literature may
therefore emerge. That is, because of information asymmetry, only the worst of the
benign technologies (which are still improvements over current practice) would be
actually transferred. By this means, DCs would be able to choose only from a small set
or be saddled with inferior technologies. Further, since the performance of any given
technology is highly context specific, and the situations of DCs are extremely varied,
there would be little assurance that a particular technology would perform as advertised
in a given DC situation.
The 'market for lemons' may, of course, also arise in the alternative case of
individual DCs identifying benign technologies and the associated depth of transfers. hi
this case, however, the choice would be from a larger set, and DCs may be better able
to relate technologies to their own circumstances. The greater freedom of choice may
be of advantage to DCs.
Technology transfer and the contractive framework of the Biodiversity
Convention
Another set of technology transfer issues are also at the heart of the BDC (Biodiversity
Convention). At its core, this Convention attempts to set up a framework by which
access to genetic resources are granted (typically by DCs to ICs) in exchange for
transfer of the technology embodying the genetic resource. Because it is physically
impossible to deny access to the genetic pool conserved3, the framework stipulates (in
the official Indian interpretation) that disclosure of the fact of use of particular genetic
resources shall be made. The parties shall conduct the exchange on 'mutually agreed
terms', meaning commercial contractual agreements involving royalty payments.
In this case, since what exactly comprises 'technology transfer' remains
undefined, ICs may endeavour to place the least restrictive interpretation of the term.
Apart from depth of transfer, since sharing of IPRs rents are envisaged, questions about
duration of transfer and geographical limits over which the licensed (transferred) rights
may be exercised are important.
Serious legal issues are raised by the apparent requirement of compulsory
disclosure of the source of genetic resources employed, and transferring the 'make or
license' discretion from the IPR holder to the gene supplier. For one, trade secrets
protection may no longer be available. For another, patent protection may significantly
lose its exclusionary power. Further, the effectiveness of the new regime hinges
critically on exactly what penaltiesfollow in the event of non-disclosure. If the
penalties are non existent or not severe, the regime would be ineffective.
in-situ conditions
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It seems that the stipulation of mandatory technology transfer in the framework
for contracts confers little negotiating advantage to DCs. The reasons for this, briefly,
are as follows:
There will be a clear asymmetry of information between the gene supplier and
the agent developing the biotechnology, nowithstanding the fact that supply of genetic
resources is to be with the 'prior informed consent' of the supplier. The latter would, at
the time of negotiations, have already completed a significant amount of research, knøw
fairly well what it was looking for, and benefitting from the provisions of the BDC
facilitating mapping and organization of genetic information, a reasonably good idea of
the chances of finding it. The developing country negotiators in such contracts would
have lesser information, since much of it would be a proprietry to the potential user,
and would therefore have little idea of the true value of the resource.
Second, is the question whether the requirement of (compulsory) transfer of
technology enhances the bargaining strength of DCs. As noted above technology
transfer may occur in several varying depths. The Convention is silent on this aspects.
Suppose that disclosure of use of genetic resource is, in fact, effectively
mandated. In that case, biotechnology innovators must negotiate with the gene supplier
regarding sidepayments and depth of technology transfer, in return for access to the
gene pooi. The gene supplier may be prepared to trade-off reduced depth for increased
sidepayments, but would start with the disadvantage of not knowing the gene pool's
true worth. It would therefore, very likely make trade-offs along an indifference contour
which at every point is below that which would be the case if it had full information.
The latter, on the other hand, having revealed less than the gene pool's true worth,
would also prefer to trade-off reduced depth for increased sidepayments, within the
disclosed valuation of the resource, since at least part of the negotiated sidepayments
may be paid by the multilateral fund. If the administrators of the fund do not intervene,
the likely result is only nominal technology transfer and low level of sidepayments.
However, the administrators of the fund may seek to eliminate such free rides
on its finances by the gene users. Accordingly, they may attempt to negotiate norms
both for sidepayments, as well as depth of transfer (which, as pointed out above, may
also be an issue in defining incremental costs). In this, developed countries Would
collectively reveal less than their true valuations for access to genetic resoirces, and
may also attempt to protect gene users' rights by proposing restrictive norms for depth
of technology transfer. Since DCs would not know the true valuation of the resource,
and collectively have little taste for increasing depth at the expense of sidepayments on
offer, the process of evolving norms may only tend to freeze the earlier outcomes.
Further, even if such norms do not emerge and all sidepayments are directly
paid by gene users, since rents from can be captured equally by sale of goods
involving the technology, or by licensing it, reducing the amount.
What kinds of policy responses are possible and appropriate for DCs? In
negotiating protocols under the Convention, they should insist upon restricting the
availability of IPRs protection to biotechnology to categories in which full disclosure of
the use of genetic resources is required (e.g., patents) as opposed to trade secrets
protection. Further, the grant of patent must be made conditional on the existence of a
prior contract for access. This may be pursued in the GATT forums as well.
Additionally, they should unilaterally incorporate this restriction on IPRs protection for
biotechnology in their domestic legislation. It is only the unambiguous requirement of
disclosure that will compel gene users to enter into contracts for access.
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Legal liability versus administrative regulation:
the problem of institutional design in global
environmental policy
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Introduction
The salient features of environmental damage are first, that they are external effects of
the activities of others, and therefore a potential adversarial relationship exists between
the agents responsible for the activity and the victims experiencing the externality.
Second, that it is often extremely difficult, if not scientifically impossible, to
categorically link a particular impact (e.g., degradation of a resource, onset of a
disease) to a particular environmental cause (e.g., elevated GHGs concentrations, toxic
water pollution). Further, even when damage can be definitely linked to specific
environmental causes (e.g., 'signature diseases' such as mesothelioma caused by
asbestos exposure), it is often quite difficult to identify which of many polluting agents
bear responsibility. This is particularly true when the (variable) natural environment
(e.g., 'background radiation') is itself a significant source of environmental risk.
This characterization does not deny the fact that there may indeed exist
environmental damage situations in which the cause as well as the party at fault can be
unambiguously identified (e.g., the large scale toxic release at Bhopal). The point is
that institutional design for regulating environmental risks should concentrate on
situations of risk which are spatially and temporally diffuse, both in cause and in effect,
because such cases are ubiquitous.
This paper seeks to contrast two distinct regimes for regulating environmental
harms. The rival regimes are, first, a legal liability system, in which agents with claims
to compensation' for injury confront alleged injurers in (environmental) courts. Second,
and alternatively, an administrative regulation regime which seeks to regulate the
activities themselves by means of policy instruments, which may be fiats or incentives
based. In the latter regime, compensation (or adaptation costs) to victims may be
provided, relying on resources generated by the application of the regulatory
instruments. However, administrative regulation may employ such revenues for other
policy objectives as well, or instead. While the administrative regulation regime may
involve the oversight of courts by way of review of agency action and enforcement of
regulatory requirements, the principal regulatory institution is administrative in
character, rather than a court. The regimes are considered to be rival in the global
environmental domain by assumption, i.e. an institutional structure embodied in
protocols for a given environmental problem would involve one and not both regulatory
regimes. Employing both concurrently would place polluters in double jeopardy and, as
a matter of judgement, would probably be unacceptable. However, this assessment is
tentative and future negotiations could possibly look at various combinations of the two
regimes.
This paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 respectively discuss the
fundamentals of legal liability and administrative regulation regimes. Section 4 looks at
externality pricing, Section 5 at behavioral norms, and Section 6 at markets for rights,
'We exclude from this discussion the question of criminal liability from environmental harm.
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in each case, under both regimes. Section 7 reviews the international practice of legal
liability, while Section 8 does the same for administrative regulation, in each case in
relation to the environment. The last section discusses the feasibility of the alternative
regimes for multilateral regulation of Global Warming.
Fundamentals of legal liability
Legal liability is the concern of civil disputes in courts. The defendant is liable when a
court awards damages against him/her for harm or loss caused to a plaintiff. Legal
scholars view liability law as pursuing three distinct objectives: compensating victims,
deterring harmful actions, and spreading risk in society. Economists, by contrast, tend
to analyze liability law in terms of (economic) efficiency in incentives and risk-bearing
(Cooter: 1991). In liability law the term 'perfect compensation' refers to a payment to
the victim which restores him to his pre-harm level of welfare. In actual liability
awards, compensation may equal, be lower than, or exceed the perfect compensation
level. (In the latter case, the award is said to contain a 'punitive' element). In some
situations courts award an 'injunction' i.e., an order to the defendant to perform a
specific act, e.g., restore the previous condition of the property of the plaintiff. The
device of injunctions avoids the necessity of making a monetary determination of harm,
but clearly applies to a limited set of liability situations.
Three distinct concepts of legal liability figure in law. 'Strict liability' requires
the injurer to compensate the victim even if the injurer is not at fault in any moral or
legal reckoning.2 'Negligence rules' impose a legal norm of reasonable behaviour, and
injurers are liable only when they fail to comply with the norm. Finally, 'exchanges of
liability rights' refers to a strategy enabling trades in such rights (in the context of a
legal rule conferring such rights), as if they were property.
Legal institutions for determining legal liability are characterized by a focus on
resolving individual disputes between particular parties, requiring each plthntiff to
establish a reasonably clear cause and effect linkage between a defendant's activity and
the plaintiffs harm.3 The process is adversarial and the perspective is post-hoc, i.e.,
after the injury has occurred.
Fundamentals of administrative regulation
Administrative regulatory regimes, though backed by law, rely mainly on administrative
institutions. The administrative agency typically seeks to regulate the level of activity
causing environmental harm, either directly, by fiat type instruments, or indirectly, by
incentive based instruments. (Net) revenues may be yielded in the application of the
regulatory instruments, and may be employed in either compensating (actual or
potential) victims, or as accretion to general revenues, or both. Revenues may exceed,
equal, or fall short of the valuation of aggregate damage.
Three main classes of regulatory instruments which have been discussed in the
literature, (and also employed in conventional environmental situations) are 'pollution
taxes', 'standards', and 'tradeable permits'. Pollution taxes are levied on each unit of a
21t is an established legal principle that liability can be imposed even for damage caused as a result of
actions not necessarily prohibited by law, this is expanded upon below.
3In certain case involving significant damage, courts have shifted the burden of proof to the damage
causing party.
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specified pollutant discharged, thus pricing the external effect of the discharge to the
polluter. Standards represent a norm of pollution emissions, (e.g., tonnes of TSPs that
may be emitted by a given power plant in a year). This norm may be violated only at a
cost, representing a penalty which may be an actual monetary payment, or some other
(e.g., shutting down the offending plant). Tradeable permits are rights to pollute (by a
given agent, over a defined region in a year) assigned by, or purchased from the
regulator, which may be traded in a market for such rights.
Intuitively speaking, the three classes of regulatory instruments bear
correspondence with the three legal liability doctrines. Strict liability and pollution taxes
both price the externality to the polluter, while negligence rules and standards both
impose behavioral norms whose violation results in a penalty. On the other hand,
markets for liability rights and tradeable permits, both refer to voluntary exchanges of
property rights over the externality.
Comparing the institutions
In typical environmental harm situations with long periods of latency, transactions costs
under legal liability regimes may be high, in relation to individual harms. Individual
victims may, therefore, desist from suing, particularly if the burden of proof in such
cases is on the plaintiff. While class action suits may reduce individual litigation costs,
'sufficient' evidence still needs to be adduced to prove the fact of harm in respect of
each plaintiff, that the harm was due to the particular environmental externality, which
in turn is attributable to the activity of the defendant. The evidentiary burden is
non-trivial even in the 'clearest' of cases, and may be impossible where a cause and
effect relationship cannot be scientifically established. Further, in the case of long
latency periods, an identifiable, solvent defendant may not even exist, having declared
bankruptcy or been long dissolved. Finally, given that liability damages are finally
awarded, the defendant(s) pockets may not be deep enough, so that the plaintiffs remain
(partly) uncompensated.
An administrative regulation system, on the other hand, relies on public
institutions to reduce transactions costs in regulating environmental harms. Further, by
exacting penalties, taxes, or collecting the proceeds of auctioned tradeable permits, at
the time the activity causing harms is undertaken, it protects victims' interests from the
possibility of injurers disappearing or being unable to meet liability obligations after the
harm is manifest.
In addition, administrative regimes furnish an important source of flexibility in
public policy. Since penalties etc., are not linked directly to hanns, the revenues may
be employed for policies which maximize societal welfare, rather than to simply
compensate the specific harms. This may be especially relevant where victims are hard
to identify, e.g., where lung cancer is contracted by non-smokers through exposure,
among other things, to cigarette smoke exhaled by smokers. A pollution tax on
cigarettes may yield incremental general revenues. These may be spent, for example, on
infant care schemes, or sanitation, which may mean a large reduction in statistical
deaths in society. This may be preferable from a societal welfare perspective in
comparison to compensating by money, a group of older lung cancer patients whose,
condition is uncertainly (statistically) related to their exposure to cigarette smoke.
It may be agreed that a legal liability practice of perfect compensation
eliminates incentives to potential victims to engage in averting behavior, leading to loss
in efficiency. A second best solution may accordingly require liability awards to be
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based on less than perfect compensation levels. This could however be perceived as
unfair.
Externality pricing: strict liability and pollution taxes
Both strict liability and pollution taxes are viewed by economists as devices to achieve
efficiency by internalizing to the injurer the external social costs of the polluting
activity. In the case of strict liability, if perfect compensation prevails, enforcement by
courts is perfect and there are no transactions costs, (aggregate) MD (Marginal
Damage) to victims equals the MB (Marginal Benefit) to the injurer. In this case the
activity (pollution) level is efficient, assuming further that the polluter is risk neutral
and rational. The situation is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Efficiency in a strict liability regime
Note that compensation to victims flows directly from the liability award, and
no payment in excess of the value of damage is extracted from the polluter, if
compensation and enforcement are perfect.
A pollution tax regime, similarly achieves efficiency if the regulator has perfect
knowledge of the MD and MB curves, and fixes the tax rate at the level where they are
equal. Once again, we need to assume the absence of transactions costs and rerfect
enforcement, and that the polluter minimizes costs. In this case, revenues in excess of
the total damage to victims is yielded, given conventional shapes of the MD & MB
curves. The situation is shown in Figure 2.
Emissions lsvsl
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Figure 2. Efficient pollution tax
In the case of pollution taxes, compensation to victims requires a separate action
of the regulator, and is not automatic. Determination of compensation amounts on the
basis of valuation of actual damage may be costly.
Relaxing some assumptions
We now relax a few of the above assumptions. In the case of strict liability, actual
compensation awards may be lower or higher than the efficient (perfect compensation)
level. Under compensation may result from the practice of courts to disallow
'ephemeral' hanns (e.g., fear of injury), or 'speculative' losses (e.g., lost economic
opportunities) or where the harms are 'too remote' to have been foreseen by the injurer
as a probable effect of his actions. Over compensation may result if the court neglects
pre-existing risk, and attributes all of the harm to the polluting activity. In particular,
courts frequently adopt a '50% rule' i.e., full compensation when the probability of a
given injury from an activity exceeds 50%, and nothing if the likelihood is lower.
Clearly the result will be either over compensation or under compensation. In each
instance, the level of pollution will be inefficient. See Figs. 3 & 4 below:4
is interesting to note that in the case of undercompensation (overcompensation) the compensation paid
to the marginal victim is less (greater) than the "true amount", whereas the aggregate compensation paid out
may exceed (be less than) its "true" counterpart.
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Figure 3. Effect of under compensation in a strict liability
regime
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Figure 4. Effect of over compensation in a strict liability
regime
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The corresponding situation in the case of pollution taxes is that the regulator
may not (and indeed is unlikely to) know the exact shapes of the MD and MB curves.5
In consequence, the pollution tax may be set too high or too low, and the level of
polluting activity achieved will be inefficient. These situations are shown below in
Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 6. Effect of a pollution tax which is too low
Further, enforcement in liability trials may be imperfect, perhaps because of the
difficulty of establishing causation. In such cases, while prior to trials the pollution
level may be efficient, a succession of court verdicts (or one seminal verdict)
5lndeed, a similar situation could arise in the case of strict liability where the victim may not correctly
perceive the level of harm infilicted, or be able to "prove" a level of harm which is different (perhaps higher)
than the actual.
x. mission. level
(Actual) (Efficient)
Figure 5. Effect of a pollution tax which is too high
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disallowing damages for a given class of harms would induce increased polluting
activity.
In some situations, courts may shift the burden of proof to a class of defendants
where it is difficult to establish which member is responsible for a given damage. Even
so, the victim must establish a clear link between his condition and an activity.
Similarly, imperfect monitoring and/or enforcement of a pollution tax may be expected
to result in inefficiently high pollution levels.
Strict liability is often employed simultaneously with the doctrine of 'joint and
several liability', i.e., any one member of a class of defendants is liable to the full
extent of damage. The advantage is that it may ensure that a 'deep pocket' is available
to compensate victims. However, the effect of joint and several liability on polluters'
behaviour is uncertain. One effect could be that smaller polluters become reckless in
their polluting behaviour, and at the first signs of being called to liability, retreat into
bankruptcy.
Behavioral norms: negligence rules and standards
Each of these regimes impose a penalty when some norm of pollution discharge is
violated. Economic efficiency, in either case, requires that the norm should be set at the
level at which marginal benefits equals (aggregate) marginal damage. Further, if the
polluter is rational and risk averse, deterrence requires that the penalty for discharges
above the norm exceed the marginal benefit at that point. Figure 7 illustrates these
principles.
Figure 7. Efficient pollution norm and deterrent penalty
Note that as long as the emissions norm is adhered to, no payment, either as
compensation or as penalty, is due from the polluter. Accordingly, if efficient, the
entire social cost, if any of pollution is borne by the victims under the normative
regimes.
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The trick under negligence rules as well as under standards, is of course, to
determine an efficient norm. In liability regimes when a community based norm exists,
courts often adopt it. As long as no externalities befall third parties (i.e., apart from the
injurers and victims), such community based standards may be efficient, owing to the
structure of the incentives of the actors in which the norm emerges (Cooter: 1990).
Courts have formalized the notion of an efficient norm in the so called 'Hand Rule'. In
effect this rule states that an act is iinpermissible if the benefit to the injurer from the
act is less than the expected (i.e. in a statistical sense) marginal damage to the victims.
In the case of administrative regulation, attempts to determine the normative
standard by reference to the locations of marginal cost and marginal damage curves, are
likely to fail, owing to the rather intensive nature of the information required on the
part of the regulator.
Relaxing some assumptions
If the probability of enforcement is too low, a rational injurer may violate a pollution
norm, under both legal liability and administrative regulation regimes. Enforcement
may be imperfect in the case of a legal liability regime if the victims are unaware of
the injury, unable to prove its occurrence, unable to prove who caused it, or unable to
prove that the negligence standard was violated. Enforcement may be imperfect in
administrative regulation if monitoring is ineffective or expensive.
In either regime, the extent of compliance may be increased if the penalty for
violation of the norm includes an element of punishment. This is calculated by
imposing a penalty at least (lip) times the perfectly compensatory level, where p is the
(subjective, Bayesian) probability of enforcement, whether as liability award, or as
administratively imposed penalty. Suppose, on the other hand, the norm and/or penalties
are not sharp but fuzzy. In this case, under either regime, one may expect that if
polluters are better organized and have greater resources than potential victims,
considerable effort involving transactions costs would be expended by the polluters to
ensure that quantitative interpretations of the standard or penalty aie liberal.6 Clearly,
there is scope for rent-seeking by the regulator (legal or administrative) when the
statute possesses this feature.
'Exchanges in rights': markets for liability rights and tradeable
permits
In a legal liability regime, liability rights may be viewed as property, and a legal
framework for voluntary exchanges in such rights creates a market in liability rights. In
such a framework, a victim may be said to possess a liability right, and if he sells the
right and suffers harm, the injurer owes damages to whoever owns the liability right at
that time.
Similarly, an administrative policy instrument for pollutionregulation is the
'tradeable permit', in which an initial assignment of pollution rights (by auction,
political largesse, or howsoever) may be traded in a market for such rights. The
tradeable permits assigned must sum to the aggregate pollution emissions envisaged.
'In the context of global environmental issues, it is possible that reverse might also hold true in the case
where the victims - represented by nation-states - are well organised. In that case, the victims might
spend resources to "establish higher levels of damage than the actoal.
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Both regimes will achieve economic efficiency, given some assumptions. These
are first that in the case of liability rights perfect compensation may be claimed, and in
the case of pollution permits the aggregate quantity of emissions allowed conforms to
the efficient level. Further, that the markets in such rights are competitive, there is
symmetry in transactions costs (or that these are absent), and in the case of a legal
liability regime, that damages are perfectly compensated by the courts. By the Coase
Theorem (Coase: 1960), as long as transactions costs do not block exchange, the initial
assignment of property rights is irrelevant from the efficiency standpoint. Thus, the fact
that under a legal liability regime the traded property is the victims' (matured or
potential) liability rights, while in an administrative regulation regime it is the injurers
right to pollute, makes no difference to the efficiency outcome. Of course, the initial
assignment of such property rights will affect the distributive consequences of
regulation. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate these cases.
x.
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Figure 8. Efficiency under a tradeable permits regime
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Figure 9. Efficiency under a regime of exchanges in
liability rights
Relaxing some assumptions
Efficiency may result from exchanges in externality rights, but only when the markets
for such rights are competitive. Causes of market failure may include market power:
monopolies (monopsonies), or cartelization, as well as ineffective monitoring &
enforcement. Additionally, some legal doctrines may, for example, by forbidding the
plaintiff from assigning the entire value of a liability claim to his attorney as a
contingency fee ('rule against champerty'), block the formation of efficient markets.
Alternatively, the regulated agents may not conform to the paradigm of cost
minimization, for example in the case of price regulated utilities, or nation states
subject to an international regulatory regime. These sources of market failure are
common to both regimes.
International practice of legal liability
The basic principle that guides much of international environmental law arises from
three main cases: the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the Lac Lenoux Case and the Corfu
Channel Case. Of these the Trail Smelter Case is the most important. The Arbitration
grew out of air pollution from sulphur dioxide fumes from a smelter in Trail, British
Columbia, owned by a Canadian corporation. The United States claimed compensation
from Canada on the basis that the fumes had caused damage in the State of
Washington. Canada was held responsible by the Special Arbitral Tribunal appointed
for the case and was directed to pay injunctive relief and an indemnity. The main
principle on which the judgement was based was that a state has a duty to protect other
states against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction. The Lac Lenoux
case arose out of a treaty between France and Spain of 1866, relating to the flow of
boundary water which safeguarded the right of Spain to the natural flow of water into
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the river Carol, an outlet of Lac Lenoux. A French proposal to use the waters for hydro
generation was objected to by Spain, because it would change the natural flow. The
arbitral award, in favour of France, held that the new use would still provide the
previous quantity of water and therefore did not violate the treaty. The principle
relevant to environmental law was that the state making the change from the norm was
required to ensure that the new situation did not leave the other affected parties worse
off.
In the Corfu Channel Case, the United Kingdom sought to hold Albania
responsible for damage caused to warships by mines moored in the Corfu Channel in
Albanian territorial waters. The International Court of Justice decided in 1949 that
Albania had a responsibility to notify shipping in general of the existence of a
minefield in its territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the
imminent danger, something that it had failed to do. In other words, nothing was done
by Albania to prevent the disaster, which made it responsible. The case established a
duty to inform of activities (here these were past activities) that were likely to cause
serious harm to the nationals of another country.
The principle that emerges from the three cases is that states are obliged to take
measures, to the extent possible, to conform to international principles and standards
and to prevent or reduce injury to the environment of another state or areas beyond its
jurisdiction. They are obliged to conduct activities so as not to cause injury to such
states or areas. States are held responsible for the violation of this principle and of
injury caused by such violation.
The causing of injury naturally leads to the question of reparation for damages
suffered i.e. liability. As indicated earlier, this paper concentrates on civil aspects of
liability.
The history of international liability for environmental harm and the current
status of the law indicates that such liability is an extremely problematic area of
international law. The Stockholm Conference in 1972 recognised it as an area that
required development, but all that could be ultimately agreed upon was an undertaking
to 'further develop the international law of liability and compensation'. The effort
since has been to develop general principles, something that has proved extremely
difficult in the absence of state practice and international adjudication. The Trail
Smelter remains the main arbitral award.
The main problem of attaching liability in international law is that much of the
external harm is caused by activities performed in the exercise of their legal rights by
states or agents within states.
Two doctrines address the situation.
The first doctrine addresses the case when rights are abused i.e. when a person
makes use of his/her property rights solely to cause harm to another person. This is not
usually the situation in international environmental harm, because the person causing
harm is not motivated by the desire to harm persons injured beyond international
frontiers.
The second doctrine makes an otherwise rightful use of one's property rights
wrong if it causes harm, unless the user compensates -the person injured by the use.
The International Law Commission (ILC) has been studying the problem of
international harm under the rubric of 'international liability for injurious consequences
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law' (Henkiir 1989). It has
provisionally considered whether a state's obligation in connection with transboundary
Legal liability vs. administrative regulation 205
injury to other states should include a duty to prevent, to inform, to negotiate and to
repair. Thus far, it has concluded, that only the failure to 'repair' the injurious
consequences would result in international liability.
Apart from general principles, specific liability arrangements have been provided
for in various treaty arrangements in international environmental law. These in turn
have had an effect on the progressive development of these principles. An examination
of some of these frameworks illustrates the type of treaties that allow for different
interpretations of the liability rule and the related problems of making states agree to
open themselves to claims for compensation.
Strict liability
The number of treaties/international arrangements that have provided for strict liability
are extremely limited, with not much expected in the future that would pull the law in
that direction. The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Objects Launched into Outer Space is the only multilateral convention open to all states
that imposes full liability on launching states. Other conventions that provide for 'strict
liability' do so in respect of the private operator of the damage causing facility and
some of these provide that the operators' state is liable on a subsidiary basis if the
operator or his insurer cannot pay. An example of this is the Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, l963.
The imposition of strict liability would therefore imply a major shift from
classical principles of state responsibility under international law, under which
responsibility and consequent liability for compensation arises only in the case of a
violation of a rule of international law. The ILC has framed the problem in terms of
primary and secondary norms. The primary norm has traditionally been the viQlation of
a rule of international law and secondary norms include the imputation of responsibility
to the state and the obligation to compensate damage. Strict liability would make the
payment of reparation the primary norm.
This principle finds expression in domestic legal systems, which recognise that
the activity in question need not be illegal for the injurer to be held liable. Strict
liability regimes evolved to regulate activities that were considered inherently extremely
dangerous. The argument was that since the operator benefited from the activity s/he
should bear the cost of injury, especially since s/he was in a better place to manage the
risks In many countries this has been extended to cover many acts involving general
(not necessarily ultra-hazardous) risks.
These reasons for the imposition of strict liability have been modified and
translated into the international arena. Strict liability has been called for in cases of
disastrous accidents involving ultra-hazardous technologies. The argument is that the
problems victims would face to prove negligence would be far too great and would
make compensation unlikely or meaningless. There are problems with this doctrine,
evidenced by the failure of affected states to claim compensation in cases that could
have involved the above principles, as in Chernobyl and Basel.
7Th1s section draws from Oscar Schachier: The Emergence of International Environmental Law, Journal
of kuernaional Affairs, Winter 1991.
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Qualified versions of strict liability
These have evolved as a consequence of governments refusing to accept strict liability
formulations for most kinds of damage. The regime being developed by the ILC would
have the state of origin compensate an affected state for appreciable harm caused by its
(or its agents') activities. This would apply to internationally lawful activities and the
harm must in principle be fully compensated (Barboza: 1990). The qualifications are as
follows. First, reparations would be decided by negotiation between the state of origin
and the affected state. Second, states are required to be guided by equity based criteria
in determining the reparation. Compensation might be reduced if the nature of the
activity and the circumstances of the case would mandate or imply equity through cost
sharing. These special circumstances could arise when significant amounts have already
been spent by the injurer on risk reduction, when damage in the affected state is less
than other beneficial side effects or when states are limited in their ability to take
preventive measures. In essence the ILC proposal would impose strict liability for all
transboundary injury, but would leave it to the states involved to decide reparation in
each individual case, on the basis of equity and balance of interests. A refusal even to
negotiate would be considered a dereliction of international obligation.
The main problem with such a formulation would be the setting up of an
institutional arrangement to oversee these cases. Experts consider it likely that the ILC
draft articles will be adopted by the Commission as a recommended basis for either an
international convention or simply to guide state practice (Schachter: 1990). It is
improbable that they will become a binding treaty, but they may become a model for
specialised treaty regimes applicable to well-defined activities involving a significant
risk of transboundary injury.
Negligence standards
State liability under negligence standards is more closely related to classical notions of
state responsibility for wrongful conduct. Certain environmental impacts that have
international consequences are dealt with under different treaty arrangements. These
establish rules and standards for activities that create risks of transboundary harm. Such
rules and standards vary from detailed ones such as those established for nuclear plants
to broad, general formulations of due diligence/due care. In these situations, a failure to
comply with such rules or standards could be wrongful international conduct, with state
responsibility and consequent liability arising from it.
There are two interpretations of the negligence standard formulation. The first is
the obvious one that if a state is party to a convention that establishes or agrees to
follow certain standards, it would be responsible and liable for damage arising out of a
violation of the rule. The second is that generally adopted standards by international
organizations would be a basis for liability even though the standards were not legally
or otherwise binding for the violating state.
Due care
Negligence standards have been further adapted into approaches that would give effect
to standards adopted by international organizations not as law but as a criteria of the
due diligence or due care required of all states in regard to activities that create an
appreciable risk of transborder injury (Schachter: 1990). This can be thought of as
going beyond a system that would use internationally binding rules and standards.
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An advantage of following a due care standard is that it focuses on the specific
activity and its circumstances, while not condemning the activity. In addition, it would
probably allow the activity to be balanced against foreseeable injurious circumstances.
Going along the same path is a proposal to shift the burden of proof from the victim to
the source of injury, something that has been established by Japanese courts in the
domestic context. An additional advantage is that under due care, it is not necessary to
mandate a specific standard. It is enough to prove that adequate precautions were not
taken.
International legal persons
An issue that queers the pitch in international law (unlike in domestic legal systems) is
the question of identifying an 'international legal person' 8 Such an entity is capable of
possessing rights and duties and has the capacity to bring certain types of cases in the
international sphere. In the traditional view only sOvereign states could be subjects of
international law, though in practice, many other entities have at various times been
recognised as legal persons of a qualified nature for specific purposes.9 As in any legal
system, not all categories of subjects of international law have identical rights.
Contemporary international law has seen a widening of the concept of
international personality beyond the sovereign nation state. This has been necessitated
in part by the entry into the international sphere of entities such as public international
organizations, multinational corporations, international NGOs, regional organizations
and movements of insurgent communities and national liberation.
The extension of legal personality to individuals is a further issue. The
progressive internationalization of human rights and the development of a body of law
around this issue has pushed the law towards increasing (albeit qualified) acceptance of
the individual as an occasional subject of international law. Some multilateral
institutional arrangements specifically allow individuals to bring complaints against
their own governments, following the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Examples of
such arrangements are found in the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A small body of case law has developed under the
latter convention.
Forums for individual redress for transfrontier environmental damage have also
developed most in Europe. The emerging principle here is that in so far as states
recognise an international duty to prevent or reduce transfrontier environmental damage,
a case can be made for rights of redress by injured parties who are not residents or
nationals of the originating or damage causing state. Several West European countries
afford citizens of neighbouring states access to their courts and administrative
proceedings on the same footing as citizens. Under the Nordic Convention on the
Protection of the Environment of 1974, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland handle
national pollution discharges causing damage beyond national frontiers in the same way
that they handle discharges causing local damages. In environmental suits for
8AIso known as a subject of international law.
9Such entities have included public international organizations such as those in the Untied Nations system,
supranational entities such as the European Community and movements of national liberation such as the
African National Congress.
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compensation or injunctive relief, the Nordic Convention guarantees citizens of the four
countries equal access to their countries courts (World Resources 1987). In 1976, the
European Court of Justice decided that within the European Community, the victims of
transboundary pollution may sue either in their own national courts or in the tribunals
of polluter states.
International practice of administrative regulation
There are extremely few examples of administrative regulation in the international
sphere. The only international arrangements that establish regulatory regimes for
environment related issues are the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
The former (also known as the Acid Rain Convention), signed in Geneva by 34
countries under the framework of the Economic Council for Europe was the was the
first multilateral agreement on air pollution, as also the first environmental accord
involving all the nations of East and West Europe and North America. The subsequent
Thirty Percent Protocol to the Convention (1985) in which the signatories pledged to
reduce sulphur emissions by thirty percent is one of the few instances involving
multilateral acceptance of a specific quantitative environmental goal.
Problems related to increased acidity of lakes and streams were brought to the
Stockholm Convention by Norway and Sweden, since these countries asserted that the
problem emanated from beyond their borders. The agreement was a compromise
between the insistence of Norway and Sweden on 'standstill' (emissions freezes) and
'rollback' (emissions reduction) clauses and the reluctance of West Europe's largest
polluters, West Germany and the United Kingdom to commit themselves to any formal
agreement. Norway and Sweden argued for a number of years that the benefits of
abatement outweighed the costs, and finally, by the time of the Stockholm Conference
on the Acidification of the Environment in 1982, most countries were convinced of the
advantages of following the treaty provisions.'0 Subsequent conferences in Ottawa,
Munich and Amsterdam built international consensus for concerted action and led to
the Thirty Percent Protocol.
The other international agreement involving specific timetables and standards for
environmental protection is the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer. The purpose of the Protocol is to inhibit production,
consumption and trade in some of the compounds that deplete stratospheric ozone.
Ozone depleting compounds are divided into two groups of 'controlled substances,'
Group I (certain CFC5) and Group II compounds (specific halons), each subject to
different limitations. The Protocol makes a distinction between two groups of countries,
the first with relatively high levels of consumption of ozone depleting substances and
the second, developing countries with relatively low levels of consumption.
The principal difference between the developed and the developing countries is
the timing of production and consumption limitations. From mid-1989, the developed
countries have had to freeze production and consumption at 1986 levels. Group I
compounds must be cut to 50 per cent of 1986 levels over the next 10 years; Groups Ii
substances may remain at 1986 levels. The developing countries are given a 10-year
grace period (beginning in 1989) during which they are free to increase production and
'°West Germany and Canada by now were facing their own acid rain problems and had a greater interest
in the successful conclusion of the treaty.
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consumption within certain limits Then, they too must cut production and consumption
of Group I compounds over a further 1Oyear period and freeze consumption and
production of Group II compounds. These obligations of developing countries are
conditional on prior fulfilment of transfers of finaces and technology by industrialized
countries. The Montreal Protocol can (and may already have started to) significantly
inhibit the worldwide growth in the consumption of compounds that deplete
stratospheric ozone around the earth.
Regulating global warming
We now briefly look at the problem of designing a multilateral regulatory framework
for Climate Change.
The issue of Climate Change is characterized by first, the global,
multigenerational spread of potential injurers and victims. Second, by great uncertainty
in the extent, nature, and spatial and temporal distribution of the impacts. Since the
implicated emissions result from major, essential economic activities: manufacturing,
transport, agriculture, domestic heating, etc., significant costs are involved in any
contemporary regulation of the sources of emissions. On the other hand, if emissions
are unabated, actual damages may be high, possibly catastrophic, and even adaptation
measures to preclude harm may involve large resources. However, great scientific
uncertainty attaches to causal links between emissions and actual impacts.
The nature and choice of regime will involve a prior equity determination. There
is therefore an underlying value judgement in all approaches to global environmental
regulation, especially since the damages are unlikely to be symmetrical over space and
time. Equity can be involved in both an initial formulation which allocates differential
responsibilities, and by the choice of a particular regime/instrument. In the case. of the
former, equity may be determined by a tentative formulation that requires states to
contribute negotiated amounts to, say, a global environment fund that wduld then be
used to mitigate the effects of global warming, or for abatement measures. In the case
of the latter, the choice of instrument will be deeply intertwined with the equity
outcome or determination.
In this case, equity could be implicated in two different ways. First, there is an
issue of justice or fairness (in the sense of legal torts) between those causing the
damage and those who suffer from it. While in this case, the parties involved could be
individuals or other entities within states, in this paper we assume that the regulating
regime recognises soverign nations as parties or agents. Second, there are equity
considerations between nations or groups of nations, in the sense of sharing of global
resources, implying real resource flows. The structure of the regime will have to be so
devised that it will affect equity at the particular level that is desired. This can be
illustrated by comparing equity under strict liability and under carbon taxes.
A strict liability regime, by definition, would address only the first type of
equity identified above. As pointed out in an earlier section, one of the main legal
rationales for liability is to compensate victims vis a vis those causing the damage, i.e.
to perform compensatory justice. Figure 1 showed the liability award under perfect
compensation. There, the dotted area under the marginal benefit curve is the amount
paid out to those suffering the damage. Note the entire remaining area under the curve
remains with the producer.
Note further that in the case of a carbon tax (Figure 2), a greater portion of the
excess revenue collected (the dotted area) can be used for effecting distributional
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objectives, after victims suffering damage have been compensated. In the global
context, therefore, a tax can be used to fulfil both equity objectives, provided the excess
revenues are converted into flows to countries that are entitled to such funds and
therefore is more flexible. Similarly, different equity outcomes can be realised under
each of the other instruments, whether legal or administrative. We now go on to
examine more specific equity implications of the rival regimes.
Consider first, the possibility of a legal liability regime, imposed through global
environmental courts established by international agreement, whose awards are binding.
Since the actual victims and injurers (individuals, economic agents) are likely to be
numerically very large, such a regime would need to recognize sovereign states as legal
representatives of the actual victims and injurers, by analogy with class action suits. A
problem at the outset would be that of enforcement; given the fact that the institutional
mechanism for international enforcement is poor, short of coercive, adversarial
measures such as sanctions and war.
In such a regime, irrespective of the actual legal doctrine adopted (i.e., strict
liability, standards, or markets for rights), states with claims for damages would first
need to prove before the court that the damages are indeed attributable to Global
Warming. Because of great uncertainty and complexity of climatic processes, it is
unlikely that scientific standards of proof would be forthcoming. Thus, for example,
desertification of a region could be claimed as resulting from Global Warming. On the
other hand, in a particular instance, it may also have more proximate anthropogenic
causes, e.g., deforestation, livestock grazing, etc. Science may be unable to apportion
responsibility for the damage in such cases to different antecedent causes. In addition,
global climate is not constant in any case, and is subject to natural viability. The
question of whether a particular impact is attributable to crossing of a natural threshold
by anthropogenic interventions may be hard to determine.
Suppose that in a given suit, despite these problems of proof, a court accepts the
plea of a particular impact having resulted from Global Warming Assume further that
anthropogenic emissions of GHGs from different countries over time are well
documented. In that case, the further question of assigning responsibility for the
damage would arise, which would be fundamentally affected by the initial equity
determination. This is because of the concept of 'excess emissions,' i.e., not GHGs
emissions as such, but their excess over the share of global natural sinks assigned to the
polluter should be the basis of apportioning responsibility. The question of equity is
involved in sharing these sinks. The problem is made more complex by the fact that the
capacity of the sinks is not constant, but at least upto a limit, increases with increase in
emissions. Further, since different countries emit different proportions of individual
GHGs species, and relative environmental impacts of different GHGs depend on the
period of integration, a further equity issue is involved in choosing the integration
period.
Additional problems with a legal liability regime arise from the fact that since
states are considered as legal representatives of classes of agents, the long time periods
involved in Global Warming may seriously undermine such representative roles. States
themselves may undergo fundamental political change, including of their borders, in a
few decades while the identities of polluters may be erased in the same time spans.
Major evolution in 'successor state' doctrines would thus be necessary for any legal
liability regime to work.
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Further problems may be anticipated in applying each of the three legal liability
doctrines to Global Warming regulation. Strict liability cannot be enforced by
injunctions to restore the pristine condition of the damaged resource, because the
impacts of Global Warming are likely to be irreversible. On the other hand, adaptation
costs are likely to seriously undervalue the damage suffered. Some impacts (e.g.,
changes in cropping cycles) may entail lifestyle and cultural changes, and thus, be
essentially uncompensable. Applying an international version of the 'joint and several'
liability doctrine (together with strict liability) may be grossly iniquitous, as damages
may be awarded against the most vulnerable, rather than the largest polluters. Also, as
described in the previous section, precedents for the imposition of strict liability in the
international sphere are few and treaty framers are unlikely to accept a formulation that
would constitute a major departure from current positions in international law.
If, on the other hand, a negligence standard is adopted, the issue of emissions
entitlements of different countries cannot be avoided. Unless the (aggregate) standard
were fixed at a threshold only over which damages would be perceptible, this would
mean that all of the costs of damage would be borne by the victims. This threshold, if
it exists, is likely to be highly uncertain in location, and a globally risk averse strategy
may entail too low an (aggregate) standard, meaning that polluters may encounter
unduly (i.e., inefficiently) high abatement costs." Negligence standards, however,
score in the sense that they are where current international law doctrines and state
practice seem to be at, and would therefore be more acceptable to international lawyers.
Given that large uncertainties would prevail regarding causation and in the
actual Climate Change impacts in different times and on different regions, it is unlikely
that markets for liability rights from Climate Change would be efficient. Further, since
asymmetry of information on impacts between developed and developing countries is
likely, and also because developed countries are better organized, have greater
resources, and are fewer in number, cartelization of the liability rights market is likely,
and thus the distributive effects may also be regressive.
A frequent criticism of liability regimes of any sort is that they often involve
disproportionately high transactions costs. However, in the case of global warming, this
might not be a significant issue, since the transactions costs may be small relative to
the value of possible damage.
Consider now the alternative of administrative regulation of GHGs emissions by
a multilateral agency under a negotiated Protocol. Carbon taxes and tradeable permits
for GHGs would constitute market based instruments, while emissions standards would
be a fiat based approach. In each case, the regulated agents would be the contracting
states. Considerations of sovereignty would require that the regulation Qf domestic
agents (firms, consumers) to ensure compliance with national obligations under the
protocol, be left to domestic authorities.
Standard environmental economics results are that market based instruments
ensure cost minimization for achieving any given environmental quality (or aggregate
111n the case of a regime based on standards, an interesting situation might arise if an global negligence
standard nevertheless allows for serious local envimnmental impacts. For example, a state might choose to
fulfil its international commitment by regulating only in a part of the country, and may leave industries in
other areas to continue to pollute, with harmful local effects.
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emissions).'2 This result, however, hinges critically on the assumption that the
regulated agents minimize costs, and additionally, in the case of tradeable permits, that
the markets for permits are competitive. Neither assumption can be reasonably
considered to be valid in the Global Warming context. Sovereign states are not profit
maximizing finns, and these are good (positive as well as normative) reasons why they
would not minimize costs (Ghosh: 1991). Further, cartelization of tradeable permits
markets (whether during initial auctions or in subsequent exchanges) is clearly feasible
for reasons similar to the liability rights market. One may conclude, therefore, that
without further research, it is imprudent to suppose that market based instruments
would minimize (global) costs of abatement.
The focus on efficiency in the environmental (and indeed in the neoclassical)
economics literature generally is based on the premise that governments have at their
disposal a suite of policy instruments (direct taxes, subsidies, etc.) which enable the
country to ensure that its equity objectives are met, corresponding to any level of
national income (efficiency). In that case, increases in efficiency are unambiguously
desirable.
In the global context, this assumption is clearly untenable because, as stated
above, the choice of any regulatory regime would involve a prior determination of the
equity issue. Considerations of convenience would suggest that the choice of policy
instruments is restricted to those which would yield significant revenues to the
regulator. This would enable funds to be kept aside for adaptation strategies or
compensation, as well as for meeting the requirements of equity. These instruments are
carbon taxes, and auctioned tradeable permits.
The likelihood of cartelization of the permits market may, however, result in
financial resource flows from poor to rich countries, and would impede equity: On the
other hand, a permits system has the advantage of ensuring a pre-determined level of
aggregate emissions. This cannot be accomplished by carbon taxes, although over time,
the level of aggregate emissions for a given level of tax would be fairly predictable.
Carbon taxes also allow the possibility of different tax rates for different (classes of)
countries, as another means for equity, although the effects of such a scheme have not
been analyzed in the literature.
The discussion in this section is premised on monitoring and enforcement in
multilateral regulation being perfect, under both legal liability and administrative
regulation. The feasibility of at least effective monitoring and enforcement is a critical
question, and needs sustained research.
Combinations of different policy instruments (e.g. pollution taxes combined with
standards) have also been discussed in the environmental economics literature. Quite
likely, one may also devise liability regimes which combine different doctrines (e.g.
strict liability with markets for rights). The present study must however terminate at
this point, and these possibilities for Global Warming regulation left for future research.
12!!, additionally, there is no unceztainty about the locations of the MB & MD curves, each of these
classes of instruments (market based as weif as fiats) may be adjusted for efficiency. This requirement of
information is so stringent, that at least in the global warming context it may be a non-sequitur.
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The Road from Rio
The Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI) in associa-
tion with the UNDP (United Nations Development
Programme) and the IDRC (International Development Re-
search Centre), Canada conducted an international seminar
in October1992, New Delhi, shortly after the Earth Summit
at Rio de janeiro in June 1992. The theme was environment
and development policy issues in Asia after Rio.
The seminar was attended by a number of eminent
researchers and policymakers from around the world, who
are active in the field of sustainable development. A large
number of papers, including several by persons who actu-
ally negotiated the Rio agreements, on the themes of the Rio
process and its outcomes, were presented. The products of
the seminar include reports by three Working Groups which
relate to the future course of action on sustainable develop-
ment in Asia, and a Compact on Sustainable Development
Concerns in the Asian Region, a non-official declaration of
the concerns and perceptions of a number of eminent
Asians. The present volume is a compilation of the papers
presented atthe seminar, the speeches made atthe inaugural
and valedictory sessions, and the outcomes. It will be of
interest to researchers, policymakers, and serious activists in
the movement for sustainable development.
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